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1. Without 'obligatory' references to feminist adages about the original matriarchial character of 
Basque society, it can be maintained that Basque agriculture mainly thrives on female labour. 
2. The custom among successors of Basque farming enterprises to marry relatively late in life 
makes it more difficult for them to mobilize sufficient labour power just when they need it 
most, i.e. in the years following succession (this thesis, Chapter 5). 
3. Farmers who dissociate themselves from the industrialized food production chain and its 
corresponding treadmill of investment and expansion by taking up the generation of quality 
products may subsequently become subject to alternative but equally coercive treadmills (this 
thesis, Chapter 7; also Mak, 1996). 
4. The combination of a) the objectivation of quality norms for agricultural products, 
disconnecting them from the farmers' craftmanship, and b) the quality producers' own 
strategies aimed at the routinization of labour intensive production and commercialization 
activities, makes the industrialized production of quality products more likely (this thesis. 
Chapter 7). 
5. If labelling shapes policy, then policy reinforces the 'truth' of the labels in force (this thesis. 
Chapter 4; also Wood, 1985b). 
6. As human action is in no small measure the result of intuition, habit and trial and error, 
sociological and economic models that are exclusively based on the rational decisions of 
actors can only explain a small percentage of this action (cf. this thesis, Chapter 10, 
footnote 1). 
7. Too much faith in statistics may obscure the understanding of social phenomena, too little 
understanding of statistics may lead to unwarranted faith in one's own prejudice. 
8. Extensive footnotes in scientific texts are not necessarily a proof of the author's erudition, 
but may just as well reflect his or her inability to integrate these remarks elegantly into the 
main text. 
9. The maintenance of an extensive illegal sector of goods or people is an effective means of 
job creation for police, judiciary and organized crime. 
10. An analysis of street violence among Basque adolescents should comprise a variety of 
intervening factors, such as, the protagonists' disaffection with their personal and the wider 
political situation, the strategic manipulation of their disaffection for political ends, and the 
function of violence as expression and reinforcement of group cohesion. The phenomenon 
can not be explained by reference to only one of these factors. 
11. As a result of Anglo-saxon influences, the use of 'pidgin' among immigrants, and the 
minimum incidence of compound sentences in 'soap' and 'talk show' programmes on 
television, the typically Germanic constructions in the Dutch language (such as the inversion 
of subject and verb after an adverbial complement, or the auxiliary verb shifting to the end of 
a subordinate clause) will gradually disappear. 
12. The adoration of sportsmen and women, pop musicians and television personalities may 
successfully be analyzed with concepts from the sociology of religion. 
13. Against the background of the ageing population in Europe, it is in the interest of Public 
Health to test the hypothesis that the high 'infantilization rate' of popular television 
programmes for adults accelerates the process of dementia among the people exposed to 
them. 
14. The way political correctness is advocated often comes dangerously close to the reasoning 
behind politically highly incorrect ideologies. 
15. Ook iandbouwwetenschappers laten zich bij de verzameling van hun onderzoeksgegevens 
soms knollen voor citroenen verkopen. 
16. A pesar de los avances en genfrtica, no est6 prdximo el momento en que los agricultores 
puedan pedirle peras al olmo. 
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Map 1. THE BASQUE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY 
P A R T I 
"Agriculture in Europe and in the rest of the world is in trouble. (...) 
"In some regions of the European Economic Community (EEC) there is an 
overproduction that creates surpluses, with few people working the land, 
producing food of poor quality and damaging the environment. On the other 
hand, in other regions farmers cannot maintain a decent standard of living 
from agriculture and are abandoning the work on the land. Since 1960, an 
average of 1300 people a day have given up agriculture in the EEC. The trend 
towards concentration in some regions and rural depopulation in others 
continues." 
(From the Resolution of the 1991 Zestoa Conference on Agriculture and Rural 
Environment.) 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The citation above comes from the resolution that was presented at the end 
of an international conference on Agriculture and Rural Environment, 
celebrated in Spain in May 1991. This conference brought together 
representatives of farmers' unions, consumers' organizations, and ecological 
groups from over 15 European countries to discuss their common interests, 
and the ways to bridge the differences still existing between them. The 
location of the conference was a small village in the Spanish Basque Country, 
one of the "other regions" referred to in the resolution, where difficult 
conditions for making a living on the land are feared to lead to the 
abandonment of many farmsteads and even of entire villages. It offered, that 
is, the participants the opportunity to observe in situ some of the effects of 
the EEC's agricultural development on one of the so-called disadvantaged 
areas within Europe. The final resolution of the meeting expressed the wish to 
develop a more "regionally-based sustainable agriculture", a new fabric for the 
European agrarian structure in which the interests of farmers, consumers and 
the rural environment, which under the present-day system dominated by 
industrialised food production are at best contradictory, can be reconciled. 
During the conference, organized by the Basque farmers' confederation 
EHNE and the Workgroup on Agriculture of the Green Fraction in the European 
Parliament, the EEC's policy on agriculture and the Northern European agrarian 
superpowers, with their huge production surpluses that invade the markets of 
agriculturally less developed nations and regions, were repeatedly accused of 
being responsible for the agricultural and ecological problems of the latter. 
1.1 Research problem and methodology 
Spain and Portugal became members of the European Economic Community 
on 1 January 1986, just when the former Common Agricultural Policy of the 
EEC, which had stimulated agricultural production and protected the farmers' 
incomes through a system of intervention prices, had been abandoned and a 
new policy came into force that confronted the European farmers with 
production restrictions for surplus products and a more direct application of 
market prices. It was generally assumed that this policy would have negative 
consequences for the large number of small farmers, not only in the two new 
member countries, but all over Europe. 
My initial research proposal focused on how farmers in an agriculturally 
relatively weak region experienced these expected negative consequences of 
their incorporation into the European Common Market, what strategies they 
developed to maintain their farms under (presumably) adverse conditions 
imposed upon them and what intervention policies were carried out by 
regional institutions, such as cooperatives, farmers' unions or associations, in 
order to defend the specific interests of certain groups of farmers. As an 
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example of such an 'agriculturally weak region' the Spanish Basque Country 
was chosen. 
The Basque Country, or Euskadi, comprises the seven provinces on both 
sides of the Western Pyrenees where the Basque language is spoken. The four 
Basque provinces in Spain are divided into two 'autonomous communities': 
the Basque Autonomous Community ('Comunidad Autdnoma Vasca'), which 
includes Gipuzkoa, Bizkaia and Alava; and the province of Navarra, which is 
an autonomous community in its own right. The greater part of the fieldwork 
for this study was done in rural areas in the province of Gipuzkoa. The mild 
and humid climate of the coastal provinces of Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia is 
responsible for the intense green colours that are so characteristic of their 
mountainous landscape. This is the region of the baserriak (or 'caserfos' in 
Spanish), the Basque farmsteads, which lie scattered on the slopes of the hills 
and mountains that surround the small valleys where the urban centres are 
located. In her influential study on Basque agriculture, Etxezarreta calls the 
baserria "the basic, unique, and traditional form of the Basque farm and the 
nucleus of the family and rural social organization" (Etxezarreta, 1977: 8). 
Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia are predominantly cattle-raising provinces where the 
main activities of farm families are the production of milk and the breeding of 
calves. Besides a plot of maize and turnips to feed the cattle, and several 
hectares of meadows, virtually all baserriak also have some hectares of 
woodland with the fast-growing Californian pine-trees (or 'pino Insignis' as 
they are locally called). In certain areas, especially in the province of 
Gipuzkoa, sheep-raising for the production of cheese and lamb is an important 
agrarian activity. Most farm families keep a few chickens and rabbits, perhaps 
raise one or two pigs and have a small vegetable garden for home 
consumption. 
I was mainly interested in an analysis of the interplay of institutional policies 
and individual or collective farmers' strategies, which, I hoped, would enable 
me to identify the determining factors that explained the outcome of these 
multi-level interactions. 
A pilot study I carried out revealed that, after two years of Spanish 
membership of the EEC, Basque farmers were still doubtful as to how exactly 
this affected their way of farming. They had experienced stagnating prices for 
their milk and beef cattle over the last few years, but they seldom attributed 
this to the Common Market; and most of them had heard about the milk quota 
that would be imposed on Spanish dairy farmers and industries, but they 
believed that the quota system would not become effective for at least a 
couple of years. For the majority of the Basque farmers, Europe might have 
come a little closer, but as far as their concrete farming practices were 
concerned, the Common Agricultural Policy was still regarded as of minor 
importance. Hardly ever had farmers consciously designed their production 
and commercialization strategies in reaction to EEC policies and market 
influences. In the policies of most regional agrarian institutions, on the other 
hand, the CAP appeared as a permanent and prominent point of reference. 
What farmers perceived of the European agricultural policy was what was 
filtered down to them, in different ways and with different effects, through 
these institutions. 
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Thus, instead of trying to detect strategies that I had expected farmers to 
design in reaction to outside influences, I needed to look for strategies derived 
from longer-term family farm objectives - whereby the consequences of the 
region's incorporation into the EEC would be seen as just one complex of 
factors among many others which might lead to the readjustment of these 
strategies and objectives. 
In their comprehensive and highly readable review on "The farm as a 
family business", Gasson et al. (1988) conclude that almost all authors 
challenge or amend the classical assumption of profit maximization when 
writing about the objectives of the family farm, though they seldom agree on 
what prime objectives should be assumed instead. The most convincing 
alternative, in my view, can be found in the findings of a large-scale study of 
family firms (not only farms), carried out by Hay and Morris. According to 
these authors, the primary objectives of family firms were "to maintain control 
and to pass on a secure and sound business to the next generation" (cited by 
Gasson et al., 1988: 4). Judging from the trouble most Basque farmers go to 
so as to find a suitable successor, I assume that this idea of passing on the 
family farm to the next generation also occupies a prominent place on their 
'ladder of values'. In addition, I posit that the short-term, day-to-day function 
of a family farm is to generate enough income to satisfy the consumption 
needs of its members (see also Bennett, 1982: 5). 
In this study I will explore how farm households mobilize their networks of 
social relationships in order to develop production and marketing strategies 
that are aimed at the realization of these two objectives. I understand that this 
mobilization takes place on two distinct levels. First, farm households try to 
enrol external actors into their strategic projects; these actors may be clients, 
other farmers, institutions, et cetera. Second, households have to mobilize 
labour and knowledge among their own members. In sociological analysis of 
farm household strategies it frequently seems to be all too easily forgotten 
that "the household is itself a differentiated unit with actors trying to realize 
their own, often contradictory projects. (..) Households do not strategize; 
people do" (de Haan, 1994: 24; also Netting, 1993: 300). Central, in this 
respect, is the relationship between the senior farming couple and their 
successor (or the succeeding couple); they are the ones who are most 
interested in, and most capable of, mobilizing the external and internal 
networks - and they mutually mobilize each other, as well. 
Theoretically, we can distinguish the process of enrolling other actors into 
one's network from the mobilization for particular ends of the network itself. 
But in practice, this distinction will often hardly be noticeable: one may indeed 
be part of a 'latent' network which may only be activated when needed, but 
in other cases enrolment and mobilization may take place at virtually the same 
time. Actors may be both individual people and collectivities (e.g. households 
or institutions) and it should be specified that an actor, apart from other social 
actors, may also mobilize material objects and symbols within his network. 
And although networks are normally mobilized for their resources, they may 
also impose constraints upon the actor as to his future decisions (Long, 1979: 
125). 
Social networks have been central in the works of sociologists for several 
decades: Barnes (1954), Mitchell (1969), Boissevain (1974), to mention only 
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a few. In this study, however, I have not so much followed their 
preoccupation with size, density, frequency of interaction, etc., but I have 
first and foremost focused on the instrumentality these networks have for 
actors trying to mobilize resources (means of production, particularly labour). 
In part, this may link up with what Boissevain calls the network's 
'transactional content'. My perspective brings me closer to the type of 
analysis which is common in actor-network theory, it even borrows part of its 
terminology11, yet it does not accept all of its premises. 
As Callon (1986) sets out to explain, the actor-network approach starts 
from three principles on the part of the observer, which he summarizes as 
"agnosticism (impartiality [towards] actors engaged in controversy), 
generalized symmetry (the commitment to explain conflicting viewpoints in 
the same terms) and free association (the abandonment of all a priori 
distinctions between the natural and the social)" (ibid.: 196). It is the last 
principle which is problematic (whereas the first two should be 'open doors', I 
think, for most present-day sociologists). If the idea of making no distinction 
between human and non-human actors, and of describing them in the same 
terms, is taken to its ultimate consequences, as Callon attempts in his paper 
on the 'domestication of scallops and fishermen' in Brittany, the result is a 
logical deadlock: either one accepts interests, negotiation of power, and even 
motives behind the 'actions' of non-human 'actors' and ends up with the 
anthropomorphism Callon wants to avoid; or one does not, but then non-
human entities can not be analyzed as 'actors' in sociological terms - or at 
least not in Weberian terms, that is attributing motives and meanings to the 
actors which become translated into social action. 
Furthermore, this approach tends to regard the collective actor too much 
as a monolithic whole, moving in unison in the same direction; the attention is 
so much focused on processes of 'intéressement' and 'enrolment' of potential 
allies that internal frictions, conflicting interests, and negotiations within 
collectivities are practically ignored. Useful, however, are the ideas of 
'displacement' and 'dissociation' (or 'dissidence'). Displacements may occur 
all along the process of network mobilization: goals and interests of actors 
involved may change, and so may their resources or their locations. These 
displacements are the result of strategic adaptations. Dissociation means that 
actors break the arrangements which link them to the network, normally as a 
consequence of displacement. Eventually, the result may be that the whole 
network falls apart. 
My account of the sociological processes whereby motives of actors (farm 
household members) are translated into action (household strategies) will to a 
The terms do not necessarily coincide in their meanings, though. In Callon's analysis, for 
example, the terms enrolment and mobilization are reserved for particular stages in the 
process of generating an actor-network (Callon, 1986: 211-219): the actor who is taken as 
the point of departure exerts himself upon other actors by claiming to be indispensable for 
solving their problems (problematisation), by locking the others into roles specifically thought 
out for them (intéressement), by relating these roles to each other in a comprehensive 
scheme (enrolment), and finally, by becoming the spokesman for the other actors 
(mobilisation) (ibid.:196). 
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large extent be based on the theory of peasant economy, developed in the 
1920s by the Russian agricultural economist A. V. Chayanov, and more 
specifically on his notion of subjective equilibrium (Chayanov, 1966). 
Chayanov points out that there are fundamental differences between farm 
households and capitalist enterprises, especially as to how the production 
factors labour, capital and land are used. Kerblay summarizes these 
differences in the following way: 
"In the capitalist economy land and labour are the variable factors 
which the entrepreneur tries to combine to obtain the maximum 
remuneration from his capital, considered as a fixed factor. In a 
typical peasant economy labour, proportionate to the size of the 
family, is the stable element which determines the change in the 
volume of capital and land". (Kerblay, 1971: 154)21 
In Chayanov's model, the peasant family farm seldom employs any hired 
labour. Agricultural tasks are normally carried out by family members alone, 
and their labour-input depends on a subjective evaluation of its marginal 
disutility (or, which is the same, the marginal utility of leisure) in relation to 
the estimated marginal utility of the output it would generate (Chayanov, 
1966: 81). Durrenberger explains this in the following words: 
"... as peasants work, each successive unit of labor is exponentially 
more loathsome than the last. (And) as peasant workers acquire the 
goods they need, the next unit is less valued than the previous one. 
As peasants work more, they acquire more of the goods they need. 
At some point, the increasing marginal disutility of labor will 
outweigh the decreasing marginal utility of the goods produced, and 
the peasants will stop working" (Durrenberger, 1984: 39; see also 
Thorner, 1966: xvi; and Kerblay, 1971: 153). 
The equilibrium, which is the production target of the household, can be 
graphically represented as the point of intersection of two curves (see Figure 
1), where the curve AB "indicates the degree of (labour) drudgery attached to 
acquiring the marginal ruble" (Chayanov, 1966: 82) and the curve CD the 
marginal utility of the income earned. 
Chayanov also postulated that there exists a causal relationship between 
family composition and farm size, whereby farm size is the dependent 
variable. His empirical data (gathered in the Starobel'sk district in the Ukraine) 
show that a peasant household tends to cultivate more land when the family's 
consumer demands increase due to a higher c/w ratio (i.e. the total number of 
consumers in the family related to the number of workers). He recognized, 
however, that this part of his model could only be generalized for those areas 
where peasants had easy access to land. For situations where this was not 
To highlight the difference, we could write these statements as economic functions. So that 
is for the capitalist economy: 
Remuneration = f(land, labour | capital), 
and for the peasant economy: 
Remuneration = f(land, capital | labour). 
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the case, he states that the family's work hands, "not finding a use in 
farming, turn ... to crafts, trades and other non-agricultural earnings" 
(Chayanov, 1966: 94); this may also happen if there is still enough land 
available, but payment for non-agricultural labour is higher than remuneration 
of farm-work (ibid.: 107). If off-farm work is hard to find, or wages are too 
low, the farm household may decide to intensify the labour-input of its 
members on the holding itself (ibid.: 113; also Patnaik, 1979: 390).31 
Figure 1. Intersecting drudgery and remuneration curves.' 
So with respect to a rural economy in which the possibilities to buy or rent more land are 
limited, the economic function for the production factors (see also footnote 1) would rather 
be as follows: 
Remuneration = f(capital, labour | land). 
As to what should be placed along the axes of this system of coordinates, I have mainly 
followed Durrenberger's suggestion: "Let the X (horizontal) axis of the graph represent units 
of goods produced, and the Y (vertical) axis represent some measure of relative marginal 
utility of goods (..). The Y axis also represents relative marginal disutility of labor" 
(Durrenberger, 1984: 40). When Chayanov himself introduces these curves, the abscissa is 
said to represent "the sum of values (in rubles) earned in a year by the subject running the 
farm" (1966: 82), i.e. the holding's income level, but where he uses similar graphs in the rest 
of his work, he is not explicit about this anymore. 
Marginal disutility of labour can also be read as marginal utility of leisure. More recent 
graphical presentations (Nakajima, 1986; Ellis, 1993) are made up of indifference curves, 
which "describe a given level of utility (personal happiness) for different combinations of 
leisure and income" (Ellis, 1993: 106), and production functions. As it is not the combination 
of income and leisure, but the confrontation between remuneration and drudgery which I 
want to highlight, I shall follow Chayanov's original figures. 
satisfaction 
(marginal 
utility of 
consumption) 
drudgery 
(marginal 
disutility 
of labour) 
output/income 
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It is this latter model (referring to areas where access to land is difficult) 
which applies best to the rural situation in Gipuzkoa. Nevertheless, another 
proviso should be made to suit the model to the present-day situation. It can 
no longer be maintained that the family's consumer/worker ratio mainly 
dictates the minimum production and consumption levels. For farmers who are 
becoming more and more integrated into the wider society and its institutions, 
the minimum level of production is often increasingly prescribed by external 
institutions, whereas the minimum level of consumption family members find 
acceptable is chiefly influenced by what they regard as their principal 
reference group within society. We shall see in Part II of this book that the 
realization of these production and consumption levels through farming is 
often constrained by the amount of family labour that can be mobilized; the 
number of workers in the family determines the attainable farm output and 
income. 
We should point out here that none of the production factors can be seen 
as a completely fixed factor. As for land, for instance, it is not only the 
number of hectares belonging to a farm which matters. In the Basque 
provinces, the same area of land may be theoretically 'under-utilized', but it 
may also be cultivated intensively. The area may be a constant, but land 
intensity is variable and depends on the utilization of the other factors, labour 
and capital. A similar reasoning holds good for capital: as we shall see later, 
extension agents maintained that Basque agriculture was characterized by a 
sub-optimal utilization of machinery, but a few farmers used their tractors and 
other equipment very intensively, working both their own plots and those of 
their neighbours. And also labour intensity may vary according to the 
implements worked with and the type of land worked on. In short, the 
utilization or intensity of production factor A should be seen as a function of 
the other two factors B and C; or in other words, production factors in 
agriculture should only be analyzed in their interrelatedness, no factor being 
constant. 
Not only the quantitative presence of production factors, but also their 
utilization (their qualitative presence) determines the attainable farm family 
income. This highlights the fundamental role of farm household members in 
deciding upon the attunement to one another of the factors of production, and 
particularly of the individual labour input of the family members. By 
'attunement of production factors' I mean their manipulation in such a way 
that they respond best to market possibilities, family members' personal 
capabilities and knowledge, and not least their individual preferences. Farmers 
choose the combination of factors of production they estimate most 
favourable in terms of remuneration of the family's economic activities and 
the costs and efforts related to the realization of these activities. 
Chayanov did not analyze the labour farm in isolation from its wider 
economic context. It cannot be denied that he had an eye for technological 
developments, external markets and even the influence of urban culture on 
the consumption needs of farm family members (cf. Chayanov, 1966: 84, 
207 ff.). But in the course of time, these external links of farm holdings have 
become stronger and more extensive, especially in Western European and 
North American agriculture, having implications for farm management that 
could not have been foreseen in Chayanov's days. Today, the supply of 
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technology in agriculture, and with it the huge labour productivity and yield 
increases it has made possible, is way beyond what could have been imagined 
seventy years ago. Markets have differentiated, all having their own logic for 
the actors operating upon them. And through industrial labour of farm family 
members, but much more as a result of mass media such as radio and 
television, the urban way of life - its consumption and leisure patterns - has 
become a constant point of reference for households on even the most 
remote farmsteads. 
Thus, farmers' strategies are not simply designed on the basis of on-farm 
factors; farmers establish what Long and van der Ploeg call 'interlocking 
projects' - with external institutions and market agents (clients, cooperatives), 
but also among themselves. 
"Actors' projects are realized within specific arenas, such as those 
shaped by market, state/peasant, agribusiness/peasant, or 
farmer/farmer-representative relations. That is each project is 
articulated with other actors' projects, interests and perspectives. 
This articulation is strategic in that the actors involved will attempt 
to anticipate the reactions and possible strategies of the other actors 
and agencies" (Long and van der Ploeg, 1994: 80). 
My discussion of the farm household's mobilization of its external network will 
be primarily focused on these interlocking processes. 
I shall try to extend my analysis beyond Chayanov's discussion of the 
family farm's drudgery/remuneration balance. Chayanov used the intersecting 
marginal (dis)utility curves in the first place to explain shifts in worker output 
and labour intensity under changing circumstances. In my work, however, the 
subjective equilibrium model will be used to illustrate the rationa.le behind 
certain household strategies (of which the aforementioned interlocking 
projects may form part) in comparison with alternative strategies. 
Farm households, some more than others, respond to new opportunities 
they are offered or constraints imposed on them as adequately as possible, in 
an attempt to enhance their room for manoeuvre. From the observer's point of 
view, keeping Chayanov's diagram in mind, this can be interpreted as farm 
households moving marginal (dis-)utility curves up and down while searching 
for a more advantageous equilibrium point. For instance, they may purchase 
new machinery in order to increase their labour productivity; as the same 
output can now be obtained with less labour drudgery, the curve AB shifts to 
A ^ , (see Figure 2). If this machinery can be bought by means of credit which 
is paid off over a number of years, the effect on the household's consumption 
pattern will hardly be noticeable. If the machines are paid with money from 
the household's savings, and part of the household's income is thus reserved 
for productive consumption6', a smaller part can be spent on the satisfaction 
of (personal) consumption needs of the family members. In other words, for 
each unit of output the income that can be spent on the family's personal 
consumption is lower than in the original situation. When the level of 
The distinction between 'productive' and 'personal consumption' is made by Friedmann 
(1978); see also Mauleon (1989: 102). 
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consumption is lower, the marginal utility of any additional unit is higher; 
hence, the corresponding marginal utility curve shifts upward (to 0,0,; cf. 
Chayanov, 1966: 209). A similar upward shift of the consumption satisfaction 
curve also occurs if, for example, household members set money aside in 
order to emulate urban lifestyles (ibid.: 84). These shifts of (dis-)utility curves 
lead to a new point of equilibrium (in Figure 2, somewhere between Y and Z). 
Now, according to Chayanov, farm households only consider adaptations to 
be advantageous if the new equilibrium point is located in the shaded area 
under the original point of intersection (ibid.: 209, 210). It is there that the 
drudgery is lower than originally, while the utility of the means of 
consumption still increases.61 
Figure 2. Shifting marginal (dis-)utility curves. 
Similar shifts of these curves occur if farmers start operating on other markets 
where prices for their products are higher, or if they decide to take up a job in 
industry, so that they get paid more in return for the same (or less) labour 
input. 
Turning to the family's 'internal' network, I believe that Chayanov's idea 
of 'the equilibrium of subjective evaluations' can be integrated into an analysis 
of the social organization of family labour within the farming household. I will 
therefore translate the concept of subjective evaluation to the level of 
individual household members. After all, it is not so much the household as a 
whole that makes a subjective balance between remuneration and labour 
It is, however, very difficult to relate these curves and equilibrium points to quantifiable 
levels of output or labour hours. Netting therefore remarks that "since utility and drudgery 
are completely subjective variables with no independent empirical referents, the model may 
have a mainly heuristic value" (Netting, 1993: 302). 
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input, but rather the individual members of the family who do so while 
strategizing the allocation of their labour so as to realize their personal 
projects. Moreover, I argue that farm family members do not just define 
workload in terms of physical exertion, nor remuneration in terms of 
satisfaction of consumption needs. A household member's subjectively 
experienced drudgery of labour is equally determined by his or her evaluation 
of farmwork in relation to work outside, by authority relations on the farm, 
the type of agricultural tasks he or she is expected to carry out and in what 
way (for example, mechanized or handwork), and so on. Whereas 
remuneration comprises a complex of factors, such as the income one can 
dispose of independently, recognition of one's task performance by other 
family members, status of one's labour in the wider context, or the extent to 
which individual realization through one's work is accomplished. Thus, family 
members sometimes prefer working longer hours, or carrying out physically 
strenuous tasks, to doing lighter or less time consuming work that they 
detest. 
Household members outline their personal projects on the basis of their 
subjective evaluations (which may be different for each individual member) 
and negotiate with each other the realizability of these projects within the 
margins of the common farming strategy. Especially important in these 
negotiations, important for the future of the holding, are the diverging 'images 
of the future' with respect to the farm and Self of, on the one hand, the 
senior farmer (or farming couple) and, on the other, the successor (or 
succeeding couple). The future that a successor has mapped out for himself 
(labour career, social life, etc.) and the implications this has for the way the 
farm will be continued may or may not coincide with his parents' image of the 
future of the farm and the consequent expectations they have of. their son. 
Hence, in the end these negotiations determine not only the production and 
commercialization strategies of farming enterprises, but also whether and how 
the farm is passed on to the next generation. 
My research centred on family households in the province of Gipuzkoa that 
were engaged in dairy farming, the most important subsector in Basque 
agriculture (both in terms of the people involved and the value represented; 
cf. Maule6n, 1989:97). The Basque dairy farming sector is not a 
homogeneous whole, but it is not easy to come up with a typology that does 
justice to the existing heterogeneity of farming enterprises. A classification 
that is still often used by regional policy makers and other analysts of the rural 
economy is the one that roughly divides the Basque farming population into 
three main types: 'modern', 'traditional' and 'mixed' (i.e. part-time) farmers.7' 
Most farmers in the region had equally adopted this typology in their 
discourse, and although it might go too far to speak of a real 'folk typology'. 
This typology bears great resemblance to the one used by Vivier in a study on farming 
strategies in the French mountain region of 'Le Massif de I'Oisans': the 'agriculteur 
professionel', who sees his farm as a business; the 'double-actifs', whose off-farm incomes 
often enable them to introduce mechanization; and the 'plus ageV (the oldest farmers) and 
those without successors (Vivier, 1987: 144,145). 
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this categorization has been widely used to describe the agrarian sector for 
more than 20 years. However, the problem with this typology, which of 
course reminds one of similar categorizations that were used within the 
dominant modernization approach in rural sociology in the 1960s and the early 
'70s, is that it has strong normative overtones. 'Modern', 'traditional' and 
'mixed' farming can be seen as labels attributed to different categories of 
farm enterprises, which had become internalized by policy makers and farmers 
alike and to which policy was subsequently tailored as if these labels were 
entirely neutral and objective. As Wood observes, "Labelling is in part a 
scientific (taxonomic) act, but it is also an act of valuation and judgement 
involving prejudices and stereotyping" (Wood, 1985b: 348). 
In Basque rural policy, as well as in the analyses of agrarian economists in the 
region, 'modern' farm enterprises were for a long time believed to be the only 
valid model for agricultural development - and this idea was only reinforced by 
the knowledge that agricultural development in the region would henceforth 
be subject to the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy. In this view, farmers 
belonging to the other categories were only hindering modernization and 
should either follow the modern farmers' trail or disappear. 
Whatmore et al. (1987) emphasize the importance of the use of adequate 
typologies for the correct understanding of social phenomena. 
"Typologies should not be regarded as ends in themselves nor simply 
as a preliminary step in the resorting of social data but rather as a 
potentially useful methodological tool providing a vital link between 
theory and practice. (..) 
"The method by which a typology is constructed derives from and 
embodies a set of epistemological assumptions about how we 
conceptualise and explain social phenomena and thus how theory 
and empirical work are related" (Whatmore et al., 1987:22,23). 
But the typology they suggest, distinguishing four ideal types of farm business 
that are identified on the basis of their degree of (direct and indirect) 
subsumption, is not very satisfactory.81 In the first place, this categorization 
is exclusively based on the extent to which the farm production process is 
subordinated to external capitals, either as a result of outside control of the 
on-farm means of production (direct or real subsumption), or through the 
external appropriation of surplus value generated on the farm (indirect or 
formal subsumption). Secondly, the ideal types, ranging from 'marginal closed 
units' to entirely 'subsumed units', are located in a system of coordinates 
with direct and indirect subsumption along the axes (ibid.:32); but it remains 
unclear why four types should be distinguished (and not more, or fewer), and 
why these four types should be placed along a straight line (the diagonal of 
the system), as if direct and indirect subsumption would invariably evolve in a 
Subsumption, a keyword in many debates in the 1980s, just like 'modernization' and 
'(under)development' had been a decade before, is defined as concerning "the different ways 
in which the agricultural production process on the farm, and its associated social relations, 
are being transformed under capitalism" (Whatmore et al., 1987:27). 
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parallel manner. In the end, this typology does not really seem to break away 
from earlier evolutionary models either. 
Nakajima, whose principal work (Nakajima, 1986) aims at exploring 
Chayanov's subjective equilibrium model from as many angles as possible, 
introduces a classification that is equally based on two dimensions, viz. the 
proportion of hired labour input on the farm (as a percentage of the total 
labour input) and the proportion of output sold (in comparison to the total 
output produced). He then distinguishes: the subsistence production farm, the 
farm household, the commercial farm, and the farm firm (ibid.:6). In view of 
"the growing tendency in Japan and elsewhere towards part-time farming" 
(ibid.:7), he suggests adding a third dimension: the proportion of off-farm 
income as a percentage of the total income earned within the household. 
Although the criteria on the basis of which Nakajima constructs his typology 
are interesting in that they reflect strategic actions of farmers, for the Basque 
situation they are less relevant, as they would hardly differentiate among 
farming enterprises. There are very few farms that hire outside labour, apart 
from the incidental contract-worker. Moreover, most farms, and this certainly 
holds good for dairy farms, produce for the market. Thus, almost all farming 
enterprises in Euskadi would be classified as farm households (which is of 
course exactly what they are). But what I am interested in is whether and 
how these households can be differentiated. 
The typology produced by the Basque sociologist Maule6n (1989) partly 
responds to this wish. He classifies the dairy sector in the region according to 
the following three criteria: the age of the farm owner, his being a full-time or 
part-time farmer, and whether an adult son works full-time on the farm or not. 
This results in the construction of eight household types, which are related to 
the scale of the enterprise (head of cattle), intensity (number of cows per 
hectare), and the proportion of milk sold directly to consumers. He 
demonstrates that there exist statistically significant relationships between 
these variables and the different types of farm household and tries to explain 
these. However, a sociological analysis of farm household strategies is not 
provided. 
Such an analysis, focusing on the heterogeneity of farm enterprises, is 
central in the so-called 'styles of farming' approach, developed at the 
Agricultural University in Wageningen, the Netherlands. This approach in rural 
sociology analyzes the variety of farmers' practices as responses to change 
and intervention. Originally, a 'style of farming' was defined by Hofstee 
(1946) as "the complex but integrated set of notions, norms, knowledge 
elements, experiences etc., held by a group of farmers in a specific region, 
that describes the way farming praxis should be carried out" (van der Ploeg, 
1994: 17). But in the course of time, a differentiation of farming styles along 
regional lines has become less relevant. At present, styles of farming are 
predominantly studied in relation to farmers' widely varying responses to the 
market and technology. Moreover: 
"Since the structuration of markets and the orientation of 
technological development have become increasingly the object of 
agrarian policy, styles of farming have, to a large extent, 
consequently emerged as farmers' responses to national and 
international agrarian policies" (ibid.: 18). 
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In recent years, the analytical tools of scholars belonging to the 'styles of 
farming' school have become more and more refined. Enterprises are classified 
according to criteria such as scale and intensity (Roep et al., 1991), 
ambition/thrift versus craftmanship/entrepreneurship (van der Ploeg et al., 
1992), or market integration and orientation to technology (van der Ploeg, 
1993a; Roep and de Bruin, 1994). In analyses of rural areas in various regions 
in the Netherlands highly sophisticated and empirically meaningful typologies 
have been produced. 
But when I collected the main part of my field material, in 1988 and 
1989, the reconceptualization of the notion of farming styles was still being 
developed and had not evolved beyond a rather rudimentary typology which 
classified farm enterprises as either marginal, vanguard, intensive, or large-
scale, relatively extensive, farms (e.g. van der Ploeg, 1987a; see also Section 
5.3 for a graphical expression of this typology). For the Basque situation, such 
a typology was not esteemed to be more adequate than, for example, 
Maule6n's. However, one of the basic ideas of the styles of farming approach 
also became the premise behind my own research: viz. that different farming 
practices, co-existing side by side in the same region, may all represent 
equally valid strategies, and that in the present economic constellation the 
survival capacity of large-scale, institutionally integrated, farm enterprises 
cannot (as is often done) a priori be assumed to be greater than that of other 
types of farming. 
The 'folk' typology I referred to earlier, which was still very much in 
vogue in the region by the end of the 1980s and taken to be an adequate 
characterization of existing farm enterprises by both social scientists and 
farmers alike, might be reinterpreted in this way. It is true that the typology of 
'modern', 'traditional' and 'part-time' farmers offers no more than a sterile 
taxonomy which "does not reveal how such people actually survive" (Wood, 
1985b: 354). I have nevertheless accepted this typology (adding a fourth 
category of 'quality producers') as my framework of analysis in Part II of this 
book, precisely in order to bring out its normative character and highlight the 
divergent rationales of the various survival strategies that are hidden behind 
such labels. 
As we have argued before, these household strategies come about as the 
outcome of negotiations among family members over the realizability of their 
personal projects. They are eventually effectuated in interaction with the 
economic, social and political environment in which farming households 
operate. But at the same time, these intra-family negotiations, the village 
structure, market developments, institutional policies and the extent to which 
farming strategies are successful all form part of the household members' 
'stock of knowledge' on which they draw to establish their personal 
equilibrium of subjective evaluations; in fact, this equilibrium is continually 
readjusted, while the actors anticipate the realizability of their individual 
projects. This whole idea links up with the notion of 'social actor' as 
formulated by Long and van der Ploeg (following Giddens): 
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"social actors are 'knowledgeable' and 'capable'. They attempt to 
solve problems, learn how to intervene in the flow of social events 
around them, and monitor continuously their own actions, observing 
how others react to their behaviour and taking note of the various 
contingent circumstances" (Long and van der Ploeg, 1994: 66). 
In my discussion, I shall regularly dwell on the question of how this type of 
analysis can help to elucidate household strategies aimed at the continuity of 
the farming enterprise. Such an analysis, in order to be meaningful, will have 
to incorporate cultural notions and manifestations concerning succession, 
marriage, authority, et cetera. 
With this, my original research problem concerning the consequences of 
the incorporation of the Basque Country into the European Community for the 
farmer strategies and institutional policies in the region is not entirely given 
up, but must be put into the light of the foregoing model of analysis. That is, 
the European market influences and Community policies are seen as some of 
the many "forms of external intervention [which] necessarily enter the existing 
life-worlds of the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way are 
mediated and transformed by the same actors and local structures" (ibid.: 64). 
Thus, l am chiefly interested in the question of how a household's survival 
and succession strategies emerge from (and shape) the mobilization of 
('external' and 'internal') social networks, with special regard to the 
interlocking projects between the household and external agents and the 
confrontation of the household members' personal projects. The following 
questions will thereby be considered: 
- Where do the projects of the senior farming couple, concerning the 
satisfaction of the household's consumption needs and the problem of 
succession, coincide with or diverge from those of their successor (or of the 
succeeding couple)? 
- How are their projects influenced by cultural factors and by changing 
circumstances within the institutional framework and the social environment 
into which the farm household is integrated? 
- To what extent can a 'Chayanovian' analysis in terms of subjective 
evaluations be helpful in understanding both farm household strategies and 
family members' projects? 
- What hypotheses can be formulated as to the perspectives for the future 
that are embedded in the different household strategies? 
As to the methodology used, I should make clear that from the outset it had 
been my aim to do my fieldwork in a rural community, living on one of the 
farmsteads and participating in the agricultural tasks and other daily activities 
of the farm families, thus getting to know the significant interrelations within 
the village. This, I reckoned, would give me the opportunity to sample the life-
worlds of the relevant social actors in the community, map out their social 
networks, learn about contrasting world-views, confrontations and conflict, 
and select some strategic cases for further systematic analysis (cf. Long, 
1988, 1989). However, I soon learned that, due to the closed character of 
rural communities in Euskadi, it would be extremely difficult to find a farm 
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family that was willing to put me up for some months or even to find a small 
rural dwelling I could rent. I therefore had to think of an alternative approach. 
Since the late 1970s, an increasing number of adolescents and young 
adults has learned Euskara, the Basque language. The language had been 
forbidden during the franquist regime, although it had been preserved in 
remote rural areas. In more recent years, the Basque Administration has tried 
to motivate farmers to put up students for one or two months so as to offer 
them the possibility to practise the language. The response of the farmers 
was low, but in some cases their nationalist sentiments and love for their 
language got the better of them. So that was the role I created for myself: a 
student of Euskara who wanted to practise his knowledge of the language in 
a rural community. I got two offers in different villages, and in 1988-89 I 
spent about five months in each of these places. My attitude 'in the field', 
however, did not correspond to that of a typical language student. Most 
farmers could not understand why I kept asking them questions about their 
lives and seemed to be interested in their ways of farming. I finally had to fall 
back on straightforward interviews. All in all, I was able to do repeated, in-
depth interviews with some 25 farm families. 
In these unstructured interviews, the following topics were discussed at 
length: the history of the farm from as long ago as the oldest generation could 
remember till our days; the present structure of the farm enterprise (cattle, 
land use, feeding, machinery, types of commercialization, institutional links, 
investments, etc.); the life histories of the most relevant family members; the 
links that the household established with outside actors, like institutions, 
clients, etc.; the social organization of labour within the household (who did 
what, and why? - paying special attention to the division of labour along 
generational and gender lines, on- and off-farm work and authority relations); 
and the organization of leisure. Farmers were asked to relive those moments 
in their lives when important decisions had to be taken as to their farm 
enterprises and to explain the reasons for the changes that had taken place. I 
also questioned them (and their children) about their plans for the future, how 
they tried to realize them, and in what way succession of the holding had 
been arranged. Furthermore, they were asked to define what type of farming 
system they regarded as the most adequate for the Basque Country, which 
farmer in the village or the area they considered to be the best, and how they 
characterized their own farm in comparison? Finally, I would ask them to 
evaluate the agrarian policies of the regional, national and European 
Administrations. 
I completed my research findings with a survey among another 33 
farmers, in which more or less the same questions were asked in a more 
structured way. Their answers were recorded quantitatively. Yet, the names 
of these respondents were obtained through a professional association of 
dairy farmers to which virtually all of them belonged, which means they can 
not be considered a random sample of the Basque dairy farming sector; apart 
from this, we are dealing with very small numbers. We should therefore be 
cautious as to the interpretation of the data. At most, they indicate certain 
tendencies, but no definite conclusions may be attributed to them. 
Furthermore, I interviewed and discussed part of my research findings with 
over 25 key informants: people within the regional Department of Agriculture 
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and Fisheries, extension agencies, farmers' unions, professional associations, 
or others who could provide me with specific information about topics that 
were of interest to me. 
The material gathered in this period laid the basis for the greater part of 
the analysis. Five years later I returned to the field for a few short visits. On 
these occasions I collected additional material on a dozen strategically chosen 
farm families I had visited before, which, among other things, allowed me to 
update the earlier research findings. 
Throughout the text, whenever I have quoted people in public functions, 
they appear under their real names. Conversely, pseudonyms have been used 
for the two villages where I carried out my research, the farmsteads I visited, 
and their inhabitants I interviewed. 
1.2 Overview of the book 
Chapter 2 provides some insight into the agricultural evolution in Gipuzkoa in 
the course of this century and the extent to which the industrial development 
of the region determined this evolution. The outcome of this process is set 
against the background of the history of the European Economic Community 
until the incorporation of Spain and Portugal and the expected consequences 
of Spain's membership of the EEC for Basque farmers. We will see that since 
the 1950s and under relatively unfavourable circumstances (small plots of 
land, a deficient technological level), farmers in Gipuzkoa started to specialize 
in types of production (dairy farming and stock breeding) that were also 
dominant in other European regions where large-scale, technologically 
advanced agricultural structures prevailed. 
The following two chapters provide the necessary background for an 
understanding of the wider setting in which household strategies were being 
developed by the end of the 1980s. Chapter 3 deals with the social 
environment of the farms in the rural mountain communities where I carried 
out the main part of my research. There was a certain consensus in the 
Basque Country with respect to the importance of maintaining the social 
viability of isolated villages, as it was feared that, when schools and shops 
closed down, doctors left, and more and more marginal farms were given up, 
eventually even the most modern farms with the best lands would be 
abandoned,too. 
Chapter 4 sets out to explore how different categories of farmers had to 
cope with a few major policy decisions as to the regional dairy farming sector. 
We shall also see how the modern-traditional typology I referred to earlier was 
translated into a kind of allocation of tasks among regional institutions. 
Basque farmers are in the first place affected by agricultural policies designed 
at the regional level (by the relevant Basque Government Departments, the 
farmers' unions and professional associations), but they also have to do with 
national and supranational laws and regulations. These policies seldom run 
completely parallel and at some times they may even be diametrically 
opposed. The interplay of institutional policies can be conceptualized as a 
social arena in which the different parties try to realize their particular 
objectives as well as possible, making use of personal, material and rhetorical 
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resources, and counteracting or neutralizing the constraints put upon them by 
the other parties involved. 
Most of the theoretical considerations exposed earlier come back in 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, where I discuss the production and commercialization 
strategies of different types of family farm households in relation to their 
social organization of labour, and the possible implications of these strategies 
for the terms of negotiation over succession on these farms. 
Chapter 9 shows that succession is not the more or less automatic result 
of successful economic strategies, but depends at the same time on the 
creativity and flexibility of both the older farming couple and the younger, 
succeeding, couple in working out a definition of the position of the 
successor's wife on the farm of her parents-in-law which is acceptable for all 
parties involved. This creativity is further needed to prevent siblings from 
dissociating themselves from the common family project called farming. In the 
concluding Chapter 10 the different arguments explored in the previous 
chapters will be brought together. 
The reader will find that, in these various chapters, the narrations of the 
protagonists of farming practices and agricultural policies have a central place 
(cf. also van der Ploeg, 1993b). They provide us with the insights and 
concepts which enable us to come to meaningful generalization. For, as 
Bennet observes: 
"If generalization is possible in multidimensional social analysis, it is to be 
found in what Robert Merton (1949) called the 'middle range' of theory, 
or an empirical generalization: that is, a generalization that pertains to an 
historically specific, and usually socially important, context of behavior 
and endeavor" (Bennett, 1982:23). 
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Chapter 2 
A G R I C U L T U R A L P R O D U C T I O N UNDER C H A N G I N G 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
2.1 Basque agriculture in historical perspective 
Nineteenth century Euskadi was a particularly traditional society, dominated 
by the Church and rural caciques, fundamentally opposed to the liberal regime 
in Madrid and the nascent national bourgeoisie. Minor confrontations 
culminated in the two Carlist Wars (1833-39 and 1872-76) that ended in 
victory for the liberal forces. The defeated Basque Country was deprived of its 
regional privileges and lost its special status as a free trade zone. Commerce 
received a severe blow. Commercial capital was thereupon invested in the 
gradually increasing industrial sector and banking institutions in the region, 
which gave the impulse to the industrialization of the coastal provinces Bizkaia 
and Gipuzkoa. This process took first place in and around the capitals Bilbao 
and San Sebastian, but expanded slowly over other parts of the provinces in 
the course of the twentieth century. 
The Civil War (1936-39) meant another major divide in Spanish history. In 
the 1940s, the Franco-regime abolished the payment of groundrent in kind 
and likewise restricted the yearly rent increase. As a result of the high 
inflation level in those decades most landlords were motivated to sell their 
farms to the tenants. Until the fifties, the majority of the farmers in Gipuzkoa 
still cultivated a wide variety of crops, the most important being wheat and 
maize. Some had even introduced the first threshing machines on their farms 
when suddenly the changeover came. In the course of a few years wheat 
cultivation was given up, the machines were disposed of again, and a process 
set in towards commercial cattle-breeding (see Douglass, 1977). What had 
brought about this change? 
The industrialization and the rising standard of living in the region had 
attracted an ever greater number of migrants from poorer regions in the 
South, like Extremadura and Andalusie, and the increase of the urban 
population led to a growing demand for dairy products and meat. In reaction 
to this, the dairy cooperative Gurelesa was created in Gipuzkoa, which offered 
its clients pasteurized milk, important in a region where tuberculosis and 
bruselosis of cows still took their toll among the people. This guarantee of 
milk of high quality created an even higher demand for dairy products. On the 
other hand, the cooperative guaranteed the farmers the sale of their total 
production all year long, which was a big improvement compared with the 
seasonal fluctuations of milk sales farmers had experienced so far. Gurelesa 
even committed itself to buy the incidental surplus production of those 
farmers who did not become cooperative members but kept on selling their 
milk directly to the consumers. The cooperative's policy stimulated milk 
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production on the farms to a great extent.91 
By and by dairy factories were set up in the other Basque provinces as 
well, while more and more farmers specialized in dairy farming with meat 
production as a complementary activity. As a result, the autochtonous 
Pyrenean cow lost its importance for the family farm economy in favour of, 
first, the Swiss breed, and eventually the Friesian milch cows. 
2.2 The industrialization paradox 
The regional industrialization also influenced agrarian development in other 
ways. I stated before that the regional industrialization was not just limited to 
the area surrounding the provincial capital. Factories were set up in many 
towns and villages all over the province, while industrial wages went up due 
to the demand for labour power. This did not only lead to the immigration of 
people from elsewhere, but also caused an important flow of labour power 
from the rural areas to the industrial centres, which only declined in the late 
1970s when Basque industry began to feel the effects of the economic 
recession. Among those who sought refuge in industry was the overwhelming 
majority of agrarian youth as well as a large number of heads of farms. This 
had several consequences. 
First, the category of part-time farmers increased strongly. The 1982 
census suggests that only 36.8% of the heads of farms (men and women) in 
Gipuzkoa "mainly work on the farm" (Gobierno Vasco, 1985). Yet, this 
percentage has to be read with some reservation. It should be mentioned that 
the data in the 1982 census are not always very reliable. Moreover, it is far 
from easy to produce an empirically sound definition of part-time farming (I 
shall discuss this definition problem in Chapter 8). 
Etxezarreta (1983) states that it was not just the desire to earn more 
money (a pull factor) that made these farmers take up a job in industry. In 
most cases it was the shere impossibility to reproduce the farm household 
with only an income from agriculture (a push factor) which motivated them to 
take this step. A farmer who started working in the factory usually reduced 
the agricultural activities that demanded high labour input: the number of 
cattle was brought down, milch cows were replaced by beef cattle, meadows 
were converted into woodland, etc. Some part-time farmers, however, were 
able to invest the extra money earned in increasing the labour productivity of 
the remaining family members on the farm. 
Second, as fewer farmers' sons were inclined to take over their parents' 
holdings, the number of young farmers decreased so that the average age of 
farmers rose. According to the 1982 agrarian census, only one out of six 
heads of farms in Gipuzkoa was younger than 45, whereas almost 60% were 
older than 55. By the end of the 1980s, however, the situation seemed to 
have changed. In the 1989 census, the percentages were 22% and 55%, 
respectively. 
Third, industrialization and urbanization caused a high demand for land. 
This is not to say, though, that the introduction of Gurelesa in the Gipuzkoan countryside 
was entirely unproblematic. We will come back to this in Chapter 4. 
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both in urban and in rural areas, and led to a spectacular increase of land 
prices in the countryside. Farmers who had found a job in agriculture rarely, 
sold their farmstead or surrounding estates, speculating on a continuing value 
increase of their landed properties. On farms without successors something 
similar occurred: while the buildings were often left to decay after the owners 
had died, their children, who lived elsewhere, planted pine-trees on productive 
arable land and meadows. Thus, the reduction of agrarian labour power did by 
no means result in a growing availability of farmland that could be used by the 
remaining farmers to enlarge their small-scale holdings. 
The economic crisis of the 1970s did not change this situation. Industrial 
workers with a rural background realized that their landed property could 
serve as a labour buffer in case of unemployment. Hence, though prices of 
both land and wood sagged, this still did not motivate farmers to sell. (In 
addition, it is characteristic of non-professional speculators that, while prices 
go up, they wait for even better opportunities to sell, and when they go 
down, they decide to wait and hope for better times.) 
So to sum up, industrialization enlarged the outlet markets for agrarian 
products, thus leading to product specialization on most of the farms: instead 
of cultivating a wide variety of crops and raising many different animals in 
small quantities and numbers, farm households concentrated on fewer 
products, but produced more of these. Besides, it enhanced the labour 
market, giving farmers the opportunity to employ their labour power in 
activities presumably more remunerative than agriculture. On the other hand, 
industrialization led to a stagnating land market, which impeded the (small) 
group of farmers in need of land to realize the necessary expansion that would 
have enabled them to increase productivity significantly. At the same time, 
the strategy of most part-time farmers to replace certain production .lines by 
others (less labour demanding and less remunerative) aggravated the situation 
of 'sub-optimal utilization' of agricultural land; that is to say, the real 
productivity of the land was considerably lower than its theoretically 
attainable productivity (the productivity that would have been realized in the 
absense of the mentioned limitations). This process of diverging consequences 
of industrialization, offering opportunities in some cases and restricting 
alternatives in other, is what we might term the industrialization paradox. 
This situation, whereby dairy farmers faced with a growing demand for 
their products on the market were hardly able to expand their livestocks as a 
result of the impossibility to purchase or hire more land, could be overcome by 
a policy of land re-allotment, something strongly advocated by some rural 
economists (cf. Etxezarreta, 1985) and policy makers. No political party 
forming part of the Basque Autonomous Government has been prepared to 
execute such a re-allotment policy, as this would have met with the 
opposition of the greater part of the farming population. 
This was the situation in the Basque countryside at the moment that the 
Iberian Peninsula became part of the European Economic Community and 
Basque farmers were confronted with the consequences of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
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2.3 The Common Agricultural Policy: its creation and reform 
The idea to create a European Common Market was launched in 1955 by the 
Benelux countries within the European Community for Carbon and Steel 
(E.C.C.S.), and on 25 March 1957 the European Economic Community, 
comprising France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, 
was founded. In 1973 the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark entered the 
Common Market, and eight years later, in 1981, Greece became the tenth 
member state of the Community, With the incorporation of Spain and 
Portugal, on 1 January 1986, the European Community acquired the 
dimension it had at the time the research on which this study is based was 
carried out. Its objectives, as stated in the Treaty of Rome, ran from raising 
the living standard of the people in the associated countries to establishing 
closer economic and political relationships among the states and maintaining 
peace in a continent that in the course of only 30 years had been devastated 
by two World Wars. 
In the summer of 1958, the foundations of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) were laid by the representatives of the first EEC countries in the 
Italian town of Stresa. Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome defined the objectives 
of this policy as follows (Werts, 1981: 18; Caja Laboral Popular, 1985: 181): 
- increasing the farmers' productivity, 
- providing the rural population with a reasonable income and a living 
standard comparable with that of the industrial workers, 
- stabilizing the markets of agrarian products, in order to avoid shortages 
and surplusses and sudden ups and downs of agrarian market prices, 
- guaranteeing Western European food supplies, 
- establishing reasonable consumer prices. 
The means to realize these objectives come from the European Fund of 
Agricultural Orientation and Guarantee, or FEOGA ("Fonds Européen 
d'Orientation et Garantie Agricole"). It was the CAP's price policy (the 
intervention prices that should guarantee the farmers a more or less stable 
income, the subsidies on exports, and the costs of storage, elaboration, or 
destruction of agrarian surplus products) that more and more absorbed the 
lion's share of this agricultural fund. In 1985 approximately 62% of the whole 
EEC budget was needed to meet the financial expenses related to the 
European Agricultural Policy (Arenaza et al., 1986: 72), which gives us an 
idea of the prominence of the CAP within the general policy framework of the 
European Community. 
The image of European agriculture has changed rather drastically over the last 
few decades; suffice it to say that in the first fifteen years after the Stresa 
meetings, every minute a farmer in one of the EEC countries gave up his 
agricultural enterprise. None the less, most of the objectives of the CAP were 
realized due to a radical rationalization of the primary sector: in spite of a 
decreasing rural population, agricultural production volumes in Europe kept on 
growing. In the words of Miramon: "Over the last 20 years the agrarian 
production has increased 40% with only half of the labour power. Today, 
European agriculture is characterized by structural overproduction" (Miramon, 
1987: 8), especially of dairy products, meat, cereals and wine. Indeed, we 
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may well agree with Miramon's observation that the Common Agricultural 
Policy became a victim of its own success. The policy to guarantee European 
farmers more or less constant prices for their products implied an ever greater 
pressure on the EEC's financial resourses. 
The 'Greenbook' ("Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy"), 
published in July 1985 by the Committee for the European Communities, 
announced a reform of the Agricultural Policy of the European Community, 
that aimed at restoring market balances and getting rid of the agrarian 
surpluses. These objectives were to be achieved by a more rigorous 
application of the market prices in force and the establishment of a quota 
system for surplus products. At the same time, special programmes were 
designed for farmers in mountainous or disadvantaged areas, based on the 
philosophy that is was important to keep the agrarian population on the land 
so as to maintain the social structure in these rural areas as much as possible. 
The new CAP suggested, however, that the future of the rural population in 
disadvantaged areas would not exclusively lie in the agricultural sector. 
We saw before how in the second half of this century farmers in Gipuzkoa 
specialized in those types of production that were dominant in the EEC 
member states with the most modern agricultural enterprises. Whereas the 
dimension and technological level of most Basque farms were only 
comparable with those in the most backward countries in the Common Market 
(Caja Laboral Popular, 1985). Irony had it that Spain, and thereby the Basque 
Autonomous Community, became part of the European Community when the 
former Common Agricultural Policy, that had stimulated agricultural production 
and protected farmers' incomes through a system of intervention prices, had 
just made way for a new policy that confronted farmers with production 
contingents for surplus products and a more direct application of market 
prices. 
In the years before Spain's incorporation into the Common Market, several 
economic studies were published that analyzed the future survival capacity of 
Spanish (or more specifically, Basque) farmers under the reformed CAP 
regime. In view of what has been said so far, it is hardly surprising that the 
majority of these publications gave the reader little reason for optimism. 
2.4 The Common Market and its expected consequences for Basque 
farmers 
Ceberio (1981) stated that the market perspectives of Basque products like 
dairy and beef would worsen after the incorporation into the Common Market. 
Basque dairy farmers had every reason to fear possible imports of milk from 
other European countries, as "one observes that price and quality differences 
are favourable for the EEC, where surplus is structural" (Ceberio, 1981: 106). 
It was therefore of the utmost importance that milk producers in the Basque 
Country could rely on a strong and modern dairy industry, once they had to 
stand up to competition from their European colleagues. According to the 
same author, poultry and pig farms would hardly be affected; export of pork 
to the rest of Europe would be out of the question, though, as long as the 
23 
African plague among pigs still existed in certain Spanish regions. Anyway, 
both types of production were of minor importance in the Basque provinces. 
Ceberio mentioned the production of mutton as one of the branches that 
might face a somewhat brighter future within the EEC. This opinion was 
shared by Garaizabal and Garcia de la Cruz (1986) who also saw good market 
perspectives for mutton; on the other hand, producers of beef, wheat, sugar, 
pork, and especially milk, faced great difficulties, that could only be overcome 
by modernizing Spanish farm enterprises and increasing their productivity. 
Another study {Mansvelt Beck and Nierop, 1986) mentioned a surplus 
production in Spain of olive oil, vegetables, fruit (including citrus fruits), and 
wine, and the country's self-sufficiency for suger, pork, poultry, and potatoes; 
there was a shortage of grain, milk, and beef. Before the adhesion of the 
Iberian Peninsula, the EEC was short of tobacco, fruit and citrus fruits, and 
this study suggested that some regions in Spain (Caceres for tobacco, 
Valencia for citrus fruits) might benefit from these market perspectives. This 
did not hold good for the Basque Country, however, where the mentioned 
products were hardly or not produced. The authors cited a Spanish stock-
breeder who pointed out that since the beginning of the eighties many dairy 
farmers had run into debts while trying to modernize their farms so as to 
resist European competition; this farmer feared that most of his colleagues 
would nevertheless be eliminated once the milkpowder and fresh milk from 
other European countries started to invade the Spanish territory. 
In the northern provinces of the peninsula, where the great majority of 
Spanish cattle-breeders can be found, small-scale, intensive farm enterprises 
prevail. In the early 1980s, the average number of cattle on Spanish farms 
was 10 (against 32.8 in the EEC-10, i.e. the EEC before the incorporation of 
Spain and Portugal), of which 4.9 were milch cows (15.7 in the EEC-10). The 
milk production of these Spanish cows was 3,173 kg per cow per year, 
against an average of 4,258 kg per cow per year in the EEC-10. The 
predominance of small-scale farms and aged farmers also accounted for the 
low level of mechanization in Spain: according to the 1982 census, there 
were only 2.1 tractors per 100 ha. of cultivated land (4.9 in the EEC-10), and 
0.6 combines per 100 ha. of cereals (1.8 in the EEC-10). 
The expansion of the Common Market called for the establishment of a 
transition period for certain agricultural products to avoid too traumatic 
adaptation problems on both sides of the Pyrenees. (This was not new, 
though: something similar had happened on former occasions, when first 
Britain, Denmark and Ireland, and later Greece, joined the European 
Community.) For agricultural products that were not expected to cause special 
problems, a transition period of seven years was established, during which the 
prices in Spain and Portugal that were lower than those of similar products in 
the rest of the EEC would gradually have to go up, while higher prices would 
remain on the same level until European prices would catch up with them. For 
milk, beef, oil, vegetables, fruit, etc., considered to be more 'problematic' 
products, either by the Iberian countries or by the other EEC members, a 
transition period of ten years was agreed upon. As Spanish dairy farmers, 
before their incorporation into the Common Market, were paid higher prices 
for their milk than their European colleagues, the dairy sector in Spain would 
at least for some time have to cope with a stagnation of producer prices. At 
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the same time, the transition arrangement regulated the maximum quantities 
of milk, dairy products and beef that were allowed to enter the Spanish 
market; over the first four years, these quantities would gradually have to 
increase, while after the fifth year imports should be free (Arenaza et al., 
1986: 86-87; see also the Acta de Adhesion Espafia-CEE, Agricultura, 1985, 
for a more detailed explanation). 
In short, whereas the producers of typically Mediterranean products, such 
as citrus fruits, olive oil and wine, were expected to benefit from the new 
opportunities offered by the European market, most authors foresaw a very 
dark future for Spain's dairy sector. This observation was particularly relevant 
for the regions along the Cantabrian Coast where 470,000 people were 
employed in agriculture, or one third of Spain's agrarian population (Arenaza 
et al., 1986: 87). The great majority of farm enterprises in this Northern fringe 
of the country, which includes the Basque provinces Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia, are 
dairy farms. According to one of the studies cited earlier, these farmers would 
become the "victims" of the integration of Spain into the EEC (Mansvelt Beck 
and Nierop, 1986: 78). 
A study published by the Research Department of a Basque banking 
institution explored in detail the economic opportunities of the different 
subsectors of regional agriculture within the EEC (Caja Laboral Popular, 1985). 
The abundancy of statistical material of which this exhaustive study made use 
yielded conclusions that were not at variance with those we already know. It 
was pointed out that in 1981 the number of people employed in agriculture as 
a percentage of total employment in the Basque Autonomous Community was 
5.6%, which demonstrated that on this point the Basque Country, and 
especially Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia, was more comparable with the industrial 
regions in Northern Europe than with the rest of Spain, where agricultural 
employment averaged 17.5% of total employment. The economic crisis of the 
seventies had had a devastating effect on Basque agriculture, causing the loss 
of more than a third of the jobs in this sector in less than ten years (ibid.: 8, 
9). The study laid special emphasis on the deficient structures and low 
productivity of the majority of the farms in this region, and concluded that 
"with the incorporation into the EEC, the problem of the lack of profitability of 
many Basque farm enterprises will become more acute, which will probably 
continue the process of disappearance of small farms and the reduction of 
employment in the agrarian sector" (ibid.: 225; my translation). 
The Caja Laboral study showed furthermore that while there existed a 
structural overproduction within the Common Market for products such as 
grain, beef, milk, and cheese, Spain still had not even reached a level of self-
sufficiency for these products by the middle of the 1980s. The outputs of 
Basque agriculture would thus have to compete on the Spanish market with 
imported products from the rest of the European Community. Within the 
Basque Autonomous Community, though, the proximity of the market might 
be in the advantage of the farmers; this was interpreted as "a defence against 
the competition coming from more distant places" (ibid.: 257). But other data 
in the same report were less comforting. A comparison of milk prices in the 
Basque Country and in the rest of Europe revealed that the most direct 
menace for Basque dairy farmers would come from their French counterparts, 
and especially from those in the South-western region of Aquitaine: even if 
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considerable transportation costs were charged, imported French milk would 
reach the factories in the Basque Country (and in other regions south of the 
Pyrenees) with a lower price than the milk delivered by farmers in the region 
itself (ibid.: 170). 
The publications referred to earlier all seemed to coincide in that the farmers' 
margins for survival would be reduced under the new CAP-regime. Indeed, by 
the end of the 1980s, when I carried out the main part of my fieldwork, the 
general complaint among dairy farmers was that they faced an important 
increase of the costs of inputs, whereas milk prices had hardly gone up. 
In May 1991, dairy farmers held several demonstrations in the Basque 
provincial capitals of San Sebastian and Bilbao to protest against the milk 
price they were paid by the factories. They claimed that the 1991 price of 
34.5 pesetas per litre equaled the prices of 1985 and did not even cover the 
production costs of 47 pesetas per litre (Social Security costs included).101 
Table 1 suggests that the first part of this assessment was not entirely 
correct, however. It shows the basis price of milk (i.e. not including bonuses) 
paid to farmers by the dairy factory Gurelesa/lparlat in the month of March of 
the years indicated. 
Table 1. Basis milk price paid to farmers in March of each year. Source: 
Iparlat. 
vear pesetas/litre year pesetas/litre 
1984 29.25 1991 36.5 
1985 31.6 1992 36 
1986 32.6 1993 36.5 
1987 32.6 1994 40 
1988 32.9 1995 38.5 
1989 39.4 1996 44 
1990 36.5 1997 43 
We thus see that the prices the farmers had received for a litre of milk had 
risen in some degree between 1985 and 1991, and that this increase had also 
continued during the next few years. At the same time it becomes clear that 
in some years prices also stagnated or even fell back to a lower level. 
Seasonal price fluctuations in the course of one year were considerable, as 
the following table shows, and these may have coloured the farmers' 
perception of the general evolution of prices over the years. (The table gives 
the monthly prices for 1991, but similar examples may be given for other 
years, as well; see Gobiemo Vasco, 1990: 21.) 
See for example El Diario Vasco, 4 May 1991, and El Mundo, 23 May 1991. 
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Table 2. Milk price fluctuation in 1991. Source: Gobierno Vasco, 1993: 83. 
month 
January 
February 
pesetas/litre 
41 
40.5 
38.3 
36.1 
34.6 
33.7 
month 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
pesetas/litre 
34.9 
36 
38.7 
40.4 
41 
41.1 
March 
April 
May 
June 
These fluctuations may have obscured the overall upward tendency of milk 
prices. All the same, this does not alter the fact that even in the months the 
farmers got paid most, the milk price remained well below what were 
esteemed to be the total production costs of 47 pesetas. 
As for the dairy sector as a whole, Spanish industries were gradually 
taken over by foreign companies: in the early 1990s, five of the eleven largest 
dairy factories in Spain were controlled by French capital, while further 
attempts of French dairy industries to increase their grip on the Spanish 
market were inminent.111 A Dutch dairy industry tried to take over one of 
the Basque cooperatives. 
In view of the gloomy predictions cited above and these recent 
developments, the Basque Administration successfully attempted to convince 
dairy factories in the region to unite their forces: in 1992 the factory Iparlat 
was formed, which comprised Gurelesa and most of the other cooperatives in 
the Basque Country and Navarra. Moreover, the regional Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries pursued a policy of stimulating dairy farmers to 
increase their production, mainly by subsidizing infrastructural improvements, 
like the purchase of modern machinery or the conversion of woodland into 
meadows (while the EEC policy by then was aimed at converting pastures into 
woodland or nature area). When the central Government in Madrid began to 
implement the European dairy quota policy all over Spain, the Basque 
Administration tried to shield the regional dairy sector from its negative 
consequences by acquiring a quota reservoir of about 25% more than what 
was actually produced in the region. 
What about the evolution of the number and size of farm enterprises in 
Gipuzkoa in the course of the 1980s and after? Although I lack sufficient data 
to relate these in any way to the incorporation into the European Common 
Market, the following statistics are interesting enough in their own right. If we 
first compare the number of cattle farms with the total cattle population in the 
province for the years 1982 and 1989, we see that many cattle farms 
disappeared, while the remaining holdings became bigger: the average 
livestock per farm increased from 10.1 to 12.3 heads. 
SeeEIDiario Vasco, 26 May 1991. 
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Table 3. Number of cattle farms and total cattle population in Gipuzkoa. 
Sources: Gobierno Vasco, 1985; EUSTAT, 1991. 
Cattle farms Heads of cattle 
1982 6,362 64,079 
1989 5,783 71,005 
(-9.1%) (+10.8%) 
Unfortunately, the 1982 census does not specify the number of dairy farms. 
We can show the evolution in the number of dairy farm enterprises between 
1989 and 1994, however (see Table 4); in the latter half of this time-span 
farmers were confronted with the effects of the milk quota. 
We see that in only five years the number of dairy farms in the province 
had been reduced with one-third. In part, this may be due to the fact that 
many full-time farm enterprises that change into part-time holdings shift from 
dairy to beef production. Furthermore, since the coming into force of the dairy 
quota, aged farmers without successors may have seized this opportunity to 
give up milk production.121 The decline had occurred principally among the 
dairy farms with fewer than 20 cows, whereas the number of holdings with 
more than 20 milch cows had increased with almost 30% (viz. from 234 to 
302). 
Table 4. Farms with dairy cows in Gipuzkoa (specified according to intervals 
of heads of cattle). Sources: EUSTAT, 1991; Gobierno Vasco, 1995. 
in 1989 in 1994 
No. of farms % of total No. of farms % of total 
1-4 1,813 45.17% 1,160 43.28% 
5-9 1,268 31.59% 744 27.76% 
10-19 699 17.41 % 474 17.69% 
20-49 225 5.61 % 265 9.89% 
50-99 8 0.2 % 33 1.23% 
2:100 1 0.02% 4 0.15% 
Total 4,014 100 % 2,680 100 % 
Table 5 shows the figures referring to the number of heads of farms in the 
course of almost two decades. It remains unclear whether we should assume 
that the number of heads of farms really grew in the 1980s or that the 
increase in the total number of farm managers between 1982 and 1989 must 
Complementary to this decline in the number of dairy farms, there seems to have been an 
increase in the number of beef producing enterprises. From 1993 to 1994, this increase was 
almost 10% in Gipuzkoa (Gobierno Vasco, 1995). 
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be attributed to a difference in definitions (in the 1989 census the term 'jefe 
de la explotacifin' did not only refer to the farm holder but could also imply 
another household member or a regular hired worker).131 It is not unlikely 
that the evolution suggested is due to imperfections in the 1972 and 1982 
censuses, which are now generally recognized. More interesting, however, is 
the evolution of the percentages of full-time farm managers: even taking into 
account the unreliability of data in the earlier censuses, the declining 
importance of full-time farm enterprises in the Gipuzkoan countryside is 
unmistakeable. 
Table 5. Heads of farms in Gipuzkoa (total number and full-time farm 
managers) between 1972 and 1989. Sources: EUSTAT, 1991; 
Gobierno Vasco, 1986. 
Total number of Full-time farm managers 
heads of farms Number percentage 
1972 11,601 7,413 63.9% 
1982 11,456 4,211 36.8% 
1989 12,018 3,054 25.4% 
At the same time, the table suggests that a reducing number of full-time 
holdings does not automatically imply a depopulation of the rural sector. If it is 
correct that the total number of heads of farms remained fairly constant, we 
may expect the number of part-time farms to have risen. 
In the 1980s, policy makers still feared that a dramatic depopulation of the 
Basque countryside would take place. It was expected that, among other 
things as a result of the entry into the EEC, many farmers would be forced to 
give up their holdings and move to the city. Part-time farming was regarded as 
no more than a transitional stage between full-time farming and eventual 
abandonment. In order to prevent the small rural villages from being 
abandoned, the regional Government aimed at carrying out a policy of 
'comprehensive rural development', a policy that was aimed at "not only 
agriculture, but also infrastructure, communication, services, schools, and the 
development of small-scale industries in rural areas" [Urrutia, Department of 
Barinagarrementeria (1989:37, 40), confronted with an increase (from the 1950s to the 
'80s) in the number of owners of farm land in a village in Bizkaia, suggests another 
explanation, namely that people from outside the rural sector, motivated by the increasing 
profitability of the Californian pine-tree since the middle of the century, bought parcels of 
woodland from big landowners who sold their properties in seperate parcels. I do not believe 
this explanation is valid in our case, however, as this so-called 'green gold' boom had come 
to an end by the 1980s. 
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Agriculture141 of the Basque Autonomous Government; X/87]. 
That the expected massive rural exodus has not ocurred may have been 
partly due to this rural policy, but is in my view mainly the result of the 
resilience capacity of the Basque farming sector itself. The former tables 
suggest that we are not so much faced with a disappearing, as with a 
changing countryside. It is precisely this idea of a changing countryside which 
can be heard in the narrations of villagers themselves. These narrations and 
the people's motives to leave or stay in the villages will be discussed in the 
following chapter (Chapter 3). 
In Chapter 4, I shall discuss how, with the European Common Agricultural 
Policy in the background, national and regional institutions designed their own 
agricultural policies, in what way the inter-institutional struggle over a 
definition of agricultural development was at the same time a struggle over 
power, and how the outcome of this struggle was perceived by the Basque 
farming population. 
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Until 1994, the full name of this department was: Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Since then, it has been the Department of Industry, Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Chapter 3 
THE REVALUATION OF RURAL VILLAGES 
In the first half of the 1980s, the policy of the Department of Agriculture of 
the Basque Autonomous Government had been aimed at a certain 
rationalization of the countryside; this implied that the majority of the small-
scale, unviable, farms should gradually disappear so that their land could be 
taken over by bigger and more modern farming enterprises that were expected 
to be better able to resist the competition with which Basque agriculture 
would be confronted after the region's incorporation into the European 
Common Market. At the same time, the idea prevailed that a massive exodus 
of rural inhabitants to the urban areas should be prevented. Not only because 
of a lack of jobs and housing facilities in the urban-industrial sector that still 
suffered from the consequences of the economic recession. But also because 
policy makers had more and more come to realize that modern agricultural 
structures and favourable market conditions were not always enough to 
motivate farmers to continue their farming enterprises; farmers' decisions on 
continuity or abandonment equally depended on social factors like the number 
of inhabitants of the village, and the presence of a school, a shop, a doctor 
and a vet. The awareness that it was important to guarantee the social 
viability of rural villages coincided with the recognition of the importance of 
mountainous and disadvantaged regions within the agricultural policy of the 
European Community. By the end of the 1980s, all over the Basque Country 
so-called Associations for Mountain Farming had been set up and money from 
European funds was passed on to projects that should support the 
maintenance of remote mountain villages. 
The greater part of my fieldwork was carried out in two small mountain 
villages which I shall refer to as Aritzmendi and Zelaizabal. When I call these 
rural communities 'mountain villages' it is not so much because of their 
altitude. A village can be defined as a so-called Mountain Farming Area, in 
terms of the European Community, if the difference in altitude between the 
highest and the lowest point within the village boundaries is greater than 400 
metres, or if the average angle of inclination of mountain slopes is higher than 
20%. In most villages in the province of Gipuzkoa either one or both 
conditions are fulfilled. In both Aritzmendi and Zelaizabal, the village nucleus 
consisted of no more than the village hall, the church, a small school, a bar 
with restaurant and a few houses around the village square; as in almost all 
villages in the Basque coastal provinces, the majority of the farmsteads lay 
scattered on the mountain slopes around these nuclei. Although it only took 
about 10 minutes to a quarter of an hour by car to get from the village nuclei 
to the nearest urban centres, it might take another 10 minutes or more, 
driving along winding mountain roads, to reach the isolated farms. There are 
reasonably well maintained asphalted or cement roads to virtually all inhabited 
farms, and on most farms there is at least one car. Complaints of feeling 
isolated, both among young and old farm dwellers, did normally not concern 
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the distance in kilometres between the farm and the village, but had generally 
more to do with disappearing services in the village and a gradually shrinking 
social environment (cf. Greenwood, 1976: 151). 
3.1 Aritzmendi 
In the second half of the last century, this village in the Goierri region had had 
about 1,100 inhabitants, and all through the first half of this century, numbers 
had still fluctuated around 800. But since the 1950s the population had 
decreased rapidly. In 1988, the village had 476 inhabitants; 399 inhabitants 
lived on the 86 farms around the village nucleus. There were only 20 farms 
where the owners were registered as full-time farmers, but 8 of them received 
an old-age pension. So there were no more than 12 farms with full-time 
farmers younger than 65 in the whole village. On three of these farms did the 
inhabitants gain their income exclusively through their farming activities, while 
on the other nine either the owner's wife, children, or other relatives living on 
the farm, gained additional incomes outside the agricultural sector. According 
to the "Enciclopedia Histdrico-GeogrSfica de Guipuzcoa", published in 1983, 
almost 40% of the local inhabitants belonged to the 'active population', which 
means they had a job; 7.62% of the total population worked in the primary 
sector, but this percentage was probably lower by the end of the decade. 
There were four factories within the village limits, one bar with a dining-
room, two gastronomic societies, and (at some distance of the nucleus) a 
restaurant. The small school with two teachers was only attended by very 
young children; the older children had to leave the village. There were no 
shops, nor was there any public transport that passed through the village 
(although there was a small station at about a kilometre from the nucleus 
where a train stopped a few times a day). If one needed a doctor or a vet, one 
had to go the nearest town. Recently, a new, roofed fronton (where people of 
all ages played the popular Basque ball-game 'pelota') had been built right 
behind the church, but there were no other sports facilities. 
According to the mayor, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the general 
tendency had been for people living in small and relatively isolated places like 
Aritzmendi to leave the village and start living and working in more urbanized 
centres. Since then, however, the situation had changed. 
"People have become aware that it's much better to live here. Roads 
have improved a lot, everyone has a telephone and a car, so it has 
become easier to live here and work in a town some 10 km away. 
So nowadays, a number of young people are not leaving the village 
anymore: they are rebuilding the farm or are having a house built 
next to their parents' farm." 
People also had the possibility to go and live in some new blocks of flats that 
had been built near the village square a few years earlier. 
Although the mayor was quite pessimistic about the future of farming in 
the region, he did not believe village life would be seriously affected. 
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"As I see it, the phenomenon of farming as a way of life will 
disappear. But that does not mean that the farms themselves will 
disappear. The majority of farmsteads in Aritzmendi are being 
renewed or redecorated. The people who live there work in industry; 
they see the farm as their house and maybe have a vegetable garden 
and some fowls and rabbits or so." 
Farms may still be abandoned in the future, but in the mayor's view this will 
only happen "on those farms where there are no children, no successors". 
There were, however, several farms in Aritzmendi that were occupied by a 
few brothers and sisters, an old childless couple, or a bachelor - that is by 
people without any descendants to pass the farm on to when they died. 
3.2 Zelaizabal 
In the first half of the 20th century, the population of Zelaizabal, situated in 
the Tolosaldea area, increased steadily, from 890 inhabitants in 1900 to 1027 
in 1950, but since then more and more people began to leave the village. In 
1988 there were only 491 inhabitants left. The Historical-Geographical 
Encyclopedia of 1983 stated that 50% of the village population was 
employed, with 18,11% working in the primary sector. Again, this 
percentage, which suggested that more than a third of the active population 
was working in agriculture, must have declined considerably by the time I 
carried out my fieldwork here. (It is, however, doubtful that the percentage of 
people working in the primary sector in Zelaizabal has ever been so high in the 
last twenty years; I believe it is much more likely that this number is due to 
statistical defectiveness. The agricultural census of 1972 is nowadays seen as 
totally unreliable, and even the 1982 census is believed to contain more or 
less serious imperfections.) According to an Animal Health Control Census, 
carried out in 1989, there were 76 farms where cows or sheep were kept: 64 
with only cows, 3 with sheep, and 9 farms with both. 
There were a few small factories in the village, but almost everyone with 
a job in industry worked elsewhere; there were two medium-sized industrial 
towns at ten minute distance by car. A bus passed the village twice a day in 
either direction. There was one small school with only lower classes, two bars 
with dining-rooms, but no shops - though some basic products could be 
bought in one of the bars. There was, however, a small cooperative where 
farmers could buy animal fodder, fertilizers and the like, and drink a glass of 
wine while they were waiting. As for sports facilities, the village had a 
hunting society with quite a few enthusiastic members, and two frontons, one 
of which had been built a year before. The doctor and his family left the 
village during the months I spent there (leaving head over heels, as a matter 
of fact, for he had been threatened by some villagers who accused him of not 
having done his work properly...); the vet had already left two years earlier. 
The village did not even have its own priest anymore; a few times a week, a 
priest from a neighbouring village visited Zelaizabal to say mass. 
Some families from San Sebastian or other towns near the coast had 
bought houses or farms in Zelaizabal where they spent their weekends and 
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holidays. Two families from a neighbouring town had bought a piece of land in 
the village and had had their cottage built there. (Some of these people 
behaved rather like the average North European holiday-maker on the Costa 
Brava, and were consequently treated with considerable disdain by the 
villagers.) The owners of one of the bars were building a country hotel, trying 
to benefit from the increasing popularity of rural tourism among urban 
residents. 
I interviewed a group of teenagers from Zelaizabal, most of them farmers' 
children, on what village life meant to them. Although they admitted that 
town life had much more to offer as far as cultural and sports activities go, 
most of them preferred living in the village. Only the few people who followed 
a university career and lived in town during the week said they would rather 
live in an urban environment on weekdays, while spending their weekends and 
holidays in the village. The general opinion among these teenagers was that 
few farmers' children would take over their parents' farm; however, most of 
them would probably not leave the farm either, but change it into a kind of 
rural dwelling - "especially taking into account the prices of houses 
nowadays". They thought it would be a good idea to build some blocks of 
flats in the village. In former years, young people who had a job in town and 
wanted to get married were usually forced to find a house there as well, as 
there were no housing facilities in the village. "If there had been houses here, 
these people might have stayed." 
These young people were quite neutral about urban weekend and holiday 
visitors, though they did not find that their presence really helped to make 
village life 'livelier'; after all, most of them were over 50 and their only visible 
activity in the village used to be their spending money on eating and drinking 
in the local bars. The teenagers thought it was much more important to make 
sure that people who lived in Zelaizabal would not leave in the future. As one 
of the students said: "If there were fewer than 100 people living in the village, 
I don't think I would come back at the weekend." 
Worth mentioning too is that they believed they were less affected by 
typical youth problems than their contemporaries in town. Not unimportant in 
a region where youth unemployment is about 50% and numbers for drug 
consumption and alcohol abuse are also among the highest in Western 
Europe. 
3.3 The quest for social viability 
Until the 1970s, mountain villages in the Basque Country were much more 
isolated than they are now: there were fewer roads, many roads were not 
asphalted, and very few people had a car. When, as a result of regional 
industrialization since the 1950s, many young men from the rural villages 
found a job in industry, they normally had to go and live in town. They were 
not only farmers' sons who left the village, but many times their fathers also 
followed after a while, leaving the farm behind. Within twenty years, the 
number of inhabitants was often reduced to half or a third, and together with 
the leavers most services had disappeared as well. 
As a result of the world-wide economic crisis it became more difficult to 
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find work in the industrial sector. But still it was easier for farmers' sons to 
find a job than it was for urban people. The former had a reputation for 
working harder and being less organized in trade unions, which was why 
Basque industrial entrepreneurs, the majority of whom were farmers' sons 
themselves, preferred contracting them. A farmer's son in Aritzmendi I asked 
about unemployment among villagers explained: 
"I think it helps if you have a rural background, because employers 
know that you are used to working. In the factory where I work, 
except one technician, all of us are farmers' sons. I was just about 
to finish my schooling, when people from two different factories had 
already offered me a job. As far as I know, there's no-one here who 
is unemployed." 
And if they do lose their job in industry, and they are still single, they can 
always come back to the farm and help their parents. Some farmers' children 
were known to have started working on the farm because they either had lost 
their job or had not been able to find one; this had led to the purchase of 
more animals and a higher production level. 
When communication between town and countryside improved, it became 
common for people in the more isolated villages to have a job in the factory 
without entirely giving up the farm. The number of cattle normally decreased, 
while pine-trees were planted where once had been meadows, but these part-
time farmers did not let their farms fall into disrepair and they kept their fields 
clean. It is because of this that many people claimed that "the part-time 
farmer has saved Basque agriculture". Although this statement might be 
challenged, there is, I think, little doubt that part-time farming has at least 
contributed to the maintenance of village life. 
It is true that children of part-time farmers hardly ever become full-time 
farmers themselves, just as the complaint of some farmers may be justified 
that they could have expanded their farming enterprise if only their neighbour 
had abandoned his farm (and sold them his lands) instead of becoming a part-
time farmer. Without wanting to ignore these objections, which indicate some 
real problems in concrete cases, it is nevertheless my contention that part-
time farming has become a determining factor in the process of rural 
development: policy makers no longer deny that part-time farmers constitute 
(part of) the social environment in which other farming enterprises operate. (A 
more detailed discussion of the phenomenon of part-time farming can be 
found in Chapter 8.) 
Considerations with respect to the maintenance of social environment in 
rural communities also play a role in the European policy on disadvantaged 
areas. There were several Associations for Mountain Farming in the Basque 
Country that worked out projects on behalf of groups of farmers or even 
whole village communities for which they hoped to get subsidies from 
Brussels. These projects varied from the collective purchase of agricultural 
machinery or the improvement of mountain roads to the renovation of meeting 
places for villagers and the organization of school transport. And villages 
developed their own initiatives, too. In some places houses were built to 
motivate young people to stay, summer courses were organized for young 
children, in many villages new, well-equipped frontons had been built. And, as 
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an informant observed: 
"Some people may criticize the fact that 'now they're even having 
the bloody church of village X done up.' But for that village, this may 
have an important function: the church affirms their identity, it's a 
meeting place, it contributes to the image of a beautiful village..." 
3.4 The social environment and the maintenance of the holding 
For some time, it was feared that the disappearance of small farmers would 
gradually lead to greater social isolation of their more viable colleagues, who 
would therefore become more inclined to give up farming as well. More recent 
developments show that this scenario should probably be readjusted. 
People in the villages have come to realize the advantages of living in a 
healthier, less industrialized and less urbanized environment. Several farmers 
or their children told me they felt privileged in comparison with townspeople. 
They did not have to live in flats or put up with noise and pollution, and they 
could eat vegetables from their own garden and meat of pigs, rabbits or 
chickens they had reared themselves. Villagers who had a job in town may 
have experienced that the ultimate aspiration of some of their urban 
colleagues was to have a cottage in the countryside. 
If a farming couple had any children, one of them normally decided to stay 
on the farm. In some cases the successor continued the farm as a full-time 
enterprise, but most of the times he or she combined a non-agricultural job 
with some minor activities on the holding, whose status was reduced to that 
of rural dwelling. In either case, it was customary practice that the son or 
daughter would take care of the parents; on the other hand, the successor did 
not need to run into debts to buy a house (although successors normally did 
have to pay part of the value of the farm to other brothers and sisters; see 
Section 6.5). 
In a number of villages, housing projects had been set up, so that farmers' 
children who had to leave the holding after being married would not be forced 
to go and live in town. It was hoped that these initiatives would bring back 
some services, like a small shop, or sports facilities, which would be 
favourable for social life in the village. School facilities for older children were 
not expected to return, but in many parts of rural Gipuzkoa there were 
schoolbusses that brought the children from the village to their school and 
back every day. Some parents found it a safe idea that their children were 
brought back to the village immediately after the school was over instead of 
hanging about in town for hours like the urban youth. 
It can safely be assumed that a greater awareness among the rural and 
urban population of the healthier aspects of village life, both physically and 
socially, will make it easier for farmer's sons, whether they want to continue 
their parents' holding as a productive unit or merely use it as a dwelling, to 
find a woman willing to marry them and live on the farm (cf. Chapter 9). In 
the past, many young farmers had experienced the incompatibility of running 
a farm and getting married, which had motivated them to take up a job in 
industry and find a house in town. 
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There is no denying that the number of full-time farmers is decreasing, but all 
in all I think that expectations with respect to the social environment in which 
farm households operate are more favourable than in the past. Crucial is the 
subjectively perceived isolation of the village. If the distance to the urban-
industrial centres is too great, the roads have not been maintained, and the 
younger villagers meet fewer and fewer people of their own age-groups on the 
streets or in the bars, the village will gradually be abandoned and only the 
aged people remain. 
In most villages, the downward spiralling development of farm 
abandonment, reducing social viability of the rural area and consequently a 
higher incidence of farm abandonment, has virtually come to a halt and it can 
be assumed that this notion is taken into account by household members who 
negotiate their future role on the farm, especially by those who negotiate the 
conditions of succession with their parents. 
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Chapter 4 
A G R I C U L T U R A L I N S T I T U T I O N S : P O L I C I E S A N D 
CONFRONTATIONS 
This chapter describes how different policies of regional, national or supra-
national institutions affect farmers' strategies and how at least part of the 
interplay of (regional) institutional policies is dominated by clashes over 
political interests. I try to come up with an explanation for the way farmers 
react to these agricultural policies and why they sometimes choose not to get 
involved in them. 
Nowadays, most of the milk sold in the Basque Country reaches the consumer 
through one of the dairy cooperatives. There are still many farmers who 
personally sell their milk every day to their clients in the villages and town, but 
their number is gradually decreasing, not in the least because their circle of 
clients is shrinking. Consumers of fresh milk may give up buying directly from 
the farmer for a variety of reasons (which will be explained in a later chapter), 
but the result is invariably the same: they will start buying either sterilized, 
pasteurized or skimmed milk from the dairy factory. 
The situation some forty years ago was quite different. In those days, the 
newly created dairy cooperative Gurelesa had great difficulty to hold out. This 
was due to the opposition of the great majority of milk hawkers, who saw 
their own interests threatened, and the attitude of the consumers, who had 
little faith in the milk that came from the factory. 
4.1 Legal restrictions and people's protest 
The first years after the Civil War were years of prosperity for the farmers in 
the Basque provinces, but prices of most agricultural products stagnated 
when products from outside began to enter the region. As to milk, in many 
Basque homes its consumption was still far from general: children often had 
garlic-soup for breakfast. In Gipuzkoa, milk production exceeded its 
consumption. For about twenty years, all through the 1940s and '50s, the 
price that a farmer in the province could ask for one litre of milk hardly 
changed, while on the other hand prices of consumer goods did go up. 
In the fifties, consumers in San Sebastian, the provincial capital, paid 
between 5.5 and 6 pesetas for a litre of milk, whereas farmers in villages at 
20 km distance did not charge more than 2 pesetas. So hundreds of farmers 
from surrounding villages began to travel to San Sebastian each morning, 
offering their milk from door to door and little by little creating a fairly stable 
market for their products. In the end, there were nearly 2,000 hawkers going 
into town every day to sell their milk and whatever other agricultural products 
(vegetables, fruit, eggs) the urban housewives might be willing to buy from 
them. There were extra buses and even special trains to transport these 
farmers from their villages to the capital and back. And as these hundreds of 
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hawkers {the majority of them women) would do their daily shopping in town, 
the commercial sector boosted. Even chemists, doctors and dentists used to 
benefit from this situation. 
The dairy cooperative Gurelesa was created in the mid-fifties. Soon 
afterwards a law was promulgated that gave regional dairy factories the 
exclusivity of milk sales in a certain territory; at the same time, the law 
stipulated the prohibition of milk hawking in towns with over 50,000 
inhabitants (this number was later reduced to 25,000). However, the law was 
never effectively sanctioned as it met with widespread opposition of both 
consumers and hawkers. 
The first demonstration under the Franco regime, in the streets of San 
Sebastian, was organized to protest against this prohibitive law as well as 
against the dairy factory: the most popular slogans were those that meant to 
discredit the quality of the milk offered by Gurelesa. Of course, the solidarity 
of the urban population with the milk hawkers was not entirely disinterested. 
If the law had been enforced and milk hawking had been forbidden in San 
Sebastian and other big towns, the whole network of economic interests that 
over the years had been created around the hawkers (of shopkeepers, bus and 
train companies, even medical services) might suddenly have collapsed. In the 
words of one of the founders of Gurelesa, and one of its first managers: 
"Everyone was against the dairy factory, the anti-propaganda was 
enormous. We even considered closing down the factory because 
we were losing huge sums of money. Imagine, even doctors 
recommended the consumption of raw milk - complete idiots!151 
"But many farmers had to give up hawking, because more and more 
people tasted our milk and they said it was much better. (..) I can 
show you letters of mothers who raised their children with our milk, 
expressing their gratitude... They saw that all those dysenteric 
deseases that existed before disappeared by using pasteurized milk." 
[Erzilia, Gurelesa; XII/88] 
Informants also suggested another reason for the decreasing consumption of 
fresh milk among urban clients. Milk hawkers, perhaps still under the influence 
of their success in mobilizing support against the prohibitive law and the dairy 
factory, began to charge more money for their milk, claiming that it was of 
better quality than the cooperative's pasteurized milk. Urban solidarity with 
the farmers' fate deminished as a result of this manoeuvre. 
Slowly, the dairy cooperative managed to gain the confidence of both 
consumers and farmers. The opposition of the milk hawkers was successfully 
neutralized by the cooperative's policy to accept their surplus production: i.e. 
what the hawkers were not able to sell to their clients in the villages and 
towns, could still be sold to the dairy factory afterwards, which was 
especially important in summer when their cows produced more milk but 
consumers would buy less. 
This happened in a period when tuberculosis and brucelosis were still quite frequent 
deseases among the cows in the region. 
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4.2 Subtleties of regional policy: restrictions in the 1980s 
A study that was carried out in 1990 by order of the Basque Department of 
Public Health revealed that by the end of the 1980s 34% of the milk 
produced and sold by the farmers in the Basque Autonomous Community did 
not reach the consumers through the dairy factories. (This was 24% for the 
whole of Spain, whereas the average for the 12 member states of the 
European Union was only 8.8%.) 
A representative of the farmers' union EHNE (Euskal Herriko Nekazarien 
Elkartasuna, that is the Union of Basque Farmers) explained why, even some 
thirty years after its promulgation, the law forbidding milk hawking in towns 
with over 25.000 inhabitants was still a dead letter: 
"The Administration in Madrid was not able to enforce this law in 
Franco's time; and today, neither Madrid, nor the Basque 
Government, nor the town-councils dare to sanction the law that 
forbids farmers to sell their milk on the street. Those who could 
demand the application of the law are the dairy cooperatives, but 
they would get the whole group of milk hawkers against them. So 
there are no complaints, no formal accusations, and the Government 
does not undertake any action either." 
[Lekuona, EHNE; XII/88] 
According to the manager of Gurelesa, who corroborated the latter comment, 
the reasons why the cooperative had never made a charge against the 
hawkers were both practical and social. 
"There's no point in forcing farmers to become cooperative members 
by accusing them of illegally selling their milk on the streets, because 
such farmers would never become loyal members of the cooperative. 
(..) 
"And many farmers in the Board of Directors of Gurelesa have 
neighbours who are hawkers; they realise that in times of great 
industrial unemployment, it has been a solution for many farms if a 
son or daughter could go and sell milk on the street for a couple of 
hours a day, thereby earning some money. In accepting their surplus 
production, we might even state that the cooperative fulfils a social 
function, although this policy is not approved of by all of its 
members." 
[Larrea, Gurelesa; XII/89] 
The main argument of those who would like to forbid milk hawking was that it 
was non-pasteurized and normally unpacked milk that was offered to the 
consumers, who were therefore believed to be subject to important health 
risks. The EHNE representative cited before strongly objected to this vision: 
"Two things to answer this: one, for many farmers milk hawking is a 
way of life; the margin that would otherwise be for the dairy factory 
means an important extra source of income on these farms. And 
two, nobody would drink this milk without boiling it first; we've all 
grown up with farm milk here: if you boil it, it's practically the same 
as when it's pasteurized. (..) 
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"We would never accept it if milk hawking was all of a sudden 
forbidden - it would mean a small-scale war..." 
[Lekuona, EHNE; XII/88] 
The Basque Autonomous Government had never seriously tried to enforce the 
law by forbidding dairy producers to sell their fresh milk directly to their 
clients. {Some people I questioned on the agrarian policy of the regional 
Government suggested that the Administration did not want to put its 
popularity at stake by sanctioning a law that had been promulgated by the 
former dictatorial regime and that had met with such wide popular resistance.) 
But in the latter half of the 1980s, a few years after Spain's incorporation into 
the European Economic Community, the Basque Department of Public Health 
let hospitals, old people's homes, bakeries and cake shops know that 
henceforward they were only allowed to use packed and pasteurized dairy 
products. As a result, many milk hawkers lost their most important clients. 
The farmer union's representative told me: 
A.L.: "We try to fight this decree, but it's very difficult as they 
have the law behind them." 
HvdB: "But does the Administration refer to the restrictive law of 
1956 or to EEC health norms in these cases?" 
A.L.: "This law dates back to the Franco days and it doesn't 
make such a good impression if you start waving with it." 
HvdB: "But many people may find it a lot more acceptable if the 
Department of Public Health declares that they are only 
following European regulations..." 
A . L : "Exactly." 
[Lekuona, EHNE; XII/88] 
While sales were left undisturbed, purchase of raw milk by institutions and 
shops was limited, apparently invoking EEC norms on the hygienic treatment 
of foodstuffs. This policy allowed the Basque Administration to shift 
responsability for such a relatively impopular measure on to some higher, 
more anonimous authority. 
4.3 Quota and conflict 
Whereas restrictions on milk hawking only affected part of the dairy farming 
population (though still an important part), the application of milk production 
quota in the region would affect the whole dairy sector. In 1987, the Ministry 
of Agriculture in Madrid stipulated that, as a first step towards the 
introduction of the dairy quota, farmers in the different regions of Spain 
should declare their milk production over the year 1985. But in the Basque 
Country this met with resistance of both the regional Administration and the 
farmers' union. The Basque Department of Agriculture objected that the 
statistics on rural production that the Spanish state operated with, and on the 
basis of which the regional quota would be determined, were highly unreliable 
and did not correspond at all with the data elaborated by the Basque 
Statistical Bureau. Thereupon the Spanish Minister of Agriculture, Romero, 
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threatened that he would consider the entire production of the dairy farmers 
who refused to declare as surplus production over which they would have to 
pay the 'superlevy'. This rather untactful observation only served to increase 
the atmosphere of conflict. The farmers' union EHNE replied that "Basque 
farmers, faced with Romero's blackmail policy, will use every possible means 
to defend themselves." But equally unambiguous was the reaction of the 
Minister who declared he would not negotiate "with people who behave like 
hooligans!" 
Tensions died down considerably when the Basque Administration claimed 
its own competency in the matter and promised to send Madrid the required 
information on regional production volumes as soon as the Minister of 
Agriculture sent the Autonomous Government a report in which he explained 
his criteria for quota distribution. There came no reaction from the Minister. 
And as EHNE also refused to declare individual milk production volumes to 
their 'own' Department of Agriculture, the situation around the application of 
dairy quota was at a deadlock for quite a long time. 
Eventually, in 1993, the dairy quota were established on the basis of 
individual and regional production in reference year 1991-92. According to the 
former Minister of Agriculture of the Basque Government, it was the pressure 
of their own farmer members which motivated EHNE to give up their policy of 
resistance against the application of the quota. 
"There was a certain evolution in the policy of EHNE, because their 
own dairy farmers were in favour of the quota. Some decided to give 
up farming and they wanted to sell their quota, which would provide 
them with an interesting sum of money. And others realized that it 
was evident that the quota would someday be put into effect and 
they wanted some security. So both groups put pressure on the 
union. 
"The Basque Government has acquired important quantities of quota 
- about 25% more than what was produced here. And we strongly 
confined the trade in quota, as we feared that people would start 
selling quota outside the Basque Autonomous Community. So free 
trade in quota was restricted and the Basque Administration quickly 
acquired the quota offered, buying the farmers' productive capacity, 
in order to avoid the creation of a market... These quota were then 
redistributed according to other farmers' necessities, not exclusively 
in function of their economic resources, as would have been the 
case in a completely free market. (..) The criteria that we have been 
using to determine who would get more quotum were: the necessity 
of the dairy farmer, the scale of the farm enterprise, the age of the 
owner of the farm, and the investments over the last few years." 
[J.M. Goikoetxea, former Minister of Agriculture, Basque 
Autonomous Government; VII/96] 
In other autonomous regions milk quota seemed to cause farmers and dairy 
factories more problems, as they were based on the declarations of the 
production volumes of 1985. The six year delay in the application of quota in 
the Basque Country was believed to have benefited the region considerably. 
The farmers' union EHNE agreed that the existence of a 'global' quotum in the 
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Autonomous Community had worked out favourably for dairy farming in the 
region. But they criticized the way in which, according to them, the 
Administration carried out the redistribution of 'liberated' quota (i.e. quota 
sold by farmers who give up milk production) in practice. 
"The dairy factory needs milk, they have invested a lot of money and 
they have to produce as much as they can in order to get some 
benefits. And they want this milk to be produced here. Many dairy 
farmers made investments in order to expand their enterprise 
without having the corresponding quotum. But they thought: When I 
need it, they'll give it to me. The present-day policy of the 
Administration is to give quota to those farmers who exceeded 
themselves." 
[X. Goikoetxea, EHNE; VI/96] 
4.4 The institutional arenas 
The former sketches of conflict situations show that there are several arenas 
in what Basque farmers may perceive as their 'landscape of power' (Pile, 
1990). Following Swartz et al. (1966), I see the arena as a particular kind of 
political field161 in which conflicts take a predominantly dichotomous form 
(Swartz et al., 1966: 33, 34). These arenas may be located on different levels 
(either regional, national or international); although they are temporary, some 
may coincide in time, but even if they do not, the course of a struggle in one 
arena may still be influenced by the outcome in another. The protagonists in 
one arena may or may not be the same contenders in another arena. 
Coalitions that are formed among the actors in an arena are sometimes 
relatively stable, while others easily shift, depending on whether actors expect 
to gain or lose from breaking existing coalitions and establishing new ones. 
In the first description (Section 4.1), we saw how a short-term coalition came 
into being of hawkers, consumers and representatives of the urban 
commercial sector, whose common interest was the abolition of a law that 
forbade milk hawking in big towns; however, each group had its own 
particular motives to join the coalition. The hawkers, who sold their milk in the 
capital at a far higher price than they would ever get in the villages, were 
afraid this market might disappear. Many shopkeepers also feared to lose an 
important number of clients. And consumers were moved by their distrust of 
the quality of factory milk and by sentiments of nostalgia (most of them had 
known the farmers who sold them their milk and other products for a great 
many years and had established truly personal relationships with them). In 
principle, the law was meant to protect regional dairy factories against 
A political field is described as "a field of tension, full of intelligent and determined 
antagonists, sole and corporate, who are moved by ambition, altruism, self-interest, and by 
desire for the public good, and who in successive situations are bound to one another 
through self-interest, or idealism - and separated or opposed through the same motives" 
(Swartz et al., 1966: 8). 
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competition from outside: in the region where Qurelesa had the right to sell 
milk, for example, no other dairy factory could enter. But this protective 
clause was linked to the one on restricting dairy hawking, a measure which 
most people saw as repressive. The hawkers can only be given credit for their 
ability to transform people's protest against the latter restrictive measure into 
what eventually turned out to be an anti-Gurelesa demonstration. 
The dairy cooperative, however, managed to overcome this conflict. As 
Gurelesa needed all the milk it could get, and the hawkers had to get rid of 
what they could not sell on the street, the factory offered to buy their surplus 
production: an intelligent policy, which seemed to be guided by the principle 
that an adversary who cannot be defeated can still be neutralized by 
establishing mutually beneficial links. 
At a later stage (Section 4.2), it was no longer the Spanish State, but the 
Autonomous Government of the Basque Country that had to enforce the 
restrictive law of 1956. The arena had shifted to a regional level and the main 
contenders had also changed. On one side we could still find the milk 
hawkers, but they were now supported by the farmers' union EHNE; this 
farmers' association had come into being in the mid-1970s, just after Franco's 
death. However, their direct opponent remained in the background. The 
institution that could have enforced the law that restricted milk hawking, the 
Basque Department of Public Health, apparently tried to avoid an open 
confrontation with the farmers and their union representatives. Indeed, the 
authors of the 1990-report on dairy hawking, which had been carried out 
under the auspices of the regional Department of Public Health, had already 
warned the Administration that a prohibition of the hawkers' activities would 
probably have a negative effect on the image of the Basque Government. The 
Department, on the other hand, is expected to carry out a policy which 
prevents people from being exposed to contagious deseases. So it was 
decided that hawkers should no longer be allowed to sell their raw milk to 
centres, like hospitals and bakeries, that could become the foci of spreading 
desease. And in the meantime it was hoped that hawkers would eventually 
either give up or become integrated into the dairy factory. (This policy seemed 
to follow another strategy, viz. that if a frontal attack is impossible, one 
contender may try to deprive the other one of his resources, thus forcing his 
retreat. Maybe the 'final retreat' of milk hawkers was not the Department's 
first aim while applying the described policy, but it may have been regarded as 
a welcome by-effect.) 
Now, the farmers' union EHNE also found itself in an awkward situation. 
Apart from some 'heroic' statements in private, they had to recognize there 
was little they could do. 
"We don't want to stir things too much. (..) We avoid discussing this 
theme in our magazine, for example, so as not to give the 
Government an argument to say that 'those hawkers are doing 
something illegal'. We try to help those who get into trouble with 
legal advice, but that's all we can do." 
[Lekuona, EHNE; XII/88] 
Thus, in this regional arena, the 1956 law had become a true sword of 
Damocles, a weapon that hung as a permanent threat over the protagonists' 
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heads, though no-one wanted it to be actually used. 
The third description dealt with the application of dairy quota in the 
Basque Country (Section 4.3). Initially, the conflict situation was dominated 
by, on the one hand, the Spanish Minister of Agriculture Romero and, on the 
other, the Basque Government and the regional farmers' union. The danger 
that this conflict would get out of hand as a result of radicalized statements 
of both the Minister and EHNE was warded off after the intervention of the 
Basque Administration, claiming their own competency in matters of quota 
distribution. This did not solve the problem, though, as the former arena was 
then reproduced on a regional scale. EHNE also refused to declare production 
volumes to the Basque Government; one of its foremen declared to the press 
that the Autonomous Government had only defended its own competency but 
had never really objected to the imposition of the milk quota. The accusation 
filled the Basque Vice-minister of Agriculture with indignation: 
"That is foul play. There are documents of 1984 that prove that we 
have always been against the quota. (..) We had come to an 
agreement with the union and the cooperatives that we would only 
send Madrid information about the milk production in our region if 
we received a report on distribution criteria first. But everyone 
accepted that in the end, as a means of defending the sector, it 
would be more effective to forward the declarations than not to do 
anything. The farmers' union also defended this." 
[Urrutia, Department of Agriculture, Basque Autonomous 
Government; X/87] 
The evolution of the union's point of view towards a more favourable attitude 
regarding the quota was brought about by pressure from their own members 
who were more motivated by economic necessities than by political principles. 
However, EHNE still maintained a critical standpoint as to the Government 
policy on quota redistribution, which, as they claimed, favoured mainly the 
biggest farmers who sold their milk to the dairy factory. If we look at the 
criteria for quota redistribution, summed up by the former Minister of 
Agriculture of the Basque Government, their criticism does not seem to be 
unwarranted. The assumption that dairy farmers who invested in expansion 
anticipated on a for them favourable quota allocation is quite plausible. 
4.5 A divide in the rural sector 
The major divide at the level of rural institutions in the Basque Country, as 
perceived by both farmers and representatives of these institutions, was the 
one between the farmers' union EHNE on the one hand and the regional 
Department of Agriculture on the other. It can be defended that this situation 
was the result of a conscious policy of the farmers' union, on the one hand, 
and distrust on the part of the regional Government as to the 'true' intentions 
of EHNE, on the other. 
EHNE was created around 1975, in the first years after the Franco 
dictatorship, by people from different backgrounds, but with a common aim: 
defending the interests of Basque farm families. After several years. 
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professional associations originated that assisted farmers with accountancy 
and veterinary services, dairy control, cattle selection, genetic improvement, 
etc.; they were actively supported by the Basque Autonomous Government, 
which came into being in the beginning of the 1980s. Many of the founders 
of EHNE became in later years outstanding figures in these associations. Most 
of these people belonged to the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the 
conservative party that has been the dominant political force within the 
regional Administration since the early years of the Autonomous Government. 
In the middle of the 1980s, the farmers' union radicalized when central 
positions were occupied by people who were close to the left-wing nationalist 
coalition Herri Batasuna, integrated into the so-called Movement for Basque 
National Liberation, of which also ETA forms part. 
According to the former president of EHNE, the union defended in the first 
place the interests of small and medium-sized farmers. (Another informant, a 
researcher of the biggest cooperative movement in the Basque Country, 
characterized the farmers' union therefore as 'lawyers of a lost cause'.) 
"The small farmer who lives on the farm, with 10 cows or 50 sheep, 
that's the one we defend through thick and thin. We also defend the 
big farmer, but the big farmer normally belongs to the professional 
associations; these organizations depend on the Administration. (..) 
It's very easy to defend viable projects. If we all did the same, there 
would be chaos; because all those people who are economically less 
interesting would go to hell! EHNE has to help the ones who are not 
viable, we can't let them down now." 
[Aldasoro, EHNE; IX/88] 
People within the Administration had their doubts about these supposedly 
altruistic motives of the union, and suspected political intentions behind the 
interest of left-wing nationalists in the agrarian sector. The president of 
Lurgintza, the most important professional association of farmers in Gipuzkoa, 
subscribed the idea of what could be termed a functional dichotomization in 
the countryside. 
"Lurgintza carries out the accountancy for the other associations and 
for some 180 farmer members who are also counselled in their 
conduct of business. Yes, I would say that in Lurgintza we work 
with the most modern farming enterprises in the province." 
[I. Arruti, Lurgintza; IX/88] 
On account of the political affinity of the people who dominated not only 
these professional associations but also some of the most important 
cooperatives for the commercialization of milk and meat, EHNE accused the 
Basque Administration of wanting to control the whole agricultural sector in 
the region and of being biased in favour of the needs of more modern, 
specialized farmers. 
"The Administration makes it a habit of mapping out routes for 
farmers which it then tries to control. (..) The intention is always to 
create projects controlled by the Administration." 
[X. Goikoetxea, EHNE; VI/96] 
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And: 
"It has been a big mistake to develop one sectorial aspect, and some 
associations, at the expense of others. The associations are focused 
on specialization. And with respect to small farming enterprises that 
complement milk with beef or cows with sheep they do too little." 
[Aldasoro, EHNE; IX/88] 
Distrust within EHNE as to the Administration's intentions came strongly to 
the fore by the end of the 1980s, when people belonging to the union tried to 
set up the marketing cooperative Behiki on behalf of beef producers in the 
region. The Basque Government had financed a study on the marketing 
possibilities within the regional meat sector, carried out by an economist of 
EHNE, but when it was presented with a viability plan for the creation of the 
new cooperative, the Department had its doubts about the successful 
realization of the plan and decided to give only limited financial support. 
Representatives of the cooperative refused to believe that this was the real 
reason. 
"We suppose that in the end the reason for this obstruction is a 
political one. The Department of Agriculture is dominated by PNV 
people. Now, the initiative to do this study on the basis of which we 
decided to create the cooperative was taken by EHNE. The 
Administration seems to be politically interested in our not being too 
successful. In private, they have called us a cooperative of Herri 
Batasuna." 
[Representatives of Behiki, Ml/89] 
The Vice-minister of Agriculture, on the other hand, maintained, that it was 
Herri Batasuna that had made it its object to increase its hold of the sector. 
"If the PNV had wanted to control the sector, it would have been 
very easy to do so - they would have controlled all those 
associations from the beginning and they wouldn't have privatized 
them. No, it's HB that tries to dominate everything, not only in the 
agricultural sector, where politics hasn't interfered as much as in 
other sectors, but everywhere. In the Sokoa papers171 it said that 
it's one of HB's objects to control EHNE in order to propagate their 
ideology through the farmers' union and to reclute activists. (..) 
"This policy is dividing the sector. If, in the end, people associate 
EHNE with HB, those who don't belong to HB will leave EHNE." 
[Urrutia, Department of Agriculture, Basque Autonomous 
Government; VII/90] 
The words of the Vice-minister turned out to be prophetical... 
Documents belonging to ETA militants that explained the strategies of the different groups 
that form part of the Movement for Basque National Liberation; the papers were found in a 
factory (Sokoa) in the south of France. 
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4.6 From divide to confrontation 
In the second half of the 1980s, left-wing nationalists became more and more 
dominant within EHNE, but the major part of its membership still consisted of 
people who voted for more moderate nationalist parties. In the same period, a 
group of young farmers originated that regularly came together to discuss 
general matters related to agriculture; most of them were members of EHNE, 
but many began to adopt a more and more critical attitude towards the new 
official policy line of the farmers' union; this frequently led to internal 
frictions. In 1992 it came to a split: a new farmers' union was formed with 
the name ENBA (Euskal Nekazarien Batasuna, that is the Union of Basque 
Farmers). Naturally, both unions had their own views on the event. The 
explanation of a spokesman of EHNE was the following: 
"The Administration tried to get a hold on EHNE. During the 
campaign to elect the next president, people in favour of the two 
most important candidates went from farm to farm to ask for votes. 
The candidate who was approved of by the Administration lost... So 
when the Administration saw they had failed to get their man 
elected president of EHNE, they decided to create another union." 
[X. Goikoetxea, EHNE; VI/96] 
The interpretation of the president of ENBA was quite different: 
"It became more and more clear to me that EHNE had stopped being 
a union that defended the interests of the agricultural sector; political 
interests predominated. Before the union finally disintegrated, we 
often had tremendous disagreements. Some of our people were even 
threatened - so that was the last straw!" 
[J. Arruti, ENBA; VI/96] 
However, he added to this that EHNE's policy might have become more 
moderate in recent years. 
"They have changed their image; it may just be 'make-up', but they 
seem to be more moderate and they tend to be more discreet in their 
attitude towards the Administration. You don't hear those radical 
statement of before anymore and some people have gone, too. But 
they haven't changed their ideas with respect to the sector, it's still 
the same old message: maintaining agricultural jobs, women, direct 
sales, local markets, etc." 
[ibid.] 
As to their philosophy on rural development, both farmers' unions maintained 
widely divergent views. As we have seen before, EHNE's policy with respect 
to the dairy sector defended the farmers' possibility to sell their milk directly 
to the consumers. Even though it was recognized that more and more farmers 
were giving up milk hawking, it was still seen as a way of life for many farm 
families. ENBA's president, however, did hardly believe in the economic 
rationality of this activity: 
"I doubt whether it really pays. I'm convinced there are many who 
rather lose money; for they spend all morning selling their milk on 
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the street and they don't count it as work - which is a mistake. (..) 
Many of them sell part of their production to the dairy factory, so in 
the end they also depend on the factory. In fact, we should support 
the dairy factory unconditionally, for it's the one that determines the 
future of the sector. (..) We don't have a particular policy on milk 
hawking, because our members are not involved in this activity." 
[J . Arruti, ENBA; VI/96] 
As a matter of fact, ENBA only accepted what its president called 
'professional farmers' as members: that is, those farmers who contributed to 
the Agrarian Social Security Fund and whose income came for at least 50% 
out of farming. Small farmers did seldom become ENBA members, the 
president admitted. Whereas EHNE's principal target group consisted of 
precisely these less viable small and medium-sized farming enterprises. 
(Membership numbers of both unions in the province of Gipuzkoa reflected 
this difference in target groups: about 1600 for EHNE and some 420 in the 
case of ENBA - according to numbers given by the respective unions; though 
we must take into account that EHNE has a longer history than ENBA. There 
were about 12,000 farmers in the province in the early 1990s, but the 
number of full-timers was estimated to be under 3,000.) 
The ENBA president criticized the opinion, defended by representatives of 
EHNE, that rural policy should be aimed at maintaining as many jobs as 
possible in the sector. He qualified this as unrealistic: aged farmers, or those 
with little land and small farms, should give up farming, so that others could 
increase the scale of their farming enterprises. While ENBA saw further 
specialization and investments as the way for farmers to increase their 
production, according to EHNE there was too little attention for 
complementarity of activities, something which could offer members of 
especially small family farms the possibility to raise their incomes. 
In interviews and upon reading magazines, reports, leaflets, etc. of the parties 
involved in the institutional drama in the Basque countryside, I frequently had 
the impression that the ENBA ideas on agricultural policy were much more 
radically at variance with the policy line defended by EHNE than the rationale 
behind the regional Government policy had ever been. The Vice-minister of 
Agriculture outlined the rural policy of the regional Administration as follows: 
"One of our aims is to defend the family farms, but at the same time 
we should try to improve their production structures, to increase 
their scale and, above all, to raise their technological capacity, so 
that finally their productivity goes up. (..) Starting from our basic 
activity, which is milk and beef production, we should diversify, 
develop complementary products, create a market for regional 
quality products. (..) And people begin to realize that agriculture has 
not only a productive role within society, but also a social and 
ecological role. (..) In more urbanized areas, part time farming may 
help to maintain the rural environment." 
[Urrutia, Department of Agriculture, Basque Autonomous 
Government; VII/90] 
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Which brings out a much more middle-of-the-road vision on rural development 
than the ENBA policy which focused mainly on the creation of modern, 
specialized ("professional") farms. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind, as 
Pile (1990) observes, that the Administration's discourse and policy do not 
always, nor necessarily, run parallel: "There is a divergence in the desire of 
the State to give considerable ideological support to the small independent 
family farm, while simultaneously directly stimulating the concentration and 
centralisation of capital in agriculture" (Pile, 1990: 13). I suggested above 
(see Chapter 3) that the increased sensibility of the Basque Administration 
with respect to the social and ecological role of agriculture might have been 
boosted as a result of the European policy in favour of disadvantaged areas. 
EHNE's strategy of creating an image of constant confrontation between 
this farmers' union and the Administration seemed to have had a boomerang 
effect, now that the 'modernization' type of agricultural policy the union had 
projected onto the Basque Department of Agriculture became the openly 
defended, official policy of the competing farmers' union ENBA. 
4.7 Farmers in the social arena 
The institutional landscape had changed considerably during the first half of 
the 1990s as a result of the creation of the new farmers' union ENBA. More 
than four hundred farmers, most of whom had left the competing union EHNE, 
had become ENBA members; and the annual subsidies of 9 million pesetas 
that EHNE had thus far received from the Basque Administration had 
henceforth to be shared: one-third for ENBA and two-thirds for EHNE. 
According to several informants, EHNE's proceedings had become more 
moderate in recent years. When asked to express their opinion about 
confrontations between institutions, farmers normally said things like "It's all 
politics" and "I won't have anything to do with that". Politics pervade Basque 
social life and people often suspect political manoeuvres even behind rather 
neutral attitudes. Therefore, most people keep themselves far from political 
issues, knowing how easy it is to be misinterpreted or to be used in some 
political battle. Politics is to a large extent a taboo subject in Basque social 
life, to be discussed only in the circle of one's own family - and often not 
even there. 
Nevertheless, the few hundreds of farmers who had left EHNE to join 
ENBA are likely to have done so for political reasons. I have not been able to 
ascertain anymore whether this step had affected farmers' discourse on 
agricultural policies or their decisions as to family labour organization and 
farming strategies in any relevant way. What we can say, however, is that 
ENBA had become the incarnation of the most pronounced faith in the 
beneficial effects of agricultural modernization. No tinkering with part-time 
farming or hawking activities. Professionalization of individual farmers and of 
the sector as a whole, specialization of farming enterprises, creation and 
maintenance of strong marketing organizations, those were seen as the 
necessary conditions for Basque agriculture to hold out within the European 
Common Market. Modernizing, expanding farmers may find herein ideological 
support to back up their own aspirations. Farmers with small-scale enterprises 
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and those who hawk their milk on the streets may recognize themselves more 
in the 'small farmer ideology' of EHNE. 
When I carried out a small survey in the region in 1990, ENBA did not 
exist yet. More than 90% of my respondents turned out to be members of 
EHNE; the same percentage belonged to a dairy cooperative (although several 
of them did not sell their milk exclusively to the factory) and 25% were 
members of Lurgintza. One of the questions I asked them was whose 
interests they thought the Administration and different agrarian organizations 
defended. 79% responded that the Basque Department of Agriculture and the 
provincial Administration favoured mainly or exclusively the biggest farmers; 
67% had the same opinion about Lurgintza. With respect to EHNE and the 
Agricultural Chambers (where farmers could apply for credits and subsidies) 
my respondents maintained quite different opinions: 79% believed EHNE 
defended the interests of all farmers, while 82% stated that the same held 
good for the Agricultural Chambers. Several farmers claimed that EHNE was 
the only organization that 'fought back' [borroka egin) when farmers' interests 
were threatened. As to the dairy cooperatives there was more diversity of 
opinion: 49% said that they defended all farmers, but another 46% believed 
they favoured mainly the biggest farm enterprises. 
Farmers were also asked to grade a number of factors according to the 
estimated importance for their farm management. The following table 
indicates the frequency with which these factors were given the respective 
scores, whereby score 1 stands for 'most important factor', score 2 for 'not 
so important factor' and score 3 for 'least important factor'. 
Table 6. Factors determining successful farm management; farmers' 
assessment of their importance. 
scores 
factors 1 2 3 
financial help (subsidies, etc.) 20 8 5 
high(er) product prices 21 6 6 
low(er) production costs 8 18 7 33 
reliable marketing channels 4 21 8 
technical advice 4 5 24 
political pressure 9 8 16 
Some 60% of the respondents considered that high prices for their products 
and financial help in the form of subsidies or cheap credits were the most 
important factors for the well functioning of their farm enterprises. (One of 
them linked both factors in saying that "the best financial help is a good price 
for your products.") Low production costs and reliable marketing channels 
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were seen as less determining (50 to 60% gave these factors a 'middle range' 
score). We should of course take into account that almost all respondents 
were members of a dairy cooperative, so that the selling of their milk was 
hardly ever seen as problematic. Technical advice (of extension agents and 
organizations like Lurgintza) was generally estimated as least important. And 
in spite of the favourable opinion of some respondents about the militancy of 
EHNE, the majority saw its political pressure on regional and national 
institutions that determined agricultural policy not really as decisive for the 
future of their holdings. 
Part-time farmers turned out to be the most critical with respect to the 
way agricultural institutions defended their interests. Although the Basque 
Department of Agriculture attributed a role to part-time farmers in the 
maintenance of the social environment in more urbanized rural areas, these 
farmers normally found it extremely difficult to get financial support for 
investments in their enterprises. As one of them said: "The high incidence of 
part-time farming has been favourable especially for the Administration, 
because we had to pay for everything ourselves without ever getting any 
subsidies; they haven't lost any money on us." And another one observed: 
"No institution has really defended our interests. The part-timers have been 
ignored by everyone." This opinion was generally extended to EHNE as well, 
even though many of them were members of the union in case they needed 
legal advice. 
4.8 Conclusions 
Farmers are not mere spectators in the various social arenas where 
institutional policies are designed and confrontations among institutions are 
fought out. They may try to interfere in the design or implementation of 
certain policies, they may want to keep aloof from institutional clashes, and 
sometimes they will have to undergo passively the consequences of the 
policies of agrarian institutions. Most of the time they will be affected in one 
way or another by rural policy, and they will respond accordingly, although 
their reactions may be difficult to measure as they do not always affect their 
farming strategies immediately or in a perceptible way. 
Basque farmers preferred to be involved as little as possible in political 
conflicts among the regional institutions that determine agricultural policy. 
Only when the schism between the two farmers' unions EHNE and ENBA had 
become a fact, did those farmers who saw more in harmonious negotiations 
with the regional Administration than in EHNE's policy of confrontation switch 
over to ENBA. However, it was the agricultural policy as such, intended to 
stimulate certain farming activities or curtail others, which affected them more 
directly. 
In Chapter 1, I have pointed out that it was quite common at the end of 
the 1980s, and particularly at the levels where agricultural policy was defined, 
to classify the Basque farming population as 'modern', 'traditional' and 'part-
time' farmers. Modern dairy farming was equated with investments and the 
expansion of milk production. As we saw before, most farmers believed the 
Basque Government's agricultural policy favoured mainly the interests of 
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modern, expanding farmers. This helps to explain why (as an EHNE 
spokesman claimed) these economically stronger, modernizing farmers, while 
planning their future strategies for further expansion, trusted that they would 
be assigned the necessary extra quota. 
Those farming practices that did not fit this 'dynamic' image of continuing 
investment and expansion were implicitly regarded as more traditional. In part, 
this held good for part-time farmers, who felt they were not supported by any 
organization. But most of all, it was true of those farmers who were engaged 
in activities, such as dairy hawking, which most policy makers characterized 
as obsolete. The hawkers themselves, as well as the farmers' union EHNE, 
suspected that if it had not yet come to a direct prohibition of their activities, 
despite a law that sanctioned the hawking of fresh milk in the streets, this 
was merely because such a prohibition might imply political risks for the 
regional Government. It was still remembered how in the 1950s, when this 
law had been promulgated, the hawkers had effectively mobilized their urban 
network of clients, shopkeepers, and the service sector, in order to ward off 
the threat of prohibition of their way of marketing. In the late 1980s, 
however, many farmers saw their sales restricted as a result of the policy of 
the Basque Administration that forbade hospitals and shops to use non-
pasteurized milk.181 Through this policy the regional Government managed to 
dissociate the hawkers' most important clients from their networks. Moreover, 
it was suggested that the motive behind this prohibition had been displaced, 
as well: from an old Franco law to an EEC Public Health norm. The hawkers 
found that they did not have a good response to this move. They could hardly 
rely on support from the farmers' unions, which lacked either the will or the 
legal instruments to challenge the prohibitory policy. It often compelled the 
hawkers to adjust their farming strategies quite radically, but exactly how 
they modified their operations depended on their family composition and on 
the subjective evaluations of household members as to labour input, 
remuneration, free time, status, and so on (see Chapter 6). 
By selling their milk in plastic bags and having regular inspection carried 
out of their cattle, milk and installations, a small association of hawkers hoped 
to convince the regional authorities to legalize their way of marketing. For 
many years, however, the Basque Administration refused to support these 
initiatives, with the argument that priority had to be given to supporting the 
dairy cooperatives. It was not until 1993 that the first of these 'modernized 
hawkers' were given officially recognized Health Certificates, which allowed 
them to sell again to the institutions they had once lost as clients (see 
Chapter 7). 
From the foregoing, we can deduce that modernizing farmers who 
expanded their enterprises and were fully integrated into the dairy factory 
could count on facilities from the side of the Government, whereas those who 
were classified as more traditional farmers saw their room for manoeuvre 
restricted. I would argue that there exists a kind of dialectical relationship 
between the typology used to classify the farming population and the 
Though we shall see in Chapter 6 that this was not the only reason for the hawkers' loss of 
market. 
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agricultural policy implemented: whereas the typology in force legitimizes this 
policy, the same policy makes the typology turn into a self-fulfilling prophesy. 
This links up with what was said in Chapter 1 about labelling. According to 
Wood, 
"Labelling is ... present as a necessary condition of the public 
(especially bureaucratic) management of scarcity. (..) 
"(T)he authors of labels, of designations, have determined the rules 
of access to particular resources and privileges. They are setting the 
rules for inclusion and exclusion, determining eligibility, defining 
qualifications" (Wood, 1985b: 351,352). 
The same author also suggests that labelling is particularly compelling, for 
appearing "as natural and objectively true" (Wood, 1985a: 345), when it is 
linked to an ideology of rationality. 
The lines about the so-called Programme of Assistance to Agrarian 
Incomes (PARA: Programa de Ayudas a la Renta Agraria) in a Strategic Plan 
for the rural sector drafted by the Basque Department of Agriculture and 
Fisheries in the early 1990s were illustrative in this respect: 
"Just like the majority of the measures which make up the new 
Basque agrarian policy, (PARA) has a marked, discriminatory and 
selective character, stressing support of viable family farming .. 
affected by the prolonged situation of falling prices. It does not offer 
unconditional assistance, but demands requirements whose 
fulfilment will foster modernization and sectorial competitiveness" 
(Gobierno Vasco, 1991?: 14; my translation and emphasis). 
In recent years, rural policy in the region has also become focused on the 
maintenance of holdings other than only the modern, expanding enterprises. 
That is, the importance of keeping small-scale farms occupied was recognized 
as a means to avoid further depopulation of the countryside. But whether this 
reorientation also leads to an active policy of supporting production and 
marketing possibilities of 'marginal' holdings remains as yet to be seen. 
In the meantime, it is ironical that the normative dichotomy of modern 
versus traditional farming, which seems to have been superseded in the 
discourse of policy makers within the regional Government, has now become 
institutionalized in the confrontation between ENBA and EHNE. 
The former typology, which until recently guided the agrarian policy to a 
large extent, returns in the chapters of Part II, where I have analyzed the farm 
households belonging to the different categories as being the exponents of 
diverging, in principle equally valid, farming strategies. 
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P A R T IS 
In the four chapters which make up Part II, 1 will discuss the survival and 
succession strategies of different types of farm households, as they came 
about through the more or less effective mobilization of external networks and 
of the labour of family members. The titles of these chapters refer to the 
typology that by the end of the 1980s was still much in vogue in the region to 
characterize the heterogeneity of the Basque farming sector: 'modern', 
'traditional' and 'mixed' (i.e. part-time) farmers (or baserritar modernuak, 
tradizionalak and mixtoak in Basque). But I have analyzed these types (as is 
common in the styles of farming approach; see Chapter 1) as divergent 
farming practices that all have their own, particular, internal logics and should 
be seen as in principle equally valid strategies; they are certainly not to be 
considered as different stages of development, as is normally done in 
evolutionary models. 
Those who are classified as 'modern' dairy farmers usually have relatively 
large-scale enterprises, deliver their whole milk production to the dairy 
factory, and maintain close ties with other institutions. By 'traditional' farmers 
I understand those who run smaller-scale holdings, with a less dynamic 
investment pattern, and who often try to realize an acceptable household 
income by selling their products directly to consumers. On 'part-time' farms, 
the family combines a full-time, external job of, generally, the farm owner 
with the commercialization, to a greater or lesser degree, of agricultural 
products. 
Some respondents would include the few producers of quality- products 
(like ewe-cheese or fresh milk, with their respective quality labels) among the 
members of the select group of 'modern' farmers, while others thought that 
these innovators should rather be seen as a separate category. I have taken 
the latter view, in consonance with the opinion of these quality producers 
themselves, who regarded their strategy as completely distinct from the 
'modern' farmers' dominant practice of delivering their entire production to 
the factory. The household income depended in this case on the creation and 
maintenance of a circle of clients who were prepared to pay comparatively 
high prices for what were presented as high-quality products. 
The four chapters in this Part II gear around a few cases that have been 
dealt with to some extent. These cases provide the reader with an idea of the 
divergence of practices that even exist among farm enterprises belonging to 
the same category; at the same time, they suggest the main lines that will be 
elaborated in the subsequent sections of each chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
'MODERN' FARMING: OF 'TATE', TREADMILLS AND LABOUR 
Modern farmers, in the eyes of social scientists and laymen, were those who 
had a relatively large herd (by Basque standards around 1990, that is; with 
respect to dairy farming, this meant some 20 dairy cows or more), who had 
been able to expand their farming enterprise and had kept up with the latest 
developments in agricultural machinery. They were full-time farmers and, if 
they were in dairy farming, delivered all their milk to the factory. 
In this chapter, I shall explore how the degree of integration of these farm 
households in the institutional environment is of influence on their strategies 
of continuing investment and expansion; what structural limitations exist on 
expansion; and what strategies they design to get round these. These 
'modern' farm enterprises are generally seen as the only ones that may be 
continued successfully by the next generation, but I will argue that cultural 
factors may thwart existing plans for succession on a full-time basis. 
It will become clear that there are some striking differences among 
modem farm enterprises as to their mobilization of labour and their 
perspectives of continuity. 
5.1 Etxeberri: getting bigger and bigger 
On Etxebarri, as on many farms in the Basque Country, there were three 
generations living under the same roof: the owner, Juan, and his wife, six of 
their seven children, and the owner's parents. The eldest daughter was 
married and lived elsewhere. In 1989, Juan was 56 years old. His eldest son, 
Joseba, was 23 and worked full-time on the farm; the second son worked in a 
factory in the village and the others (one daughter and three sons, aged 12 to 
20) were still at school or at University. 
Juan was continuously trying to increase his livestock. In 1985 he had 
about 20 milch cows, four years later 33, and in 1996 there were 44 milch 
cows and more than 30 followers. In 1989, he also had more than 20 fatting-
calves, but because of lack of space in the shed, they had to be sold when 
the number of dairy cattle grew. The milch cows grazed on the meadows 
around the farm; he also kept some 25 head of beef cattle on remote 
mountain pastures. He rented several pieces of land from other farmers or 
from urban visitors who had bought a house with some land in the village (see 
Chapter 3); the grass he cut on these fields was either used for silage or hay-
making. In the deals with the weekend-guests there was usually no money 
involved: he simply kept the fields behind their cottages or renovated 
farmsteads clean and in exchange for this, he could keep the grass for free. 
He had recently built a slurry pit under the cow-shed, which enabled him 
to dress his fields with liquid manure. In the whole region, there were still no 
more than a few farmers who used this procedure. And periodically, the 
farmers' counselling organization Lurgintza (see Chapter 4) carried out soil 
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analysis on most of his land to determine what types of artificial fertilizers 
were needed. Juan claimed that his cows received more concentrates, and 
better attuned to their individual needs, than those on other farms in the 
village; a computerized fodder system determined exactly how much each 
cow should get. He definitely had more machinery than most other farmers: 
apart from a tractor, there was a pick-up cart, a mowing-machine and a 
plough; in 1991 he and his son bought a hay baler and a few years later, in 
combination with two more farmers in the village, a machine to make silage 
bales. Joseba often carried out contract work on other farms with most of 
these machines. 
In 1989, their cows produced an average of 6200 litres per cow per year, 
but Juan thought they should be able to produce more: "7000 litres per cow 
should be possible," he said then. Genetic improvement, breeding only with 
the best cows, with selected semen (that he bought from the regional artificial 
insemination bank), occasionally buying better cows, and disposing of dubious 
yearlings - that should do it, he thought. The average annual production per 
cow in 1996 had risen to 7700 litres, which meant that the total production 
volume had increased with about sixty-five percent in 7 years!19' 
Work on the farm was mainly done by Juan and Joseba. Whereas Juan 
primarily did the tasks on and around the farm, his son - after having fed and 
milked the cows - often went to work in the fields with his machines, or he 
did contract work for other farmers. Juan was not all that happy with this: 
"Of course it's good that he has so much work. But with all the work he does 
for others, the work on our farm sometimes comes second." 
In 1996, the amount of contract work had only increased. With two other 
young farmers in the village, Joseba had put together enough money to buy 
an expensive silage baler; they used to take turns to work with this machine 
for their clients. By that time, Joseba's brothers had all found jobs outside 
agriculture, but as they still lived on the farm they normally lent a hand in the 
evening or at weekends. In summer all of them helped with haymaking, while 
in winter each one had his own, well-defined tasks. When Joseba or his 
parents wanted to go on holiday for a few days or a week (something which 
happened only once a year, at the most), those who remained on the farm 
had to increase their labour input. 
In 1989, some villagers had doubts about Joseba succeeding to his 
parents' farm. "They say that he may try to find a job elsewhere, as he's still 
single...," it was said. Juan had told me that his son should become a full-
time farmer, if he wanted to take over the farm. "It's no good being a part-
time farmer; then the farm will be lost," he believed. Seven years later, 
Joseba had a girlfriend and their plans were to get married and to continue on 
the farm. "At the outset full-time," Joseba explained. "Later, we'll see. As 
long as my parents are able to work, fine. But after that... it's much more 
difficult to do all the work alone." 
Although Juan was still the owner of the farm in 1996, the cattle and 
machinery had already been put on Joseba's name. 
33 cows * 6200 I/cow = 204,600 litres in 1989, against 44 cows * 7700 l/cow = 
338,800 litres in 1996. 
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5.2 Iriarte: modernizing in the absence of successors 
In the winter of 1988-89, when I visited this farm a few times, there were 
four brothers living on the farm; the youngest, Koldo, was 54 years old, the 
oldest 68. The four of them were bachelors. An unmarried sister who had also 
lived with them on the farm had died several years ago. Two brothers had 
always worked on the farm. The third one had given up his factory job in a 
nearby village some seven years earlier and had joined them; he was crippled 
and had an invalidity benefit. The oldest brother had been a dentist all his life; 
when he retired in 1987, he received his old age pension. He helped a little on 
the farm, though he could not do very much due to serious health problems. 
Koldo and his brothers were regarded as the richest farmers in Aritzmendi. 
People said they normally worked like animals, because they had nothing else 
to do: "But there's no one they can give their money to, for they have no 
children nor nephews or nieces." 
More than 20 years ago, they sold the milk of their six cows to a hawker; 
but after several years, this man let them know that it was becoming more 
difficult to sell milk in summer, and that he could not accept their whole 
summer production any longer. They then decided to sell all their milk to the 
dairy cooperative. In 1980, when they had about 10 milch cows, they rebuilt 
the cow-shed, rented more land, bought some machines to work the land and 
increased their livestock to 16 head. In 1988 they had 20 milch cows and 14 
yearlings, and a total production of 80,000 litres of milk per year. Seasonal 
fluctuation was considerable: they produced more than 400 litres a day in 
summer but only 150 litres in winter. 
These farmers were believed to have the best land in Aritzmendi, relatively 
flat and most of it close to the farm. All the same, they claimed that no 
farmer here really had enough land to keep 20 cows and that that was the 
reason why farmers had to give their cows so much concentrates. Koldo's 
oldest brother added to this: "I always say there's only place for two farms in 
this valley. What we need here is a re-allotment scheme so that the land will 
be used in a more rational way." 
Koldo described their present farming system as follows: a lot of land, 
many cows, and a relatively low milk production per cow. They still thought 
of increasing the total production volume of milk, but they did not want to 
increase their cattle population any further. Instead of that, they wanted to 
raise the milk production per cow, which in their view depended primarily on 
the possibility to improve the quality of their yearlings. That is why they had 
become members of the regional artificial insemination bank, which enabled 
them to buy semen of some of the best bulls in Europe. And they would also 
try to improve the quality of their milk, so that they could claim higher quality 
bonuses. They belonged to a professional association that regularly checked 
the milk quality of all their cows. 
When l came back in the village in 1996, the situation on this farm had 
changed quite drastically. The oldest brother, the former dentist, had died in 
1992, and around the same time the others had sold all their dairy cows - and 
their milk quotum, for which they were said to have received a considerable 
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amount of money. The shed where they once had kept their dairy cattle now 
gave shelter to some 15 cows of a beef producing race. Koldo, who was 60 
by now, still seemed to work as tirelessly as ever, but both his brothers had 
retired. 
5.3 Vanguard farms: scale-enlargement and intensification 
Farms like Etxeberri and Iriarte were seen as 'vanguard' farming enterprises in 
the region, both by farmers and representatives of the Administration. They 
combined a large number of dairy cattle with a relatively high milk production 
per cow, tried to adopt the latest technological innovations and were to a 
large extent integrated in input and output markets. If we caracterize these 
farms as vanguard enterprises, we should of course point to the relativity of 
the term: with their 20 to 50 milch cows, they would be considered small or 
medium-sized farms in north-west European countries (something of which 
Basque farmers and policy makers were well aware), but according to Basque 
agrarian standards they belonged undeniably to the 'elite'. If there still was a 
future for Basque dairy farming within the European context, it was believed 
to be theirs. Thus, regional agricultural policy was aimed at defending and 
potentializing precisely this type of farming. 
Vanguard farms (or 'grands intensifs', as they are adequately 
characterized in French) are a relatively recent phenomenon in the dairy 
farming sector, as van der Ploeg (1987b) demonstrates. Before social 
scientists had become aware of more complex differentiating patterns in 
agriculture, they would often describe the sector in dichotomous terms: of 
small, intensive farms on the one hand and large-scale, relatively extensive 
enterprises on the other. Vanguard farmers are the exponents of a style of 
farming in which scale-enlargement and intensification are combined. Van der 
Ploeg contrasts these vanguard farms with marginal holdings. The increasing 
differentiation in time among these four farming styles, which has to do with 
specific developments within these styles, is brought out in the following 
figure (Figure 3), whereby 'intensity' is defined as the output per object of 
labour and 'scale' stands for the number of labour objects per labour units (cf. 
van der Ploeg, 1985:6).201 
This typification is based on statistics covering hundreds of farms, 
whereby the terms 'scale' and 'intensity' have been abstracted from farm 
related factors like hectares, dairy cows, amount of labour input etc. 
I have mentioned earlier (see Chapter 1) that in later publications of authors belonging to the 
'styles of farming' school this typology has been much more refined and elaborated. 
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Figure 3. Ideal-typical sketch of the increasing differentiation among farming 
styles. Sources: van der Ploeg, 1985: 7 and 1987b: 260; Bolhuis 
and van der Ploeg, 1985:.92. Adapted. 
However, if we descend to the concrete level of farming practices in the 
Basque countryside, strategies like intensification or scale-enlargement are not 
always that unequivocally interprétable. It is the ambiguity of the concept of 
'labour object' - meaning either a milch cow, or a piece of land, a fruit 
plantation, etc. - which should make us cautious in labelling farmer strategies. 
At one time, a strategy of intensification may mean: increasing the milk 
production per cow (but on the same area), and at another: incrementing the 
output per hectare (through a greater number of cattle per area, without 
increasing the production per cow). Scale enlargement, on the other hand, 
could be: a) expanding the area for pasture, under a proportional increase of 
the number of cows, but also b) increasing the number of cattle per labour 
unit on the same area. In situation a) the intensity remains the same, while in 
situation b) intensity varies with scale. We are thus dealing with 
distinguishable strategies, based on different underlying farming decisions. 
When I interviewed farmers about their strategies so far and their plans 
for the future, their answers provided me with some insight that remains 
obscure in Figure 3 above. This figure may induce the reader to think that 
farming enterprises experienced a unilinear and exclusive development 
towards the (ideal-typical) style of farming they belong to at present; my own 
findings suggest that the evolution of individual holdings is not always that 
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straightforward. Even if farm enterprises belong to the same style of farming 
they may have got there following completely different steps. We saw earlier 
how Juan of the farm Etxeberri had increased the number of dairy cows and 
the production of milk per cow at the same time, introducing more and better 
machines both on the land and in the stable so as to prevent an intolerable 
increase of labour input. On the other hand, Koldo and his brothers of the 
Iriarte farm had first rented more land, bought machines and expanded their 
livestock; they then planned to increase their total milk production by raising 
the production per cow (which means they initially followed a strategy aimed 
at scale-enlargement, and subsequently adopted an intensification strategy). 
On another big farm in Aritzmendi, the farmers (three elderly men) had 
followed a similar strategy as on Iriarte: they had increased their landed 
property and the number of cattle and then strived to augment the production 
of their dairy cows; but at the same time they planned to expand the area 
under cultivation even more, so that they could feed more forage which might 
bring their mash expenses down. (We see here an intensification with respect 
to the dairy cows, but an extensification in relation to land surface.) 
Studies in terms of the styles of farming tradition would certainly be 
enriched by a deeper insight into the different strategy 'paths' that farmers 
choose before eventually creating the type of farm which, at a certain 
moment in time, induces the sociological observer to classify them under one 
or another style of farming. This naturally asks for intensive, longitudinal 
research, comparable to the analysis Bennett carried out with respect to 
changes in 'management styles' among Canadian farmers in the course of a 
decade (Bennett, 1980: 214, 223 ff.). Unfortunately, this is not the easiest 
type of investigation to be carried out. Such research, however, will probably 
bring put that farming enterprises which were once headed under style X may 
within 5 or 10 years be found under style Y or Z; it would thus contribute to 
shed more light on the chain of decisions these farmers have to take 'along 
the way'. 
5.4 Scale-enlargement, intensification and TATE 
On the basis of extensive statistical material, Bolhuis and van der Ploeg 
(1985) conclude that in the Italian region which they studied the growing 
incorporation of farming enterprises into the market corresponded with a 
tendency towards enlargement of scale (and relative extensification). For 
farmers who attune the organization of their production process more and 
more to market and price relations, entrepreneurship becomes an increasingly 
important quality. The farmer may decide to 'externalize' certain tasks in the 
production and reproduction process on the farm, which means that they will 
therafter be carried out by external institutions. At the same time, "the 
'coordination' between farms and external institutions (..) is frequently 
organized via a complex of technical-administrative instructions that links and 
subordinates farm labour to external market agencies" (van der Ploeg, 1985: 
16). Here, the analysis links up with Benvenuti's model of the Technological 
and Administrative Task Environment (or TATE). 
Benvenuti stresses the growing integration of the farm enterprise into the 
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wider institutional environment. TATE is defined at the level of the 
interrelations between the farm and surrounding institutions as "the 'social 
constellation' of which a given farm operation directly takes part and within 
which its operator technically acts" (Benvenuti, 1975: 47; emphasis in 
original). The relationship between TATE institutions and the farm is an 
asymmetrical one: what is being cultivated or reared and in what way is no 
longer exclusively decided on the farm, but is increasingly determined by the 
institutions that are part of the TATE environment of that farm. 
"TATE forms with the farm operation a complex network of 
functional interdependencies which most of the times signify 
normative, functional and material dependency of the farm unit upon 
it" (ibid.: 49). 
According to the author, they are particularly the most specialized farms, 
those that are believed to be run by the most modern-thinking, dynamic, 
agricultural entrepreneurs, that are caught in the TATE web: "In fact, the 
greater the specialization of the farm operation, the greater its openness and 
therefore its dependency upon TATE" (ibid.). 
The empirical material on which this model rests was gathered in Italy and 
the Netherlands. It turned out that in Italy TATE was predominantly related to 
large-scale and relatively extensive holdings. The heads of these farms were 
more in contact with extension agents than their colleagues on other farms; 
they made themselves and their farm enterprises more dependent on TATE 
institutions. In contrast, farmers of intensifying holdings normally relied more 
on their craftsmanship; their attitude towards TATE tended to be more critical. 
On the other hand, Benvenuti's analysis in the Netherlands of the relationship 
between an agricultural cooperative and its members suggested that strong 
links with the TATE complex may also force farmers to intensify. What it 
amounts to in both cases is that the more farmers are drawn into TATE 
relations with surrounding institutions, the more their farm management 
becomes subject to external prescription. As production is becoming more and 
more dependent on outside technical and scientific knowledge, the farmer's 
craftsmanship and experience is gradually made superfluous. Benvenuti states 
that the institutional environment consciously intends to standardize farm 
management on individual enterprises (Benvenuti, 1991). 
De Haan (1994: 16) criticizes this model for stressing technological and 
economic factors too much, while ignoring family factors. The criticism may 
be correct, but this shortcoming need not be inherent to the model. My own 
empirical data suggest that it is possible to relate the establishment of TATE-
like relationships to family factors like household composition and capabilities 
of members. 
In the case of Iriarte (see Section 5.2), the farmers had first followed a 
strategy of scale-enlargement (more land, more dairy cattle) and then tried to 
raise the milk production of their cows. In other expanding and modernizing 
farming enterprises the idea of a further increase in the production per cow 
was rejected; the argument was that there was too much risk involved in such 
a strategy, these cows needed much more attention and care, and if 
something went wrong with one of them, it would immediatly have important 
economic repercussions for the farm. However, for farmers with no more 
62 
scope for expanding their area under cultivation and the number of cows, 
intensification becomes the only option to increase their income from farming. 
Now, intensification is seen as a hazardous undertaking by most farmers: it is 
more expensive to replace a highly productive cow than an average one. 
Besides, it normally implies more work and demands more of the farmer's 
craftsmanship. My hypothesis is that it is precisely for these reasons that 
farmers who follow a strategy which involves taking certain risks may 
establish or strengthen ties with the institutional environment, in order to 
externalize certain tasks for which they lack the knowledge or the time (as a 
matter of fact, Benvenuti himself suggests that farmers, out of an attitude of 
risk-avoidance, place themselves under the "protective umbrella" of 
institutions; Benvenuti, 1975: 53). On Iriarte intensification was realized 
through improving the quality of their livestock and of the milk produced, 
while selection and quality improvement of both cattle and milk were 
delegated to external institutions. 
As I have said before, the essential part of Benvenuti's argument is that 
once producers are part of the TATE network they tend to become 
increasingly subject to the external prescription of their farm management. 
Not only that, TATE also confronts them with ever changing and more 
compelling advice and exigencies. And only if these farmers conform to the 
logic of TATE will they be regarded as rational entrepreneurs and rewarded 
correspondingly. 
It is the idea of external prescription of farm operations, and induced 
innovations, as a result of TATE relations that will be explored next. 
5.5 The treadmill 
In his comprehensive anthropological study on the rural sector in two Basque 
villages, William Douglass (1977) mentions that in the 1960s a farmer with 3 
cows and 10 calves was called a big cattle owner. Some 25 years later, one 
of the bigger farmers I interviewed told me how they had had to expand and 
modernize "in order to be better able to make ends meet. Formerly you could 
live on 5 cows, but at present you need about 25." 
Pile (1990) uses the metaphor of the treadmill to characterize this 
development.211 He states that farmers are forced to constantly adopt new 
technologies if they want their farms to survive. This "expanded reproduction 
of capital in farming" (ibid.: 135) is what he calls the treadmill's 'driving 
force'. The consequence for farmers is that they "have seen a continual 
increase in the size of the 'viable' farm unit" (ibid.). Yet, technology also 
enables farmers to cultivate more land, keep more animals and raise 
production levels with more or less the same amount of labour input. Or as 
Juan of the Etxeberri farm put it: "We have 44 cows now and we have less 
work than many years ago, when we only had 10 cows. This is due to the 
machines we use: they save a lot of labour." 
The work on the land and in the cowshed can be carried out with the help 
For a fuller discussion of the treadmill concept, see Ward, 1993. 
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of all sorts of machines, fodder may be administered by means of a computer, 
and farmers themselves belong to institutions that regularly carry out quality 
controls of their cattle and the milk or where they can obtain selected semen. 
All in all, their work probably demands less physical exertion than one or two 
decades ago. But the treadmill also had the effect of "further linking producers 
to external agencies" (ibid.: 13). Farmers are faced with indebtness, causing 
financial worries, and with institutional prescription of certain tasks that have 
to be coordinated with the rest of farm labour. This all means a greater mental 
burden for farmers. Induced by external institutions and motivated by their 
own desire to keep abreast of new developments, they adopt further 
innovations that should help them to secure the reproduction of their farming 
enterprise. 
The most direct way in which farmers are induced to adopt new 
technology is through regulations of Government agencies, normally alleging 
the necessity of public health measures, or through marketing organizations 
like agricultural cooperatives, generally for reasons of efficiency in the 
collection and processing of farm products. In the early 1980s, the dairy 
cooperative Gurelesa decided that its members should purchase a milk 
refrigerated tank: this would not only benefit the quality of the milk, but it 
would also enable the cooperative to collect the milk once every two days 
instead of each day. Most farmers followed the cooperative in this, but for 
some members such an investment (or the additional costs of improving the 
access roads to some of the farms so that the new and heavier trucks would 
be able to reach them) was beyond their financial possibilities; they had to 
leave the cooperative and look for alternative marketing channels or give up 
farming. 
However, farmers are not only 'chained' to the treadmill through the 
adoption of technology (or 'technical capital') but also through the input of 
biological capital. In the past, the Administration carried out several sanitary 
campaigns to eradicate tuberculosis and brucelosis among the cows: the 
farmers received compensation for the infected cows that had to be sacrificed 
and were then offered the opportunity to replace them (often under 
advantageous financial conditions) by the more productive Friesian cows that 
were imported from Germany, the Netherlands or Denmark; some bigger 
farmers even went abroad on organized trips, subsidized by the 
Administration, to select the cows personally in their countries of origin. 
All this is not to say that farmers are the passive victims of institutions 
that incite them to ever higher investments. The farmers themselves (i.e. 
those who are able to do so) actively adopt the innovations and integrate 
these into their farming operations. And in their discourse the adoption of new 
technology is frequently presented as entirely their own decision. But even if 
this is so, they often realize that they are somehow forced to continuously 
innovate and progress, if they do not want to be overtaken by economic 
developments. It is precisely on the bigger farms, with the most cows and the 
highest production, that the treadmill of investment and adoption of 
technology is most strongly felt. The family farm household may earn quite a 
good income, but at the same time its members must realize that there is 
hardly a way back for them: if one has specialized in large-scale dairy farming 
for many years, the economic risk involved in taking up an alternative line of 
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production or commercialization or even of slowing down the pace of 
investments has simply become too big (see also Benvenuti, 1991: 49, for a 
similar development in Dutch agriculture). One of Pile's respondents 
expressively summarized the effect of the treadmill on farm management as 
"you've got to run faster to stay in the same place" (ibid.:135). 
Pile's observation about British agriculture that "(t)he amount of land required 
to provide a living for an individual family member has increased progressively 
over the years" (ibid.:139) is equally valid for the Basque situation (and, 
indeed, for that in many other countries or regions). However, Basque farmers 
willing to expand often found themselves severely constrained in their 
possibilities to acquire more hectares or to make a more productive use of the 
land they already had in property. The dispersion of fields and the steep 
mountain slopes on which these fields are located are factors that were 
believed to contribute to a sub-optimal utilization of land in property. Factors 
that were held responsible for the difficulty to buy new land were the 
existence of an large group of part-time farmers and the virtual non-existence 
of an adequately functioning land market in many areas. 
5.6 Under-utilization of land and machinery 
Negative sentiments towards part-time farmers were fairly widespread among 
full-time, modernizing farmers and might also be expressed by people in rural 
institutions. The general image was that a part-time farmer was only 
interested in carrying out not too labour demanding agrarian activities that 
were compatible with his industrial job and at best yielded him some extra 
income, but not in making the best possible use of agricultural production 
factors. There are many examples of farmers who took a job in industry, 
replaced their milking herd by beef cattle and planted pine-trees on their 
dispersed pasture fields. 
Part-time farmers had in common with other categories of farmers their 
unwillingness to sell part of their landed property. Retired farmers without any 
heirs, for example, would seldom sell the meadows or mountain fields that 
they hardly exploited to modernizing farmers who might need these lands in 
order to expand their farming enterprises. Nor were they very much inclined to 
lease land to others. Some of my informants would attribute the farmers' 
reticence to sell or lease to their 'attachment to the land' as if we were 
dealing with some irrational attitude of the farmers in question. Farmers 
themselves, however, referred to less abstract reasons: like the high inflation 
rate, which made it unwise to sell land and put the money into a bank, or 
certain laws that made it difficult to cancel a lease. Furthermore, in times of 
economic growth and industrial expansion, many owners of rural land in 
possession of a permit for industrial construction tried to speculate with their 
property, asking prices that would far exceed what might have been justifiable 
from an agricultural point of view. On the other hand, in periods of economic 
crisis, both full-time and part-time farmers (and even urban heirs of abandoned 
farms) would keep their property intact, considering it as something to fall 
back on in case times got even worse. 
65 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that voices might be heard 
demanding a re-allotment policy in order to guarantee a more optimal use of 
agricultural land - and not only in interviews with big farmers, but also in 
reports of policy-makers (e.g. Ansola et al., 1980) and publications of rural 
economists. 
"The extension of some farming enterprises can only be realized by 
using the land that other farms occupy at present. Stimulating and 
strengthening agricultural modernization demands the territorial 
reorganization of farming enterprises, their scale-enlargement, which 
implies a drastic reduction of their number" (Etxezarreta, 1985: 132; 
my translation). 
Nevertheless, ideas on land re-allotment were far from popular among the 
majority of Basque farmers and the topic did therefore not appear on the 
priority list of the regional Department of Agriculture. 
If it is politically unfeasible to carry out a policy aimed at creating bigger 
farming enterprises, the alternative may be to stimulate farmers to make a 
more intensive use of the land they own or rent at the moment. In the 1980s, 
Basque farmers were known to spend a lot of money on concentrates 
(according to Lurgintza studies, cattle-fodder purchases on average farms 
amounted to about two-thirds of total farming expenditures, most of it being 
spent on mash) and relatively little on artificial fertilizers. They believed that 
the organic manure produced by their cattle was of good quality as a 
consequence of their high mash consumption. "To produce high-quality dung, 
you should feed concentrates," was their maxim. Now, this practice of 
feeding cattle a lot of concentrates and comparatively little forage was 
criticized by representatives of the Administration and the professional 
institutions, who recommended farmers to spend more money on manuring 
their fields better so that they would be able to feed their cows more forage 
instead of mash; eventually this would save them money. In the words of the 
Deputy of Agriculture of the province of Gipuzkoa: 
"First you have to 'milk' the land and then the cows. But you cannot 
milk the cows while not 'milking' the land, and then buy fodder 
elsewhere, for that increases production costs." 
[J . Zubia, X/87] 
And the retired vet Erzilia, former manager of the dairy cooperative Gurelesa 
and an informal adviser of farmers in the region around Aritzmendi: 
"There are many different types of soil here that should be treated 
with different types of fertilizers. (..) Farmers here have never 
properly fertilized their lands. Did you know that some farmers have 
been able to double their livestock because they improved their 
manuring? (..) Farmers should make their concentrates at home, but 
they should see it as something complementary. The basis should be 
forage: that has to fill the cow's rumen." 
[A. Erzilia, XII/88] 
In general terms, farmers seemed to subscribe to these ideas. When the 
farmers who participated in my survey were asked to describe the most ideal 
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farming system for agricultural producers in the region, they were quite 
unanimous in their answers: a lot of dairy cows, a high production per cow, 
more than enough land, and using a great amount of fertilizer. Only referring 
to concentrates their opinions diverged: the percentages against and in favour 
of feeding big quantities of mash roughly equalled (40%), the rest did not 
mention it. The argument of those who were against was that concentrates 
were normally one of the principal expenditures on the farm. 
On the other hand, most farmers I interviewed did not believe the scenario 
of little mash and much fertilizer would work in practice, and they explained 
why not. First, the grass in the region was claimed to be of bad quality so 
that extra manuring would make little sense; and second, if they were able to 
increase grass or maize production, it would in many cases be difficult to 
mechanize crop care and harvests on the mountain slopes: a production 
increase of forage would thus imply the need for higher labour input. But on 
many farms labour was scarce. 
Nevertheless, some of the bigger farmers had begun to have soil analysis 
carried out on all their pieces of land. Directed manuring should raise their 
forage production, while on fields that were hard to mechanize beef cattle 
could be kept (though at times the farmers still had to go into these fields to 
scythe the grass that the cows refused to eat). Furthermore, the 'silage 
revolution' that has taken place over the last decade or so might reflect an 
improvement in manuring practices. In 1984, hardly any farmer in the region 
had a silo: "the cows won't eat it," and "it smells as if it were rotten," were 
the arguments farmers used. But more and more farmers realized that a silo 
made it possible to have an extra cut of grass early in the year, on top of the 
usual two cuts a year for haymaking, so by the end of the eighties it had 
become quite common for farmers to feed their cattle from the silage pit. And 
in 1996 many of them had adopted the latest innovation: the big silage bales 
that were made by contract workers. 
Extension agents assured me that farmers did not only make an sub-optimal 
use of their land, but that the same applied to their use of technology: the 
potential of agricultural machinery on many farms was claimed to bear no 
relation to the use that was made of it. A similar argument could be found in 
studies on agricultural productivity (see for example Caja Laboral Popular, 
1979: 314). 
At first sight it may seem contradictory that under-utilization of land co-
exists in the same region, even in the same village, with under-utilization of 
agricultural machinery. After all, if there is an overcapacity of machinery on 
the farms in a village, there seems to be no reason why the land around these 
farms should not be used to the limit. Farmers explained this paradox as 
follows: they simply needed all the machines they had so as not to depend on 
others in peak periods such as the haymaking season. In agriculture, they 
claimed, everyone needed the same machines at more or less the same time. 
Greenwood, in his study on Basque horticulture in a village in Gipuzkoa, 
stated that "lack of capital is not the cause of farm problems" (Greenwood, 
1976: 203), and perhaps we might extend this conclusion to the dairy sector 
as well: if farmers had machines, that was because they could afford to buy 
them. This held good especially for part-time farmers, of course, who could 
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spend part of their industrial income on the purchase of machinery that should 
lighten their work on the farm. However, if we allege that money seldom 
seemed to be a limiting factor for farmers who wished to buy machinery, we 
should not forget Mendras' warning. Speaking about the French countryside, 
Mendras points out that the pace with which 'mechanical improvements' 
spread over the countryside has often little to do with their profitability for the 
majority of farmers, but everything with their desire to imitate their wealthier 
colleagues: 
"(Small farmers) emulate in big farmers the actions that best 
conform to the dominant image of progress (the purchase of a 
tractor, for example) and not those that are more effective (such as 
the use of chemical fertilizer and artificial insemination) and within 
their means" (Mendras, 1970: 149). 
This is another possible reason why even on relatively small farms more 
machinery could be found than what might have been justifiable on the basis 
of the economic criteria of extension agents in the region. 
Farmers who were willing to expand, but did not have the possibility to 
intensify their land use nor to purchase new land might design other strategies 
to get round these constraints. 
5.7 Machinery and land use: interlocking projects 
Douglass describes the distribution of land belonging to a Basque farm in a 
schematic way as a number of concentric circles around the farmstead that 
coincide with different forms of land use (see Figure 4; from Douglass, 1977: 
44, slightly adapted). As Douglass observes, the general rule governing this 
type of land distribution is that the amount of labour dedicated to a plot 
decreases as we move away from the farmstead. While accepting the validity 
of this rule, we should nevertheless elaborate the schematic distribution laid 
out in Figure 4 a little more, thereby introducing some corrections that 
changing circumstances since the days Douglass carried out his research in 
the area (1962-63) have made necessary. Firstly, in the Basque coastal 
provinces there are practically no farmers anymore who grow cereals. Yet, 
most farm households still have their kitchen gardens for home consumption 
(though some may also sell some vegetables on the market or hawk them on 
the streets together with milk) and some fields on which they grow fodder 
plants, like maize, mangold and turnips, for the cows. Secondly, in the sixties 
most dairy farmers still kept their cattle in the cow-shed all year long, while 
meadows were only used to produce forage, but not to let the cows graze. 
Nowadays, dairy cows normally graze on the pastures around the farmhouse, 
weather permitting (i.e. if it is not too hot or too cold), whereas the meadows 
farther away from the farm are kept for silage and hay production. However, 
if because of steep slopes or a rocky surface it is difficult to introduce 
machinery for manuring and harvesting on these meadows, cows of a beef or 
milk-beef producing race (Charolais, Limousin, etc.) may be kept there. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of land according to its use. 
On mountain pastures, farmers normally keep the tougher Pyrenean beef 
cattle.23' Thirdly, the fields belonging to a farm do not normally form a 
continuous surface; at best, this may hold good for the pastures around the 
farm buildings. The meadows farther away and those in the mountains, on the 
other hand, seldom lie side by side but are normally rather dispersed, 
distributed among the fields that belong to other farms. With these 
corrections in mind, we can now re-sketch Douglass's scheme (see Figure 5). 
The number of farms for sale in Gipuzkoa was very low. And if a 
farmstead with surrounding lands was sold, modernizing farmers were seldom 
willing to pay a large sum of money for a whole farming enterprise that might 
lie several kilometres away. But in many cases there were quite a lot of fields, 
belonging to, for instance, part-time farmers or urban weekend visitors, which 
lay scattered among their own parcels and whose owners did not mind leasing 
them to other farmers who would make a more productive use of this land. 
(These fields correspond to the shaded areas in Figure 5.) These part-timers or 
urban cottage dwellers could do without the forage and in this way they did 
not have to keep these fields clean themselves. It also happened that these 
lease arrangements were made without money being involved. Under the 
prevailing circumstances, the expanding farmers did not even find it necessary 
anymore that fields to be leased bordered their own lands. After all, these 
fields would be used for forage production (as the cows normally grazed 
Douglass distinguishes two different types of land use, one with the farmstead and the other 
with the village nucleus in the centre of the concentrical circles. I only refer to the first type, 
which turned out to be more relevant in the context of my own research findings. 
Farmers used distinct terms for these fields in Basque: etxe inguruan (also belardia or zelaia) 
for the fields around the farm, errepartitutak (or aldapak) when they referred to the dispersed 
fields on the mountain slopes farther away, and mendi zelaiak for the mountain pastures. 
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around the farmstead), and due to better access roads and machinery, 
distance had become less important. If forage could be obtained for free, 
farmers did not even mind mowing it in another village. 
mountain fields 
(beef catt le) 
meadows 
(hay and 
silage) 
pasture 
(milk-beef 
cows) 
kitchen garden 
forage fields 
(maize, turnips, etc.) 
pastures (dairy cows) 
Figure 5. Distribution of fields according to their use 
(the shaded fields belong to other farms). 
For the good order, this arrangement whereby one farmer obtains forage 
through working the land of another without paying for this has nothing to do 
with the way such things were done in traditional agricultural systems. What 
we see here is a kind of symbiosis between the modern farmer, on the one 
hand, and the part-time farmer or urban weekend visitor, on the other: a 
creative arrangement that is not laid down in an official lease contract, in 
which no money is involved, and of which both parties know that they will 
gain by it. (As a matter of fact, if a weekend visitor asked money for his 
grass, the farmer would probably not accept mowing it; consequently, the 
urban visitor would have to clean his fields himself!) As long as both parties 
were interested, these arrangements would automatically be renewed year 
after year. It would be wrong to conclude that, because this is a non-
commodity relationship between two parties, we therefore have to do with a 
traditional ('folk') arrangement. 
It cannot be denied that there are farmers who are only able to expand 
because they can establish such arrangements with their neighbours. In fact, 
these arrangements are excellent examples of what I have earlier referred to 
as 'interlocking projects' (see Chapter 1). The rationale of establishing these 
arrangements for the farmer trying to expand his enterprise might be 
explained with the following Chayanovian diagram (see Figure 6). Let us first 
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imagine that a farm household had to buy land in order to expand its 
production. Presupposing that this purchase is financed out of the household's 
savings, this means that part of the family's capital, which would otherwise 
have been used for consumption, is now used for productive purposes; 
consequently, the satisfaction of part of the family members' consumption 
needs has to be postponed and the corresponding curve shifts upward (this is 
line L in the Figure). Machinery, like ploughs, hay and silage balers, will be 
used to work the expanded area; these machines increase the labour 
productivity on the farm, which means that the drudgery curve is shifted 
downward. As some of these machines must probably be bought, the demand 
satisfaction curve rises even further (line L+M). The equilibrium point moves 
from X to Y. However, this is not unmistakeably advantageous for the farming 
household: the net income may have increased, but so has the drudgery of 
labour, because the capital expenditure on machinery and land will have to be 
earned back (cf. Chayanov, 1966: 209). If, on the other hand, the family does 
not have to buy the extra pieces of land, but is given the usufruct by the 
owners in return for keeping these fields clean for them, the demand 
satisfaction curve rises much less (to line M, as only machinery will have to 
be bought), so that the equilibrium shifts to point Z. (It is obvious that the 
equilibrium point is even more advantageous, Z', if purchases can be financed 
by means of credits.) Thus, the articulation of one's own project with those of 
other actors results in the most advantageous situation for the modernizing 
farmer: the output and family demand satisfaction are higher than at point X, 
whereas the drudgery of labour is lower. 
satisfaction 
(marginal 
utility of 
consumption) 
drudgery 
(marginal 
disutility 
of labour) 
output/income 
Figure 6. Land use and interlocking projects. 
It is true that the minor scale on which such interlocking projects were 
established must have made this phenomenon hardly noticeable. But if that is 
so, it might just as well be an indication of the lack of a really effective 
demand for land. 
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A similar story can be told about farmers with a lot of agricultural machinery, 
who may decide to carry out contract work for other farmers.24' This was 
the case of Joseba and two more young farmers in Zelaizabal. In the first 
place, this enabled them to pay off the generally expensive machinery more 
easily, but it also meant that these machines would be more intensively used 
than if they had only been used on their own fields. (Moreover, due to steep 
mountain slopes, heavy machinery could often not even be used on all fields 
belonging to the own farm.) Again, the logic of this strategy may be illustrated 
by means of a Chayanovian diagram (Figure 7). It often concerns machines 
that can only be used part of the year: Chayanov gives the example of the 
threshing machine (Chayanov, 1966: 211), but I shall choose the haybaler to 
make my point. 
Figure 7. Agricultural machinery and interlocking projects. 
The haybaler is only used a few times a year on the farmer's own fields. It 
enables the household to do the tiresome and time consuming tasks of hay-
making much faster and easier, but the labour time gained can hardly be used 
more productively on the own holding. The haybaler raises the family 
members' labour productivity only for a short period of the year (curve A hB in 
Figure 7). The purchase of this machine shifts the demand satisfaction curve 
upward (curve H) in T,, for the same reasons we have explained with respect 
to Figure 6. The resulting equilibrium point Y will not be considered 
advantageous by the farm household. If, however, this household uses the 
haybaler to carry out contract work for other farmers, it will earn itself back: 
For the good order, it should be mentioned that not all expanding farm enterprises also had 
all expensive machinery. Even on Iriarte, for example, they called for a contract-worker when 
particularly heavy work had to be done. 
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in T 2 the demand satisfaction curve H shifts downward and the equilibrium 
point moves to Z. Again, from the household members' point of view this 
equilibrium point Z is more favourable than X or Y. 
For the clients of these contract-workers the situation may be described 
as follows (see Figure 8). By contracting a specialized worker with machinery 
the labour drudgery of household members reduces (curve AB shifts 
downward). But as they have to pay for this service, they will have less 
consumptive capital at their disposal (curve CD shifts upward to S). 
Eventually, the new equilibrium point is more favourable, not because a higher 
demand satisfaction is translated into more consumer goods but into having 
more free time. (Theoretically, this free time could of course be used 
productively again by increasing the output of farm products, but this would 
go against the family members' original purpose of reducing their workload.) It 
may even be so that, as a result of mechanization, the amount of hay 
produced is higher than if the work had been done manually. This effect may 
be translated into a slight downward shift of the curve S again (towards S'). 
Figure 8. Labour saving through contracting specialists. 
Those farmers who did contract-work for others still had to deal with the 
problem that the other farmers in the area all required their service in the 
same period, which sometimes led to priority conflicts as they were expected 
to attend their 'clients' before working their own lands. This problem was 
especially pressing in the period of haymaking, but may not have been so 
important in the case of silage baling, which is less dependent on weather 
conditions. As it turned out, this priority conflict came especially to the fore in 
the relationships between fathers and sons. Whereas the fathers of these 
young farmers would rather see that tasks on the farm were done first, their 
sons preferred the money they would earn by working for others and thought 
they could still do the work on their own farms afterwards. We may expect 
satisfaction 
(marginal 
utility of 
consumption) 
drudgery 
(marginal 
disutility 
of labour) 
output/income 
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these opposing views to be a constant object of negotiations between fathers 
and sons on these 'modern' farms. 
Basque dairy farmers who are willing to expand and modernize their 
enterprises are thus faced with certain difficulties to realize their projects, like 
a hardly functioning land market and the high prices of specialized agricultural 
machines (that can often only be used part of the year). But they are also 
known to find solutions to their problems by establishing strategic 
relationships with other actors (farmers and non-farmers) in the village. In the 
next section, we will see how cultural factors may influence the generational 
continuity of these farms. 
5.8 The future of 'modern' farms 
By the end of the 1980s, farmers in Aritzmendi foresaw that no farm in the 
village would be continued as a full-time farming enterprise. There was one 
young farmer who had invested quite a lot of money in an alternative type of 
milk sales (selling raw milk in plastic bags - see Section 7.3), with the idea, as 
he had told me, to take over and modernize his parents' farm before long; 
nevertheless, most villagers believed (and correctly, as it turned out) that even 
he would give up farming as soon as he was offered a job elsewhere. In 
Zelaizabal, prospects were only slightly more positive: on three of the 64 
cattle farms a son would take over the farming enterprise as a full-time 
business. Joseba of the Etxeberri farm (Section 5.1) was one of them. 
Joseba's father wanted his son to realize that continuing this farm on a 
part-time basis eventually meant its loss as a productive unit. In other words, 
his 'image of the future' of a viable farm, and of his own farm in particular, 
only matched the prospect of a full-time successor. Joseba's plans were to 
work as a full-time farmer for at least the time his parents would be able to 
help him on the farm (and most probably for as long as his father lived), but 
as to what would happen in the long run, he was not sure yet. Joseba had a 
group of friends of his age in the village; most of them were farmers' sons like 
himself, but had jobs in industry and only helped a bit on the farm in the 
evening when they came home from work or on Saturdays and Sundays. At 
weekends, Joseba frequently went out with them. He had also actively helped 
with the organization of the local 'fiestas' in August, and he even went on 
holiday in summer. But no doubt he realized that once he had full 
responsibility for the farm, this would all be over. Now, his parents and his 
brothers worked a little harder when Joseba went out or took a day or a week 
off. (As a matter of fact, due to the amount of labour power they were able 
to mobilize, the owners of Etxeberri were known to finish work like hay-
making or potato lifting normally a few days before other farms in the village.) 
But what would happen in the future, when his brothers married and left the 
farm and his parents were too old to be of any real help? 
Farmers in this region could call in the assistance of contracted farm 
'managers' in case of illness or if they wanted to go on holiday for a week or 
so. Although this relatively new service was not very popular yet, there was a 
growing number of farmers who made use of it. But that only solved the 
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problem of the holidays. Farming is not a nine-to-five job; in the evening or at 
the weekend, when his neighbours go out, the farmer may still have work to 
do. This consideration may also have motivated Joseba's hesitation, just as it 
influenced the negative decision of many other young men to take over their 
parents' farms on a full-time basis. But his main worry seemed to be the 
every-day work: he feared that it simply might become too heavy for him 
alone, once his parents were no longer there to lend him a hand. 
Consequently, for him the image of his personal future did not necessarily 
coincide with that of the full-time farm. This was also true for potential 
successors on several other modern farms I visited. In spite of bright 
economic perspectives, there were other factors which eventually made them 
decide not to follow in their parents' footsteps. 
An important factor, in my view, is the phenomenon of late marriage in 
the Basque countryside; several decades ago, this was already mentioned by 
Douglass (1971, 1976) and the situation has apparently not changed much 
since then. It makes a big difference for the total family labour input if the 
successor marries at the age of 30 or even 35, as is so common on many 
Basque farms, or at the age of 25. I shall try to demonstrate this following 
Chayanov's analysis of the evolution of the farm family composition 
(Chayanov, 1966: 58). We take as our central unit of analysis the parents, 
the succeeding couple and their succeeding son (and his wife). The age 
difference between husband and wife of all couples is 5 years. We assume 
that the labour capacity of an adult (say, 20 to 65 years old) is 0.9, that of a 
15-year-old child 0.7, and that of a person of 70 also 0.7; the labour input of 
children younger than 15 and of people over 70 is taken to be insignificant. In 
the following tables, the A-columns record the age of the parents, the B-
columns that of the succeeding couple and the C-columns that of the second-
generation successor and his wife; the labour capacity per couple or individual 
is given in brackets. In the last column of each table we see the evolution of 
the total family labour capacity. The years of marriage of the successors are 
underlined in these tables. (For the sake of simplicity, I will only focus on 
senior and succeeding couples, ignoring the remaining family members for the 
present. In the following chapter, I shall come back to this.) 
75 
Table 7. Family labour capacity; marriage of successor at the age of 25 
(M-25) 
Family 
A B C labour capacity 
70/65 45/40 20 4.3 
(1.6) (1.8) (0.9) 
75/70 50/45 25/20 0 4.3 
(0.7) (1.8) (1.8) 
80/75 55/50 30/25 5 3.6 
(-) (1.8) (1.8) 
60/55 35/30 10 3.6 
(1.8) (1.8) 
65/60 40/35 15 4.3 
(1.8) (1.8) (0.7) 
70/65 45/40 20 4.3 
(1.6) (1.8) (0.9) 
75/70 50/45 25/20 4.3 
(0.7) (1.8) (1.8) 
80/75 55/50 30/25 3.6 
(-) (1.8) (1.8) 
Table 8. Family labour capacity; marriage of successor at the age of 30 
(M-30) 
Family 
A B C labour capaci 
55/50 25 2.7 
(1.8) (0.9) 
60/55 30/25 0 3.6 
(1.8) (1.8) 
65/60 35/30 5 3.6 
(1.8) (1.8) 
70/65 40/35 10 3.4 
(1.6) (1.8) 
75/70 45/40 15 3.2 
(0.7) (1.8) (0.7) 
80/75 50/45 20 2.7 
(-) (1.8) (0.9) 
55/50 25 2.7 
(1.8) (0.9) 
60/55 30/25 3.6 
(1.8) (1.8) 
65/60 35/30 3.6 
(1.8) (1.8) 
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Table 9. Family labour capacity; marriage of successor at the age of 35 
(M-35) 
A B C labour capaci 
65/60 30 2.7 
(1.8) (0.9) 
70/65 35/30 0 3.4 
(1.6) (1.8) 
75/70 40/35 5 2.5 
(0.7) (1.8) 
80/75 45/40 10 1.8 
(-) (1.8) 
50/45 15 2.5 
(1.8) (0.7) 
55/50 20 2.7 
(1.8) (0.9) 
60/55 25 2.7 
(1.8) (0.9) 
65/60 30 2.7 
(1.8) (0.9) 
70/65 35/30 3.4 
(1.6) (1.8) 
75/70 40/35 2.5 
(0.7) (1.8) 
We are now able to represent the family labour capacity on which the 
successor in column B can count at different moments of his life in a graph 
and compare the three situations with each other (Figure 9). 
Succession of the holding normally takes place when the aged farming 
couple is between 60 and 65 years old. Successors who marry at the age of 
25 will then take over the farm when they are about 35 or 40. Figure 9 
shows that at the moment of successsion they can expect an increase of the 
family's labour capacity which will remain higher for the coming fifteen years 
(see curve M-25). But reality in the Basque Country is quite different. If the 
succeeding son does not marry before the age of 30 or 35, he will have to 
take over the farming enterprise almost upon marriage or perhaps even before, 
that is, at the moment that family labour capacity is about to go down and 
will remain low for the next twenty-odd years. (The average labour capacity 
evolution curve for this situation is represented as a thick, continuous line.) 
Irrespective of the economic prosperity of the holding, the drudgery of labour 
per person can be expected to grow after the farm has been taken over. What 
is more, this problem may become more acute as the size of the 'viable farm 
unit' (Pile, 1990: 135) increases. It is true that on expanding, modernizing 
farms labour productivity may be increased through mechanization, but in the 
mountainous areas of the Basque Country the substitution of machinery for 
labour is only possible to a certain extent. Moreover, a decrease of family 
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Family 
labour power makes it more difficult to maintain the institutional and social 
networks that had facilitated expansion in the first place. On a large-scale, 
expanding farm, the successor's prospects of increasing drudgery of labour 
are even greater than on a smaller holding; consequently, his motivation to 
continue the farm as a full-time enterprise may be proportionately lower. 
4.5 
1.5 
20 25 3D 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 
age o f successor CEO 
Figure 9. Total family labour input during the lifespan of successor B, 
according to his age of marriage. 
On many farms in Gipuzkoa, the succeeding sons had not been able to find a 
spouse at all. Those were the farms run by aged bachelors (mutilzarrak in 
Basque), where succession would in all probability be out of the question. 
This phenomenon was more typical of traditional holdings, but it was also 
frequently found on modern farms. On Iriarte, for example, the owners had 
modernized even in the absence of any future perspectives - simply, as the 
people in the village would say, because they had no alternatives. They did 
not have a family to spend their money on, they lived deprived of all luxuries 
and just spent enough money to live on; the rest of what they earned was re-
invested. But they did not even have any nephews or nieces who could take 
over their farming enterprise. Here the image of the future of the holding was 
linked in a dramatically direct way to the life-span of the owners: the farm 
would probably be abandoned when they died. In other such cases, a 
(married) brother or sister or more distant relatives were expected to inherit 
the farm, which would then most likely be used as second housing or, at the 
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the farm, which would then most likely be used as second housing or, at the 
most, as a part-time or hobby farm. 
5.9 Conclusions 
Modernizing farmers are generally forced to continue on the treadmill of 
increasing investment and further expansion if they want to survive. And 
most middle-sized holdings follow their example in an attempt not to let the 
vanguard enterprises get too far ahead. Both strategies, of scale-enlargement 
and of intensification, may lead farmers to establish more and stronger links 
with surrounding institutions, among other things as a way to reduce risks 
and in order to externalize tasks for which farming households lack the 
necessary knowledge or labour power. As these farm households are then 
likely to become more and more subject to outside prescription (from the 
TATE complex) of on-farm tasks, their enterprises are becoming ever more 
'chained' to the treadmill. Consequently, the minimum output level of what 
can be defined as a viable farm enterprise is continually adjusted in upward 
direction. 
The strategy of the 'modern' dairy farmers we have dealt with in this 
chapter was aimed at expanding their livestock as well as raising the 
production per cow. In order to realize this, land was needed for forage 
production, but there was seldom land for sale at a reasonable distance from 
the farmstead (or at least not at prices they found economically justifiable 
from an agricultural point of view). Labour could in general be mobilized within 
the household; it might however become a scarcity factor as the production 
level increased. Raising the household members' labour productivity 
demanded capital, but especially heavy machinery to work the land could 
seldom be used profitably on only the own holding. 
We have seen now that farmers were able to get round these problems by 
establishing strategic relationships with others, like part-timers, aged farmers, 
or urban cottage owners, for whom the same relationships were equally 
interesting. Such arrangements enabled these expanding farmers, for instance, 
to use more land without having to buy it (at the most they would have to 
pay some lease), or to use expensive machinery in a more rational way. These 
arrangements are examples of what 1 have called interlocking projects in 
Chapter 1. 
In general terms, we might say that farmers who meet with obstacles on 
the way to carry out a planned strategy mobilize the necessary resources to 
get round these obstacles through the network of social relationships they are 
part of, or which they establish to that end. But at the same time, the 
establishment and mobilization of this network may present them with new 
constraints - constraints which were either not foreseen, or were foreseen but 
taken for granted. The treadmill of expansion and investment is an excellent 
example of how a farmer's belonging to a network of interdependent (TATE) 
relationships constrains his decisions as to future action. As I have argued, it 
is extremely difficult for most farmers to 'dissociate' themselves and start 
doing something else. But something similar might be said about, for example, 
farmers who carried out contract work with their machinery for other farmers. 
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These contract workers found that once they had built up a network of 
clients, this network tended to expand and clients started to demand their 
service for more and more tasks. The external claims on them might bring 
them into conflict with the work that had to be done on their own farms. If a 
few of these farmers had shared expenses to buy some machines together, 
and had thus become engaged in another network, it became difficult for the 
individual contract worker to decide unilaterally to give up this activity. 
I have further argued that cultural factors may interfere with the outcome 
of households' survival and succession strategies, especially in as far as these 
strategies depend on the amount of labour power which may be mobilized 
within the farm family. Differences in cultural outlook between a senior farmer 
and his succeeding son, for instance, may lead to generational tensions. 
Whereas older farmers identify themselves mainly with the village society, 
their successors have normally adopted many urban values. So while a father 
might first want to get the work on his own farm done, his son, who might be 
more money-oriented, could give priority to carrying out contract work with 
his machines on the land of others. It also happened that the senior farmer 
felt strongly that his full-time enterprise would not be continued as a part-time 
holding, whereas his successor had serious doubts whether he would be able 
to respect that wish. 
As to this latter point, I have shown that as a result of late marriage in the 
Basque countryside (another cultural trait), the moment of succession on 
many farms coincides with the household's labour capacity going down. A 
reduction in the amount of labour power to be mobilized within the family 
means that the same work will have to be done by fewer people. (In Figures 6 
and 7, above, this would be translated into an upward shift of the labour 
drudgery curve AB.) It will be increasingly difficult to carry out the necessary 
tasks on the farm, including the maintenance of the former interlocking 
projects; the eventual result will probably be that the original advantage is 
nullified or even turns into its reverse. This perspective may be reason enough 
for the potential successor to decide not to continue the parental holding as a 
full-time farm enterprise. 
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Chapter 6 
'TRADITIONAL' FARMING: THE DEMISE OF THE PRIVATE 
TRADER? 
This category is supposed to comprise the large majority of Basque farmers, 
but the criteria to qualify farm enterprises as traditional are quite ambiguous. 
In the following Sections 6.1 and 6.2, I will present the cases of two holdings 
that are believed to be involved in traditional activities, and that basically have 
it in common that they sell their farm products on a private basis, without the 
interference of any marketing organizations. It is particularly the fate of the 
hawkers of fresh milk which will be explored in the course of this chapter. 
6.1 Beko-etxe: easy does it 2 5' 
In 1989, there were three people living in this small farm in Zelaizabal: Ignacio 
(61), his wife Pilar (54), and a 31-year-old son, who had a full-time job as a 
construction worker and only helped his parents a little after work and at 
weekends; their other four children lived in town. Pilar had inherited the farm 
from her parents: "My parents left me no money when they died, but a farm 
where I could work for a living." They kept 5 Friesian dairy cows and 7 calves 
to be fattened. The cows were milked by hand and produced less than 40 
litres of milk a day; half of the daily production was used to make cheese. 
While her husband was busy feeding the cattle and cleaning the cowshed, 
Pilar did the housework, prepared the meals, worked in the kitchen garden 
and fed the pig and the chickens. Together they worked in the forage fields 
and the meadows. They only had a small mowing machine. Most of the daily 
work was done by hand or with the help of a mule, but in summer they paid a 
contract-worker (Xabier of the Antolar farm, see Chapter 8) to bring in the 
hay. 
Until 1957 they sold their milk to a few private, female milk traders in a 
nearby town, who used it to make butter. When the dairy cooperative 
Gurelesa started functioning, those milkmen and women disappeared and Pilar 
and Ignacio had to determine whether they should sell their milk through 
Gurelesa henceforth. Ignacio decided to wait: "Let's first see if others get rich 
by selling to the cooperative." As this did not happen, Pilar began to make 
cheese, which she had learned from her mother. Why had they not tried to 
sell their milk directly to urban consumers, as so many farmers did in those 
days? Pilar: "I've never learned to drive a car; I really do regret that now." She 
used to make 3 cheeses a day: one of a kilo and two smaller ones of about a 
pound, which were sold once a week on the market in town to a relatively 
stable circle of clients. She only used half of the daily milk production for 
For part of the information about this farm, I rely on fieldwork data gathered by Veerle van 
den Broek (1992). 
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cheese-making; the whey and the rest of the milk was fed to the calves. 
"Making more cheese means more work. You may earn a bit more 
than when you feed the milk to the cows, but you never know if you 
can sell all that cheese. Apart from that, you can sell a calf that has 
been fattened with whey when it's only 13 months old instead of 
15" (V. van den Broek, 1992:33; my translation). 
Since the end of the fifties, they had had about the same number of cows, 
five or six; only from 1971 to 1984, when Ignacio worked in a factory and 
later as a woodcutter, the livestock was reduced to 4 cows. In that period the 
family needed the extra income to finance the education of their children. 
Ignacio still received a small unemployment benefit in 1989. 
With respect to one of the most modern holdings in the village. Pilar 
observed: "Yes, they have a lot of money, a beautiful new house, and 
everything is well organized, but they also have an awful lot of work; they 
hardly have any free time." Their own evaluation of income, free time and 
labour intensity was quite different. They worked less efficiently, but in a 
more relaxed way. The work in the fields with their mule could take ages, but 
they did not seem to mind. A high income and a lot of luxury had never been 
important for them, they claimed. What they really found important was their 
independence as to production and commercialization. As to consumption, 
they preferably ate their own products, in part because it was cheaper, but 
mainly because "only then you know what you're eating." According to Pilar, 
her clients knew that she sold them exclusively natural products; for instance, 
she only added natural rennet to her cheese (obtained from the rennet 
stomach of lambs), unlike most cheese factories which she accused of using 
chemical rennet and adding potatoes and bacon to make their cheese heavier 
and tastier. 
Pilar believed that the only possibility to maintain the viability of the small 
farms in the region was the creation of small-scale production cooperatives: 
several farms that put their lands together, bought their machinery collectively 
and sold their products as one enterprise. However, she had never dared to 
propose that idea to other farmers, because "they would think that I'm only a 
woman and that I rather fancy myself." Apart from that, she said, "farmers 
here will never work together successfully, because they distrust each other 
too much. We're too proud: we think that we can do things better alone than 
together. It's a pity, but that's the way we are: if some farmers come up with 
a good initiative, we're always afraid that others get more out of it than 
ourselves." They had little hope for their own farm. About ten years ago, they 
already knew that none of their children would become a full-time dairy 
farmer, so they had never invested in the expansion of the holding. 
Nevertheless, "as long as we're healthy, we'll keep on working on the farm. 
Maybe also a little because of the money, but most of all because this is our 
life. If I can't work anymore, I'd rather die" (ibid.: 35). The only son who still 
lived on the farm saw it as his responsibility towards his parents to maintain 
the farmstead, but he would probably only keep some beef cows. There were 
some vague plans to modernize the living-quarters, and he was expected to 
help paying off the mortgage. His decision to actually keep on living on the 
farm in the future depended on whether he could find a wife who would be 
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willing to live there as well. 
Seven years later, and on the instigation of some of their children, they were 
renovating the cowshed and had also begun to rebuild the house. Their idea 
was to keep 5 cows of a beef-producing breed with their calves. Pilar had 
given up cheese-making: both she and her husband were getting older and 
could not work that hard any longer, she explained, and moreover "the market 
is worse now; there's a lot more competition than before; and it seems that 
we will ail soon have to put labels on our cheese." Their son still lived with 
them on the farm; they did not expect him to get married soon. 
6.2 Eguzkitza: wealth but no future 
In 1988, the main activity of the family household of this farm in Aritzmendi 
was the hawking of some 200 litres of milk on the streets of two small towns 
at about 5 kilometres from the village. This was normally done by the owner, 
Martin (63), and his 20-year-old son Julen. Julen was the youngest son and 
the only one still living on the farm; three of his four older brothers lived in 
villas they had built on their parents' land. 
From the 1950s until 1970, they used to sell all their milk to the dairy 
cooperative Gurelesa. They did not have more than 8 cows in those years. 
The reason they began to sell milk from door to door was, according to 
Martin, that "the cooperative only paid us 30 pesetas a litre, but with two 
hours of hawking on the streets you got 60 pesetas." By and by, the number 
of clients grew, which enabled them to expand their livestock. They 
eventually had 22 dairy cows. There was no competition among the dairy 
hawkers in town, as they all had their own route, which was respected by the 
others; moreover, hawkers in the same town would charge their clients more 
or less the same price per litre. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s it had 
become more difficult to sell, which was attributed to the anti-propaganda of 
doctors and to the fact that most urban residents now preferred to buy milk in 
the shops and supermarkets, together with the rest of the shopping. Julen: 
"At present, we charge our clients 78 pesetas a litre, but in the supermarket 
you can sometimes get milk at 65 pesetas, and of different types, like 
skimmed milk; whereas our milk contains a lot of fat..." 
They had recently begun to reduce their livestock again: there were only 
15 cows left in 1988. Martin was getting older and his wife had serious 
problems with her legs. But the most important reason for this reduction was 
that none of their sons would continue dairy production upon succession. For 
some time they had thought that their fourth son would take over the holding. 
He had studied agronomy and had helped his parents for a few years. But he 
left the farm and the village rather unexpectedly. Rumours in the village had it 
that he had met an urban girl who owned her own house and was not willing 
to live in the country. He now lived with his girlfriend in town and ran a cafe 
with a friend of his. 
After that, Julen was expected to stay and live on the farm, but his 
parents knew he would also try to get an off-farm job. So they sold most of 
the cows, gave up hawking and passed their clients on to the only hawker left 
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in the village (of the five dairy hawkers that had lived there two years earlier). 
Julen did a one-year technical course and started working as a mechanic in a 
small factory. When I spoke to him again in 1996, he told me he had married 
a year before. After having lived in a flat in town for some months, Julen and 
his wife had decided to come and live on the farm with his parents. His wife 
had an urban background; nevertheless, "she didn't object to living on the 
farm, although she had her doubts about living with my parents. But she's 
quite happy now. The only condition was that she didn't have to do any 
farmwork." Julen's father received a pension. He still had three cows to keep 
the fields clean and to raise a few calves that would be slaughtered for home-
consumption; but the most important reason for keeping these cows, said 
Julen, was that his father would have something to do. The pastures around 
the farm buildings were used to let the cows graze, but the dispersed 
meadows farther away were leased to other farmers. None of them, however, 
had used these fields to expand their livestock. 
6.3 Progressive marginalization 
In spite of their differences, the two farms described above would be regarded 
as traditional holdings by most people. However, it normally remained obscure 
what criteria scientists, policy makers or respondents in the field used to 
qualify a farming enterprise as traditional. These criteria were seldom made 
explicit and might vary from one person to the other. From my own 
observations, I deduce that a qualification as 'traditional farm' was generally 
attributed to holdings that to some extent corresponded to the following 
descriptions: 
a) The holding was characterized by its small-scale production and low level of 
mechanization. 
b) Expansion of the holding and economic efficiency were not believed to be 
the main objects of the farming household. 
c) Household members were occupied with what were seen as obsolete 
production or commercialization activities. 
d) Institutions were kept at bay. 
e) Continuation of farm production was highly unlikely. 
If one of these factors applied to a holding (say, small-scale production), this 
might not be regarded as enough to call it traditional; conversely, a traditional 
farm did not necessarily bear all these elements in it. Moreover, the attribution 
of these characteristics to a certain farm was not in all cases that 
straightforward. For example, if a farming couple alleged that they valued 
their independence and a relaxed way of working higher than earning a lot of 
money and being tied to all kinds of institutions, one could conclude, and 
quite correctly perhaps, that their holding scored high on factors b and d. But 
it might also be their way of rationalizing their incapacity to achieve a higher 
living standard or that they had been forced to leave the dairy cooperative 
because they could not meet new demands for capital contribution. 
Furthermore, a farming enterprise might score high on one factor but low on 
another. Policy makers and economists, especially, tend to regard personal 
instead of anonimous market relations as something that does not go with 
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'modern' farm management, and even more so if the products sold are not 
subject to all kinds of controls. In the Basque Country, activities like milk-
hawking or selling home-made cheese without officially recognized quality 
labels were therefore often believed to be something of the past. 
According to this standard, the Eguzkitza farm, like most other farms 
where direct milk sales were the main activity, could be considered a 
traditional holding. On the other hand, a quick calculation shows that the 
family's monthly (gross) income was far from 'backward'. In 1988, they sold 
more than 200 litres a day, twenty-six days a month (every day except 
Sundays), at 78 pesetas a litre; consequently, their income was over 400,000 
pesetas a month, which was more than double the average income in Basque 
society.261 (This is of course a gross income from which production costs 
should be deduced. But farmers who sell all their milk to the dairy factory 
need many more cows and/or a higher production per animal to reach a 
comparable income level as these hawkers, so their production costs can be 
assumed to be even higher.) 
On the other hand, the example of the Beko-etxe farm shows that some 
farm households really did make a different evaluation of their remuneration-
drudgery balance, at least in their discourse (see their comparison with 
modern farmers). They accepted a lower income in return for less drudgery 
and stress; yet, they considered farming just as much their way of life as 
most 'modern' farmers would do. In previous chapters I have argued that the 
minimum acceptable standard of living for the farm family and the 
corresponding (minimum) level of output are in part socially determined and in 
part prescribed by external institutions, more than they are dependent on the 
household's consumer/worker ratio. Conversely, I would suggest that on 
farms whose owners consciously withdraw from TATE relationships or keep 
aloof from urban norms on living standards the c/w ratio influences the 
family's labour input level more directly. On Beko-etxe, Ignacio had a few off-
farm jobs during the years he and his wife had to spend extra money on the 
education of their children. 
Most bachelor farmers also accepted lower than average income levels. 
They had no family to take care for, no children who had to go to school, so 
they lacked these motives to strive for more wealth. In general, their holdings 
were among the ones that villagers would mention as the most traditional 
farms.271 It seems plausible that marriage and children draw the holding 
closer to a living standard which is the norm in the wider society, but the 
example of Beko-etxe demonstrates that this does not happen in all cases. 
If farming activities on a particular holding were being 'phased out', either 
because there were no children to follow or because none of the children was 
In 1995, the average income in Euskadi was esteemed to be around 200,000 pesetas per 
month. In 1988, this must have been much lower. 
In a small number of cases, bachelor farmers were able to develop their holdings into more 
'modern' enterprises, as we saw in Chapter 5. From what I observed, I venture that this 
might happen when such a farm was run among two or three bachelors together who, apart 
from further investments, lacked any alternatives to spend their money on. We might call this 
'modernization by default'. 
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willing to continue the farm as a productive unit, that alone was seldom 
enough for observers to label this holding as 'traditional' (after all, I mentioned 
in Chapter 5 that succession on many modern farming enterprises could not 
be taken for granted, either); but in combination with any of the other factors, 
it could reinforce their judgement. 
I propose looking at so-called traditional farmers from another angle, 
namely as actors who witness their own marginalization; this process of 
progressive marginalization is taking place at different levels and these 
farmers have to find solutions to it if they want to assure the reproduction of 
their holding. In this approach the criteria cited above, although somewhat 
ambiguous, can still play a role, but are not determining for the definition 
anymore. By marginalization I understand the process through which certain 
(groups of) actors are pushed to the fringe of social networks relevant to them 
(which range from concrete entities, like cooperatives or political groups, to 
less tangible networks of clients or fellow villagers), where their room for 
manoeuvre as well as the interaction density between them and people in the 
centre of these circles are very much reduced. By describing the farmers of 
this chapter as 'actors who witness their own marginalization' I also want to 
bring out the importance of these farmers' own perception of their reducing 
room for manoeuvre. In the early 1980s, for example, the members of the 
Eguzkitza farm probably did not see themselves as marginalized. It was not 
until restrictions were imposed on purchasing non-pasteurized milk and their 
clients began to change their consumption habits that these hawkers began to 
become aware of the threatening marginalization. In the rest of this chapter I 
will focus primarily on dairy hawking as an example of a marginalizing 
economic activity, since for several decades this has been the main alternative 
for sales through the milk cooperatives. 
In Chayanovian terms, the rationale of dairy hawking (or private trading in 
general), as opposed to delivering milk to the dairy factory, can be described 
as follows (see Figure 10). As the farm household is able to realize a higher 
price for each litre of milk, the demand satisfaction curve CD shifts downward 
to C,D,. But the household members' labour input needed to deliver the milk 
directly to the consumers is higher than when the milk is delivered to the 
factory. Consequently, the labour drudgery curve AB shifts upward to A,B,. 
The resulting equilibrium point Y is more favourable than the original 
equilibrium X. The total output may be lower than in case of delivery to the 
dairy factory, but since we have to do with a distinct market where higher 
prices are in force, the total family income may be just as high or higher than 
in the original situation. We can even go one step further. It sometimes 
happened that the family took up private trading because one of the children 
had not been able to find an off-farm job or had become unemployed. This 
form of job creation within the family did not lead to an increase of the total 
labour drudgery of the household; hence, the corresponding curve was not 
displaced and the equilibrium point Z was still more favourable than Y. 
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Figure 10. Marginal utility curves for private trading. 
A good example of a process of marginalization within an organization can be 
found in the functioning of a small dairy cooperative in the Deba Garaia region 
in the early 1980s; part of this process has been discussed in van den Broek 
and van der Schoot (1983). When the cooperative LANA was created in 
1960, its aim was to defend the interests of the many small farmers in the 
region. At first the cooperative grew rapidly, then a short period of stability 
set in, and since the early seventies membership numbers declined again. 
Parallel to the reduction of the number of farmers associated to the dairy 
factory, the amount of milk the remaining members delivered to the 
cooperative increased considerably. In the course of a decade, over 50% of 
the members had stopped delivering milk, while the total dairy production to 
be processed more than doubled due to the concentration of huge production 
volumes on a few big farming enterprises. In 1983, the cooperative had 75 
dairy farming members; 20% of them delivered no less than 80% of the total 
volume that the factory received from all of its members (ibid.: 13-16). The 
management and many big farmers began to see the bulk of small milk 
producers as a drag on the cooperative's further evolution. According to the 
principle of 'one member, one vote', members who hardly delivered any milk 
had an equal say in the cooperative's policy as those farmers who provided 
the factory with the main part of its total volume. Moreover, transportation 
costs were considered to be higher than necessary as a proportionally 
insignificant amount of milk had to be collected on so many small farms. 
Some big farmers openly said that small farmers had to leave the cooperative. 
The managing director regretted that he had no power to decide who could 
and who could not be a cooperative member; otherwise, "for the sake of 
economic rationality" he would have reduced the cooperative's membership 
number to half. Apparently, farmers were also confronted with this opinion at 
cooperative meetings, for as one small farmer observed: "On one of these 
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ocassions, from what the manager told us I deduced that we were hindering 
the development of the cooperative"; shortly afterwards he resigned as a 
member. In the early 1980s, many farmers left when the cooperative 
demanded the installation of refrigerated milk tanks on all associated farms 
and when, a few years later, the remaining members were asked for extra 
capital contributions.281 Some of those farmers started selling their milk 
directly to urban consumers. In spite of their low production volume, they 
could still obtain a satisfactory income as a result of higher selling prices than 
by delivering to the dairy factory. However, in the course of the following 
decade, dairy hawkers here as well as in other regions were confronted with 
other processes of marginalization. 
According to a report written by order of the Basque Administration {IKEI, 
1990), the Department of Public Health, aiming at the eradication of still 
existing cases of brucelosis among the population, saw it as one of its objects 
to ban the commercialization of non-pasteurized milk that did not meet 
sanitary requirements. In order to understand how many dairy farms would be 
affected by such a policy we have to make the following calculation. The IKEI 
report mentions that there were in the three provinces of the Basque 
Autonomous Community 898 farms with five or more milch cows that 
hawked their milk in milkchurns, or with corrections for missing data: some 
1300. In Gipuzkoa alone, there were 443 farms; applying the same correction 
factor: 641. If we compare this with the 1989 figures on the total number of 
dairy farms of similar size in this province (2201, according to Table 4, 
Chapter 2), we have to conclude that by the end of the 1980s almost 30% of 
the dairy farm enterprises with five or more dairy cows sold their milk directly 
to the consumers. 
As to the demand side, more than a quarter of the households in the 
province of Gipuzkoa used to consume preferably fresh milk by the time the 
IKEI report was written. In Basque villages with fewer than 10,000 
inhabitants this even held good for 44% of the families. The consumers of 
raw milk seemed to be much more satisfied with the quality and price of their 
product than those who consumed pasteurized or sterilized milk. More than 
85% of the people who regularly consumed fresh milk were convinced of its 
high quality; only 25% believed that this type of milk could produce diseases. 
These results suggest that consumers would not be very susceptible to 
warnings of doctors as to the possible pathogenic character of non-
pasteurized milk. Nor would they understand a government policy that forbade 
its commercialization on that ground. The IKEI report advised the 
Administration to design a policy that would offer alternatives to part of the 
dairy hawkers (for instance, permitting and supporting the sales of fresh milk 
Benvenuti, quoting Gouldner, speaks of 'reciprocity imbalance': "So, for instance, farmers' 
cooperatives which have originally come into being thanks to the support of comparatively 
greater numbers of small farmers do not reciprocate for the function once exerted in their 
respect by these farmers. In fact, through the implementation of a set of constantly adapted 
and sharpened selective institutional rules, they tend to favor in an increasingly explicit way 
larger farmers more than proportionally with respect to small farmers" (Benvenuti, 1975: 60, 
note 8; emphasis in the original). 
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in plastic bags): such a policy would satisfy both the hawkers who were able 
to make the change-over and those clients who wanted to continue 
consuming raw milk in the future, thus enabling the Administration to show 
its good will. Some years before this report came out, the Administration had 
already started to implement a policy which forbade hospitals, old people's 
homes and the like to consume unpacked and non-pasteurized milk (see 
Section 4.2). This prohibition meant that dairy hawkers who delivered to 
these bulk consumers suddenly lost an important part of their market and 
consequently saw their income from farming decline. 
But there were also more and more individual consumers who stopped 
buying fresh milk. These people may not have been motivated by fear of 
contagious diseases, but the more so by worries about the high fat content of 
farm milk and the dangers of a diet of too much cholesterol. The consumption 
of skimmed milk increased rapidly. But the most important reason for the 
decreasing consumption of fresh milk was that former consumers switched to 
consumption of, predominantly, sterilized milk for reasons of convenience. Of 
many urban couples both husband and wife worked outside, which made it 
impossible for them to stay at home and wait for the dairy hawker.291 
Sterilized milk can be stored for a long time, even up to several months, 
which makes it possible to buy milk only once a week or once a fortnight, and 
this milk is preferably bought in the supermarket, together with all the other 
household products needed. The IKEI report mentioned that from 1988 to 
1990 the number of consumers of fresh milk had gone down with one-third. 
No doubt, an important factor which influenced this downward tendency 
was the changing composition that the hawker's circle of clients had often 
undergone over the years. Decades ago, many of these clients had 
themselves been of rural origin; they might even have been of the same 
village as the hawker. The hawker not only provided them with milk and other 
farm products, but also with the latest news and gossip about the village. 
That is, the network around this hawker was not only based on commercial 
but also on social ties. For these consumers this hawker was the umbilical 
cord with the village they had left. But the children of these clients grew up in 
town; their relationship with the hawker was no longer based on common 
background and nostalgia. And with the industrialization of the 1960s and 
70s in the region, many small towns in Gipuzkoa had experienced the 
immigration of thousands of people from poorer areas in Spain; many of them 
also started buying fresh milk from the hawkers. Joseba once remarked that 
"nowadays almost all of our clients are immigrants." The younger clients and 
immigrants did not identify with the hawker's fate in the same way as the 
first clients had done: as the social element had virtually disappeared from the 
relationship of the hawker with most of his clients, the latter were sooner 
inclined to shift to other products if they considered that circumstances had 
changed. 
In passing it may be noted that changing consumer habits not only 
affected the consumption of fresh milk, but also caused a decline in the sales 
Indeed, according to the IKEI study, the typical buyers of raw milk were housewives older 
than 50, who had received little schooling and had no outside jobs (IKEI, 1990: 42,43). 
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of the regional dairy factories. For decades, these factories had almost 
exclusively produced pasteurized milk, for that was the type of milk that 
Basque consumers, that is those who did not consume raw milk, preferred. 
Pasteurized milk is of higher quality than sterilized milk, but can only be kept 
fresh for a few days. In the 1980s, many people still believed that the Basque 
dairy cooperatives would hardly be affected by competition from other 
countries of the European Community: as pasteurized milk was too perishable, 
imports would necessarily be restricted to sterilized milk - for which, it was 
thought, there was no market in the Basque Country. Hence, when 
consumers, mainly for reasons of convenience, began to buy more sterilized 
dairy products, pasteurized milk experienced a spectacular loss of market 
share, which forced the regional dairy factories to increment their production 
of sterilized milk. The logical consequence was that these factories had now 
become more liable to competition from outside. Thus, an apparently minor 
change in consumer habits had a great impact on the whole regional dairy 
market. 
Farmers who experienced a reduction of their room for manoeuvre often 
saw themselves as victims of a conscious policy of agricultural institutions; a 
policy that was believed to be aimed at favouring big farmers more than 
smaller ones and at protecting organized marketing channels over private 
channels of commercialization that could not be that easily controlled by the 
Administration. As to the shift in consumption habits of individual consumers, 
most hawkers affirmed they could understand the motives behind it, but many 
also partly blamed it on the anti-propaganda against fresh milk of doctors and 
the Department of Public Health. The result of all this was that the 'natural' 
distrust of farmers towards institutional policies was only reinforced and in a 
few cases turned into outright animosity. 
It is this distrust towards institutions that are no longer experienced as 
defending the (small) farmers' particular interests which breeds the proverbial 
cunning of these farmers: they begin to see it as legitimate to cheat on the 
Administration and even on the cooperative they once helped to create (this is 
what Scott has termed 'everyday forms of peasant resistance'; Scott, 1985, 
1986). Farmers gave me some striking examples of the tricks they had played 
on institutions. One of them explained how he had injected a few worthless 
cows with turpentine during an anti-tuberculosis campaign so that they 
seemed to be infected and he could claim subsidies to buy imported Friesian 
cows. On another farm the owners told me that they had demanded 
compensation from the dairy cooperative when part of their holding had 
burned down - "just to see what would happen..." The cooperative sent them 
a few trucks of hay and paid the wood to rebuild the farm, "so we stripped 
the cooperative of quite a lot of money then." In case the farm's heir had an 
off-farm income, farmers might temporarily replace his name in the succession 
contract by that of another son who earned considerably less, thus becoming 
entitled to receiving higher subsidies or to pay lower interests on loans. 
That discontent among farmers was principally translated into individual 
actions of protests was in part due to the earlier mentioned political 
sensitiveness of a topic like dairy hawking. More important, however, is that 
these farmers did not all experience the negative consequences of 
Administrative measurements and market developments at more or less the 
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same time; this does not favour collective actions of resistance (cf. Scott, 
1986: 14). 
Farmers who are facing progressive marginalization but who do not want to 
give up farming may either do their best to hold out as long as possible or try 
to shift to some more viable alternative. The following section will present 
examples of both strategies. 
6.4 Resisting marginalization 
Landa-berri 
The family household of this farm in the Deba Garaia region consisted of 4 
people in 1996: the aged farming couple (82 and 68) and their children 
Nekane (32) and Mikel (29); three older sons were married and lived 
elsewhere. Already sixty years ago, the farmer's mother had sold raw milk 
from door to door in a small town nearby and his wife Maite took over from 
her in 1954. In those days they still had the farm on lease, but ten years later 
they were able to buy the holding, thanks to Maite who managed to persuade 
enough relatives and friends to lend them the money they needed. For more 
than two decades, they did not have more than six cows, but in recent years 
they had been trying to expand. Around 1990, they had 6 milch cows and 6 
beef cattle; six years later, their livestock had grown to 36 head: 9 dairy 
cows, 7 heifers, 7 beef cows and 13 calves. They wanted to keep some of 
the heifers in order to raise the total milk production even more. 
Many years ago, Mikel and his mother sold the milk in town, but he did 
not like this work: he preferred working on the farm. That is why Nekane 
replaced him: in the morning, before she went to work (she had a job as a 
lawyer for an agricultural organization), she first helped her mother. They used 
to sell about 80 to 90 litres a day and charged their clients 100 pesetas a litre 
(in 1996), whereas the dairy cooperatives did not pay farmers more than 40 
pesetas. Apart from having some 50 individual clients who consumed 1 to 3 
litres a day, they also sold 10 to 15 litres to a well-known hotel; at weekends 
this might even be as much as 100 litres a day. Originally, Maite's sister and 
brother-in-law, who also had a dairy farm, used to sell milk to that hotel; 
when they started to reduce their production for lack of continuity (they had 
10 children, but no one wanted to take over the holding), they passed most of 
their clients on to Maite's family (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Genealogy of the Landa-berri family, including Maite's sister and 
Why were customers willing to pay 100 pesetas for a litre of raw milk while 
they could get sterilized milk in the supermarkets for only 70 pesetas? Nekane 
explained: "Because people who are familiar with it notice a big difference. 
But many people have never tried it. The Administration says it's getting more 
and more difficult to sell, but my experience is that if you made a bit of 
propaganda, it would even be possible to sell more." They had more clients 
now than in the past: "There are customers who buy milk for normal 
consumption in the shops or the supermarket, but who prefer fresh milk to 
make croquettes or desserts and things like that. However, we've also lost 
some clients: some have died, and others said they had to watch their weight 
or they had to cut down on cholesterol." The number of hawkers who sold 
their milk in the same town as them was gradually going down, but there 
were still five left in 1996. 
In the 1970s, most of the farming enterprises around Landa-berri had 
been given up; some had been sold to urban people, a few had been totally 
abandoned. Nekane observed: "In part you can say that this has been our 
luck, for we could use their lands; if three farms had continued here, we 
would have had to make do with less. On the other hand, thanks to us there's 
still some agricultural activity in this valley." Mikel used to clean the fields of 
six of these neighbouring farms; he could keep the forage in return and only in 
one case did he have to pay lease. He had two tractors of his own. Together 
with two other farmers in the same area he had bought several agricultural 
machines in the last five years: a hay-baler, a silage baler, a hay tedder and a 
fertilizer sprinkler. With some of these machines he sometimes carried out 
contract-work for other farmers. His brothers, who all had their own jobs, 
often came round in the evenings and at weekends to help him in the fields or 
when construction work had to be done. The family had plans to build a new 
house behind the farmstead and use the old farm as a cowshed and for 
brother-in-law. 
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storage. 
As to the future, Maite was convinced that her youngest son would 
continue the farm: "Either with a girlfriend or as a bachelor, but Mikel will stay 
on the farm." In the long run, he would probably specialize more in cattle of a 
beef-producing breed, as that was less labour-demanding and responded 
better to his preferences. But for the time being, the family did not want to 
give up their hawking activities, being their most important source of income. 
Nekane and Mikel thought that one day they might be forced to start selling 
their milk in plastic bags, as a result of stricter sanitary regulations imposed by 
the Basque Department of Public Health. There was another reason why they 
would try to continue selling milk in town as long as possible, according to 
Nekane: "You can't tell my mother that she should stop hawking. Though she 
suffers from infirmities, it's her life: she loves selling and she's very good at 
it. But we realize that she won't be able to work this hard much longer." 
Iturmendi 
After his military service, Aitor began to work full-time on his parents' farm, a 
few kilometres outside the village of Aritzmendi. They had 16 cows then, but 
9 had to be sacrificed during an anti-tuberculosis campaign. Ten years later, in 
1988, their livestock consisted of 22 dairy cows and 7 calves that were kept 
on 8 hectares of pasture land. The farm work was done by Aitor, who was 30 
years old by then, and his parents. Aitor's wife did not have a rural 
background; she worked as a nurse in a nearby old people's home and never 
did any agricultural tasks. Aitor had become a member of the association 
Lurgintza in 1985; he was also active as the regional representative of the 
farmers' union EHNE. 
Just as his grandmother and his parents had done in previous decades, 
Aitor hawked the milk of their cows in town. But he thought it might be wiser 
to start selling to Gurelesa, as consumption of raw milk was gradually 
declining. In 1980 he had still sold about 180 litres a day on the streets, but 
in 1988 this had declined to 140 litres. His main problem was the fluctuation 
in sales: in summer, when many of his clients went away on holiday and 
those who stayed consumed less, he could often not sell more than half of 
what he used to sell in winter. In 1990, when he finally gave up hawking, he 
was not able to sell more than 110 to 120 litres. 
Until then, Aitor had delivered the milk that could not be sold in town to a 
dairy factory from a neighbouring province, because "in case of irregular 
delivery, they pay more than Gurelesa". But when he gave up hawking, he 
decided to sell all his milk to Gurelesa, not only because its milkprice was 
higher in case of regular deliveries, but mainly because he considered that 
Gurelesa's economic stability was being guaranteed by other institutions: 
"They're being supported by the Department of Agriculture and the banks; 
there are lots of people working there; and most dairy farmers depend on 
them. They won't let such an enterprise go bankrupt that easily." He had to 
pay an entrance fee of half a million pesetas to become a cooperative member 
(125,000 pesetas being paid at once while the remaining part was deduced in 
small sums from the litre price for the milk delivered); and being a member he 
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was no longer allowed to sell his milk otherwise than through the cooperative. 
Since Aitor had become a cooperative member he had leased 12 hectares of 
land, which meant that his total surface of meadows and pastures had more 
than doubled. As a dairy hawker he had earned a lot more per litre of milk 
than now that he delivered to Gurelesa; in order to compensate for this loss of 
income he had to increase his total milk production. In 1988, his dairy cows 
produced an average of 4,100 litres per cow per year, still 1,000 litres short 
of the Lurgintza norm. But eight years later his production per cow had risen 
to more than 5,600 litres per year and equaled the norm on the readjusted 
Lurgintza scale. He had also bought three more cows, but the old cowshed 
did not allow for any further expansion, so the only solution was to build a 
new one. Lurgintza had calculated that, in order to pay off the building costs 
and obtain an average income out of farming, Aitor would have to expand his 
livestock to 48 head. His short-term plans for the future were therefore to 
have the new shed built before the end of the year and then gradually buy the 
more than 20 milch cows needed that would make this investment profitable. 
"That's the choice you have: you either increase the livestock to an 
acceptable number or you have to.close the tent and quit." 
He realized it would be extremely difficult to face the debts. Ten years 
earlier, when he had married, he had had a new house built next to the 
farmstead where he went to live with his wife; they still had not finished 
paying off that mortgage either. "At this moment, I wouldn't have an income 
with the number of cows I have. It's as clear as that. If my wife didn't have 
her own job, I wouldn't be able to maintain the cows; I would have to find 
work elsewhere..." 
Although both his parents, in spite of their age (Aitor's father had become 
66 in 1996), still worked as hard as possible, their labour input was noticeably 
lower than several years before. Being aware that their help would soon be of 
little avail to their son, they had a particularly gloomy outlook on the holding's 
future. Aitor: "When I was 20 they encouraged me to continue on the farm, 
but now they say that it might have been better if I had found a job in 
industry." 
Marginalized farmers' resistance capacity 
Dairy hawking provided these holdings with an extra margin that the farmers 
who sold their milk through the cooperative lacked - a margin that hawkers 
believed enabled them to resist adverse market conditions better than their 
non-hawking colleagues. Generally, hawkers were also convinced that in case 
of massive dairy imports from other European countries they would be able to 
hold out longer than the regional dairy industries. As one of the hawkers I 
interviewed observed: "If imported milk is sold at 50 pesetas a litre, we can't 
keep on selling our milk at 70 pesetas, of course. But if necessary, we'd sell 
at 40 pesetas a litre. We wouldn't gain anything then, but foreign companies 
would not be able to hold out very long either. We can use this whole margin 
that the cooperatives cream off of their members." This observation implicitly 
recognizes that dairy hawking household families would temporarily have to 
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go into self-expioitation in order to survive. The hours that household 
members spent on selling the milk to their clients would not be remunerated. 
On the other hand, a regional dairy cooperative facing foreign competition 
would also have to reduce its consumer prices if it did not want to lose part of 
its market and the consequences of such a policy would sooner or later be 
passed on to its members. 
Hawkers were aware that their survival capacity depended furthermore in 
no small measure on the faith of their clients in the quality of fresh milk. We 
saw before that buyers of fresh milk generally seemed to be more convinced 
of the quality of the milk they consumed than those who used to buy factory 
milk. In interviews, hawkers would frequently contend that their clients' faith 
was completely justified. Most of them were absolutely convinced that their 
milk was far superior to the milk that passed the dairy factories, and some 
would go so far as to criticize the "industrial manipulation" of the milk that 
reached the consumer through the cooperatives and the shops. 
"What you buy in the shops isn't real milk. The factories pay the 
farmer 40 pesetas for a litre of milk, then they add goodness-knows-
what-products to it and they sell it at 80 or 90 pesetas." 
"How is it possible that the cooperatives are able to bring four or 
five different qualities of milk on the market, all with different prices? 
This obviously depends on the amount of water they mix the milk 
with..." 3 0 1 
One or two hawkers, however, realized that their clients' loyalty might not be 
entirely based on the quality of the milk offered to them, but could equally be 
motivated by the fact that many 'lifelong' clients found it difficult to tell the 
farmer frankly that they would rather not have his milk any longer. 
Hawkers did not only establish close relationships with their clients, they 
were also generally involved in loose networks with other hawkers who sold 
in the same town. If one of them incidentally needed an extra 50 litres of 
milk, for example, he or she could easily obtain it for a friendly price from any 
of the others. They also came together sometimes to discuss the prices that 
they would charge their clients: they realized that competition would only 
undermine the stability of their client networks. The number of consumers of 
fresh milk was gradually going down anyway, but at the same time more and 
more dairy farmers gave up hawking, as well. The remaining hawkers, being 
part of the hawker network, could take over the clients of the ones who had 
disappeared, which gave them new opportunities to hold out somewhat 
longer. Some even managed to increase their production volume. 
Nevertheless, all must have realized that they were, so to speak, exhausting 
their period of grace. 
Conversely, the manager of the dairy factory Gurelesa, citing the results of analyses carried 
out in two Gipuzkoan municipalities in the late 1980s, claimed that it was the quality of the 
milk sold by hawkers that often left much to be desired; the analyses had demonstrated that 
in several cases their fresh milk had been watered down. 
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The following table gives an idea of the reduction of the amount of milk 
that was sold through hawking in the years from 1988 to 1994. In 1988 
almost a third of all milk produced in Gipuzkoa was still sold directly to the 
consumers, while six years later this was only little more than a tenth. 
Table 10. Commercialization of milk in Gipuzkoa, 1988-1994. Sources: 
Gobierno Vasco, 1989, 1995. 
through to dairy total 
hawkinq factories production 
1988 
in 1000 I. 41,786 70,561 134,661 
in % 31.0% 52.4% ... 
1993 
in 1000 I. 16,346 93,671 118,540 
in % 13.8% 79.0% 
1994 
in 1000 I. 12,858 92,709 113,305 
in % 11.4% 81.8% >* > 
£ 1988-1993 -60.9% +32.8% -12.0% 
A 1993-1994 -21.3% -1.0% -4.4% 
A 1988-1994 -69.2% +31.4% -15.9% 
The lower part of the table is perhaps the most revealing. Whereas the 
amount of milk delivered to the dairy factories increased with more than 30% 
in the course of six years (in spite of falling back slightly from 1993 to 1994), 
the total quantity of milk sold by hawkers declined with over two-thirds in the 
same period; in only one year, from 1993 to 1994, hawkers in Gipuzkoa lost 
more than 20% of their market. 
If a farm family is forced to give up their current agricultural activities, the 
future of the farm as a full-time enterprise depends on the household's 
capacity to change over to other, more profitable, activities. A holding can be 
considered truly and permanently marginalized if it lacks the capacity to shift 
to more viable activities or if this capacity is ignored. Such capacity can not 
be expected of an aged farming couple without any successors and close to 
retirement; they normally prefer to hold out while continuing their present 
activities. Major changes are only brought about when there is a successor 
willing to continue the holding as a productive enterprise. The holding's 
landed property, its capital assets and the labour power present are only 
partly of influence here; the way in which the potential successor defines his 
task as the future owner of the farm determines how these production factors 
will actually be used. 
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6.5 Changing norms on succession 
Traditionally, succession on Basque farms took place according to the so-
called mayorazgo principle. The oldest son was held to be the single heir, and 
he was expected to continue his parents' holding, unless he was impeded by 
a physical or mental handicap (see Gibbon and Curtin, 1978, for a similar 
pattern of succession in Ireland). Incidentally, parents deviated from this norm 
if one of the other sons was clearly more capable of running the farming 
enterprise than his oldest brother. All through his teenage years, the 
successor was being prepared for his future tasks; the other children knew 
they would have to leave the family holding upon marriage; if they did not 
marry and stayed on the farm they would become entirely subject to the 
successor. When the development of regional industries caused a drain on 
rural labour power, the mayorazgo principle came under pressure. One of the 
most sailient consequences for succession was that many farms were 
continued by precisely those sons who were not fit to do anything else (see 
also Greenwood, 1976: 124, 149), that is, the ones who had remained on the 
farm while their smarter brothers tried to find a job in industry.31' In later 
years, following changes in the law on succession (ibid.: 148), it became 
common for successors to give their brothers and sisters who left the holding 
their own share of the farm's value. Since the 1980s, a fourth form of 
succession has become more important. It could be observed that on more 
and more holdings it was no longer the oldest or the most capable son or the 
one who had failed to get a factory job who took over the parents' farm, but 
the son, or sometimes also the daughter, who was the last one among the 
children to marry. In these cases, the successors had not been consciously 
preparing themselves for their future task, trying to increase their formal 
knowledge on agriculture and to gain relevant experience in order to be able 
to run a farming enterprise successfully, but had simply waited too long to get 
married and were now faced with the double perspective of having to 
maintain the farmstead and taking care of their parents until their death. Julen 
of the Eguzkitza farm (Section 6.2) voiced this relationship between 
succession and commitment as follows: "I will take over the holding, but my 
brothers will also get their part out of it. We have already stipulated the 
amounts of money I'll have to pay them. However, the farm won't be divided 
in equal parts: I will get considerably more. But on the other hand, I'll have 
the responsability of looking after my parents." 
It should be mentioned here that although these different forms of 
succession emerged one after the other, new forms did not displace former 
ones, but different forms existed side by side in the same region. 
Nevertheless, a certain tendency could be noted. The mayorazgo principle, in 
spite of still being cultivated as the normative ideal by many farmers, had in 
practice almost become a dead letter. The phenomenon of succession by the 
'least qualified' son seems to have been primarily confined to the generation 
of the massive rural outflux. As to the remaining forms of succession I argue 
This was an appreciation not only of scientists and extension agents, but also of farmers in 
the region. 
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that we can detect a twofold development in recent years: succession by the 
most capable son is predominantly taking place on full-time, modernizing 
farming enterprises that either aim to expand or to achieve a higher added 
value per product through quality production; while on farms that are 
supposed to become further marginalized, succession, though seemingly 
following more arbitrary standards (as not one child in particular is expected 
to succeed), frequently responds to the rule that the last child to marry will 
take over. Causality is not always clear in these cases; it is more likely that 
the succession pattern and the farm's status and foreseeable development 
determine each other mutually. That is, on a modern, expanding farm one of 
the sons would normally be expected to qualify in order to take over, but the 
example of the Iturmendi farm (Section 6.4) shows that it is equally possible 
that a motivated and capable successor is able to convert a marginalizing 
holding into a more prosperous one. On the other hand, it often occurs that 
none of the children actually wants to continue the farming enterprise so that 
marginalization becomes inevitable, but it also happens that all children 
'wisely' try to leave an already marginalized holding as soon as possible. 
I would contend that vocation plays a more determining role in the 
explanation of differential development patterns of farms than is generally 
recognized in socio-economic analyses.321 Although it is not a concept that 
can be easily operationalized, vocation has, in my view, to do with the 
importance the farm's owner or successor attributes to the maintenance of 
the family holding and with his being prepared to make sacrifices to achieve 
this aim. Or in other words, a successor's vocation is somehow reflected in 
his lifestyle and in the extent in which he derives his identity from being the 
owner of farm X. This may suggest that the presence or absence of vocation 
can only be revealed after frequent interview sessions and longitudinal 
observation of someone's attitude, but in practice it frequently turns out to be 
less complicated. It is often quite obvious if farm family members, who could 
also have chosen more easily attainable alternatives, have taken considerable 
pains to maintain their holding. We saw this for example on the farm 
Iturmendi, where Aitor had decided to build a new cowshed and almost 
double his livestock, knowing that this would increase his indebtedness, and 
with his parents telling him that he should have taken an off-farm job. The 
situation on the Landa-berri farm was not very different. The youngest son, 
Mikel, had taken over his parents' dairy farm, but with the idea to specialize in 
beef cattle in the long run. His sister Nekane had her own job as a lawyer and 
representative of an agricultural organization, but every morning she used to 
help her mother selling their farm products in town before she went to work; 
and her mother, too, in spite of her age and her ailments, still participated as 
much as possible in the hawking activities and all other work that had to be 
done. They continued dairy hawking and even took over clients of other 
hawkers who gave up in an effort to safeguard their high income as long as 
possible, thereby trying to provide the farm with a firmer financial basis for 
The implication of this argument is not, of course, that an analysis of the structural factors 
that may influence succession on farm holdings would be less meaningful; on the contrary, 
these structural factors may determine a potential successor's vocation to a large extent. 
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the future. It is also interesting to note that both Nekane {of Landa-berri) and 
Aitor (of Iturmendi) were very active members of the farmers' union EHNE. 
Aitor had been the union's regional representative for several years, whereas 
Nekane had taken part in many national and international congresses on 
behalf of EHNE. It seemed as though they had translated the EHNE policy of 
defending marginal farms into some sort of a personal commitment. 
6.6 A 'marginalized' future 
The strategy of modern, big farmers is to invest and expand; the consequence 
of the treadmill (cf. Section 5.5) is that for them progress has become the 
condition for survival. The characteristic feature of probably the majority of 
the owners of marginal farms, at least of marginal full-time holdings, is that 
they lack the means or the motivation to invest. On the other hand, the family 
members may produce little, but they normally consume even less. They 
spend very little money on luxury goods and hardly ever go out. This is the 
reason why so many small-scale, marginalized farms have survived to these 
days. As an elderly farmer's wife said, speaking about the farmers of her 
generation: "They don't go out, so they don't spend any money. On Mondays 
they go to the (livestock) fair in town - and that's it. It's only recently that 
they organize a dinner party now and then; and the old people sometimes 
make a trip that is subsidized by the Town Hall." But the times have changed. 
The urban consumption culture has become an ever more powerful point of 
reference for rural youth; it is therefore highly unlikely that future successors 
will accept a situation of survival through economizing on consumer goods. 
As to the labour capacity on marginal farms that are taken over by the 
last married child we can be short. In most cases, though not in all, the last 
son or daughter to marry is also among the youngest children of the farming 
couple. So obviously the age gap between the owners and the successor is 
wider than if one of the older children had succeeded. If, for example, in a 
family of three children the first two marry at the age of 30 and leave the 
farm, the family labour evolution curve, indicating the total family labour input 
on which the eventual successor (i.e. the youngest child in this case) can 
count, will be situated under the corresponding M-30 curve in Figure 9 (see 
Section 5.8). This fact may be an extra motive for the successor to abandon 
the idea of continuing the farm as a full-time enterprise, if he or she had not 
already done so a long time ago. 
Marginalized farms will no longer be as massively abandoned as they were 
in the not so remote past. I pointed out in Chapter 3 that it had recently 
become quite in vogue for people in town to have a house in the countryside 
where to spend the weekends and the holidays. And sometimes farms that 
were located not too far from the urban centres were bought and renovated 
by townspeople for permanent occupation. This contributed to the revaluation 
of farm ownership in the eyes of the rural population. Moreover, there are 
definite advantages to living on the farm over migrating to town, as Julen of 
the Eguzkitza farm explained: "I can keep on living where I've lived all my life; 
I know the people here; and I don't have to spend a fortune on buying a 
house in town." 
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The successor on a marginalized farm is likely to occupy his or her 
inherited property first and foremost as a rural place of residence; this 
successor is normally one of the children (assigned by chance rather than by 
the parents), or in the absence of children, a nephew, a niece or another close 
relative. The new owners will in all probability not continue such a holding, 
which they regard as unprofitable, as a full-time enterprise. 
6.7 Conclusions 
The marginalizing milk-producing farms, where the household members find it 
increasingly difficult to assure their reproduction as agricultural enterprises, 
are suffering the negative consequences of the tendency to concentration 
which is taking place in the Basque dairy sector. Their marginalization can 
only partly be attributed to Euskadi's incorporation into the European market, 
but is principally due to developments within the region itself. As for dairy 
hawkers, the loss of market share they experienced was the result of, on the 
one hand, the restrictions imposed by the Basque Administration on the 
purchase of their milk and, on the other, the changing consumption habits of 
their clients. 
Nevertheless, for private traders of farm products the rationale of their 
strategy had long been evident. By selling their milk (or cheese) directly to the 
consumers, with whom they often established long-term economic and social 
relationships, these farmers received a much higher price per litre than what 
they would be paid by the factory. Hawking enabled many small and medium-
sized farmers to earn a reasonable income with fewer cows (and thus with 
lower forage and mash costs and spending less time on care of their cattle) 
than those farmers who sold their whole milk production to the dairy 
cooperative. During the first years of the factory's existence, they found that 
they were really better off than most cooperative members, as the latter had 
to conform to all kinds of institutional requirements. Yet, in later years most 
hawkers also became members of the dairy factory, because this gave them 
the opportunity to get rid of that part of the milk production they could not 
sell on the streets. They incorporated, so to speak, the dairy factory into their 
hawking strategy - but the consequence was that their farm management 
became more subject to external prescription (in the 1980s, for example, all 
members of Gurelesa were told to install a refrigerated milk tank). 
A dairy farmer can only decide to sell the greater part of his production 
directly to the consumers if a number of conditions have been fulfilled. First, 
there has to be enough labour power on the farm to combine the diversity of 
on-farm tasks with personally marketing milk or cheese on the streets of a 
nearby town. Second, mobility is essential; the farm family has to have at 
least one car and the hawker needs to have a driving license. (This is less 
important if the products are sold at one place, like the urban market: if one 
only has to travel to town, one can make use of public transport.) Third, one 
of the household members must be willing to hawk and he or she should be 
good at it. It should be stressed that all these conditions have to be fulfilled 
simultaneously: there are numerous examples of women who had been more 
than willing to hawk but who did not have a driving license, while their 
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husbands did have a license but felt they "were no good at hawking". 
The hawker's average client was a middle-aged housewife with little 
schooling, who distrusted industry-made foodstuffs which might contain 
chemicals and who valued the regular social contacts with the farmer who 
provided her with milk, sometimes some vegetables or eggs, and often the 
latest local news. Hawkers made sure they attuned their activities as much as 
possible to their clients' wishes, doing what was necessary to live up to their 
confidence - and fostering their clients' distrust of factory milk. Again, we see 
how projects of different actors interlock. And it also becomes clear that 
interlocking projects not only involve mutual economic interests, but may also 
satisfy social or psychological needs (we will see this aspect return in the 
following chapter). 
But the hawker-client network is subject to socio-economic and cultural 
influences that gradually cause it to fall apart. Among young married couples 
it is common that both partners have a job, which means there is no one at 
home to wait for the hawker. The increasing popularity of low-cholesterol 
products, moreover, leads to a change in consumer habits. Especially younger 
clients and immigrants feel less committed to the hawker's calling and find it 
therefore less problematic to break the relationship unilaterally and thus 
'dissociate' themselves from the hawker's network. 
The hawkers' resistance to further marginalization may take on different 
forms. They may eat into their capital, lower their consumption level and try 
to hold out until their retirement. They may manage to take over the clients of 
other hawkers who have stopped, which hopefully puts off for a few years 
the moment they themselves are forced to give up. Or they can try to switch 
over to a more viable alternative. 
Perhaps only some older farmers accept survival through economizing on 
consumption as an acceptable option - after all, they may have been forced to 
do so several times in their lives. But this certainly does not hold good for 
their successors, whose point of reference is rather the consumption pattern 
and lifestyle of urban contemporaries. 
I have pointed out that a kind of dual succession pattern has come into 
being in the Gipuzkoan countryside. I also indicated that on a farm which is 
taken over by the last child to marry (generally one of the younger children) 
the age gap between the senior farmer and the successor is greater than on a 
farm that is continued by one of the oldest siblings. Referring to Figure 9 in 
Chapter 5, I therefore suggest that the mobilization of enough family labour 
upon succession is even more problematic in the former than in the latter 
case. As I mentioned in Section 5.8, though, when I calculated the total 
family labour capacity during the successor's lifespan, I only took into account 
the senior and succeeding couples while ignoring the presence of any other 
family members. We shall now try to complete our insight. Let us therefore 
reconsider the differences in succession patterns between the Etxeberri and 
the Eguzkitza farms (Sections 5.1 and 6.2, respectively). When Joseba, the 
oldest son on Etxeberri, was about to take over the parental farm, there were 
still three younger brothers living on the holding; they all had their own jobs, 
but as long as they had not married and gone to live elsewhere, they were 
expected to help in the byre or on the fields when necessary. On Eguzkitza, 
the youngest son would succeed; his four older brothers had all married and 
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left the farm. Three of them lived nearby and often lent a hand, but only 
because they felt like it. Their first responsibilities were to their own families 
now. There did not exist the same authority relation between the successor 
and his brothers as on the Etxeberri farm. Thus, we can conclude that for a 
farm enterprise where the successor is an only child or where his siblings have 
left the holding, the validity of the family labour evolution curves in Figure 9 
(Section 5.8) goes unchallenged. Conversely, if at the moment of succession 
there are still a few younger siblings living in, the decrease of the 
corresponding curve will be mitigated or postponed several years. 
When the senior farmers realize that they have failed in their attempt to 
enrol one of the children in their project of full-time succession, they normally 
refrain from high-cost investments. Many a farm enterprise that is becoming 
more and more marginalized will be taken over by the son or daughter who 
marries last and the holding will be continued on a part-time basis. Only if the 
successor is highly motivated to continue the farm as a full-time enterprise, if 
he has spent years preparing himself for this task and is therefore seen by 
both his parents and his siblings as the most suitable candidate for 
succession, he will look for ways to realize his objective. Might he decide to 
deliver his entire production to the dairy factory henceforth, he would then 
have to increase his production considerably in order to maintain a comparable 
income level. It may be hypothesized that this will force him to an, initially, 
accelerated participation on the treadmill of investment and expansion. If the 
ex-hawker experiences the effects of the family labour evolution curve at the 
moment of succeeding to the parental holding, it will hit him even harder than 
others. 
A problem for full-time successors is that their wives often have their own 
(urban) jobs which they are seldom inclined to give up after marriage in order 
to help their husbands on the farm. On the enterprises of hawkers, where 
farm management has always hinged much on the division of labour between 
husbands and wives as to animal care and distribution of the product, this 
may make existing labour constraints even more acute. Conversely, on 
holdings where all the milk is sold to the dairy factory it may be less 
problematic; the literature suggests that farmers' wives do not enter the 
cowshed or the fields very often: female tasks are usually rather relegated to 
the domestic sphere here (cf. de Rooij, 1994: 73). In the case of the ex-
hawker who has started to produce for the dairy industry, and therefore has 
to make extra investments, the off-farm income of his wife may make things 
easier. On the other hand, however, he loses his right to apply for cheap 
credit if his wife's income turns out to be higher than what can be earned by 
the farm enterprise. 
The hawker who feels forced to change may also try to continue his hawking 
activities in another, more modern way, namely by selling his milk in plastic 
bags, officially recognized by the regional Administration. In the following 
chapter I shall deal with the activities of a group of hawkers who promoted 
their fresh milk as a quality product and who managed to create a niche for it 
on the Basque dairy market. 
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Chapter 7 
PRODUCTION OF 'QUALITY': THE EPHEMERALITY OF THE 
NICHE 
Most farmers would contend that their products meet the quality criteria that 
prevail in that part of the market in which they move themselves. This holds 
good for the hawkers of fresh milk (or for the producers of cheese), who claim 
to offer their clients an entirely natural product, free from any chemical 
adulteration. And it is equally valid for those who deliver all their milk to the 
dairy; after all, the factory only accepts their milk if it conforms to strictly 
defined requirements, like being free from any pathogenic germs, having a 
certain fat percentage, and so on. 
However, the farmers belonging to the category we will deal with in this 
chapter distinguish themselves by having made the quality of their products 
the pivot on which their production and marketing strategies hinge. A quality 
concept may either be based on objective or subjective elements, or on a mix 
of both. We shall see that those farmers who wish to be called quality 
producers usually strive to 'objectify' the quality of their merchandise by 
means of officially recognized distinctives (labels, etc.). 
7.1 Jauregi: the complex organization of family labour 
Pedro and his twin brother are the oldest of the eight siblings. They were only 
16 when their father died in 1970. The farm where they lived was run by 
their grandfather, though; their father had worked in transport. The 
grandfather kept 4 or 5 cows of which the milk was sold to the dairy 
cooperative; the production of cider provided an extra income. In 1976, five 
brothers decided to continue on the farm; they used to combine their agrarian 
activities with their study or an off-farm job. They started with 10 cows but 
that number gradually increased, especially when, two years later, a dairy 
hawker who gave up his farming activities offered them to take over his 
round. They then began to sell most of their milk directly in town, mainly to 
individual consumers but also in a few shops; what could not be sold in one 
day was delivered to the dairy factory. Soon they were also able to create 
new circles of clients in surrounding villages. 
Despite their successful start, these five young men were not able to 
generate enough incomes for everyone, so one after the other they had to 
take up other activities. The oldest son, Pedro, took over and developed the 
cider branch of their holding by fitting part of the farmstead up as a small 
restaurant. Cider farm restaurants, which had once been quite popular among 
farmers in several regions of the Basque Country, had virtually disappeared for 
many decades; since the end of the seventies, some had slowly reappeared 
and they had immediately regained their popularity, but now among an 
important part of the urban population as well. The Jauregi farm was among 
the first agricultural enterprises to make the most of this new trend. Cider 
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processing and the sales of bottled cider were done by Pedro himself, but 
during the busy 'cider season', the months of January and February, when his 
restaurant was full almost every evening, his brothers and sisters always 
assisted him. 
o"=? cf=9 ''cf 
Pedro Gortca 
tf= $ cf = ? ?f ? cf 
lone 
engaged in farm activities 
assisting Pedro/Gorka 
Figure 12. Genealogy of the Jauregi family. 
After Pedro's twin brother had finished his military service, he had begun to 
work for an industrial company and only helped on the farm in the weekends. 
The third one, Gorka, had initially followed his example, but after five years he 
decided to return, and since then he has worked exclusively on the holding. 
For a couple of years, he worked together with his fourth and fifth brother, 
but the latter left when he was offered a job on an institute for agricultural 
training. The following two children are daughters. The first one had worked 
in a shop in town, but since 1991 she has helped her mother in the kitchen of 
her brother's restaurant. The other daughter, lone, was employed by a 
professional association of farmers, for which she carried out milk quality 
checks on hundreds of holdings in the region. Their youngest brother had set 
up his own business: he had bought agricultural machinery, employed two 
men, and carried out contract-work for the Provincial Council and for farmers 
in the area. 
In 1985, a small group of hawkers in the neighbouring province of Bizkaia 
had begun to sell their milk in plastic one-litre bags. A formal association, 
called Baserriko Esnea {Basque for 'farm milk'), was created to promote their 
initiative; its object was to persuade the Basque Administration to legalize this 
way of marketing fresh milk. The initiators also contacted hawkers in 
Gipuzkoa who might be interested. Gorka and his brother were among the 
first to join Baserriko Esnea; lone was asked to become the association's 
spokeswoman in the province. Becoming a member implied two things: paying 
an entry fee of 50,000 pesetas and buying a packing machine. Somewhat 
later, they also bought a refrigerator, which facilitated their work a great deal. 
It meant that they did no longer have to pack the milk immediately before 
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they went to sell it, but could pack at any moment of the day when they had 
some free time; the bags were stored in the refrigerator until the following 
morning. Hawking was done between 7.30 and 9.30 a.m. 
At first, they sold their bags of milk to the same individual consumers and 
shops they had also delivered their unpacked milk to, but soon afterwards, in 
an attempt to rationalize their hawking activities, they reduced their sales 
from door-to-door; individual clients were told that from then on they could 
find the milk bags of the Jauregi farm in the shops in the neighbourhood. This 
was a big mistake, as lone explained: "We lost a considerable part of our 
clientele, and we've not been able to get these clients back. In fact, we 
showed them the way to the shops where they could get any milk they 
wanted. Yet, most of the clients we continued to visit at their homes still buy 
our milk. This is something that all members of Baserriko Esnea have noted: if 
you sell them your milk personally, at the door, consumers find it a lot more 
difficult to tell you they don't want your milk anymore." These clients feel 
'forced to buy', as she called it. 
When Gorka and his brother began selling through Baserriko Esnea, 
Gurelesa let them know that the cooperative would not accept their surplus 
production any longer, so henceforth they had to sell their surplus to another 
dairy factory in a neighbouring province. Moreover, Baserriko Esnea members 
were soon confronted with the consequences of the same Government 
measure that had also deprived 'traditional' hawkers of their most important 
clients: the prohibition on the purchase of non-pasteurized milk by certain 
institutions. 
In 1993, and after years of struggle with the regional Administration, 
several farmers belonging to Baserriko Esnea finally qualified for a so-called 
Health Certificate; this was reserved to those dairy hawkers who fulfilled 
certain conditions that would reduce the risk of contamination of milk by 
viruses and bacteria to a minimum. Its main implication was that hawkers in 
possession of such a Certificate were allowed to sell their fresh milk to shops 
and institutions again. In view of this, the cooperative Gurelesa, which had 
become part of the unified regional dairy factory Iparlat, changed its policy, 
too: Baserriko Esnea members could deliver their surplus production to the 
factory. The Jauregi farm sold 400 litres to Iparlat and 200 odd litres on the 
streets in 1996; around 1990, they had still been able to sell 300 litres in 
town, while another 300 litres were sold to the factory. 
In December 1995, Gorka's brother also left the farm; he had been 
contracted by one of the Associations of Mountain Farming (see Section 3.3) 
for clearing mountain roads and collecting dead cattle. Since then, Gorka has 
had to run the farm on his own. But even worse was that at about the same 
time he had to undergo two operations which would practically keep him out 
of the cowshed for at least six months. This forced him to take on a young 
man to feed and tend the cows. Hawking was done by the wife of Gorka's 
fifth brother; she had just been offered a job, but had decided to refuse it in 
order to help her brother-in-law out. Gorka himself seemed to be quite 
motivated to continue, although he recognized that hereafter he would 
probably have to contract someone permanently, as the work was more than 
he could tackle alone. 
Only Gorka and his two sisters still lived on the farm, together with their 
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mother. The others had married and lived elsewhere. Most of the eight 
brothers and sisters were engaged in work related to agriculture; but even 
though the activities of some of them were carried out on the farm where 
they were all born, these were seen as economically independent jobs. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent them from helping each other when help 
was needed; most of the time this was done without being paid for, but 
recently they had established financial remuneration in two concrete cases: 
one, for helping their oldest brother in the restaurant during the 'cider season', 
and two, when Gorka asked his youngest brother, the contract-worker, to 
help him with his machines. 
7.2 Creating a niche 
We mentioned earlier (Section 5.4) that processes of incorporation and 
institutionalization generally lead to the externalization of tasks that were thus 
far carried out on farming enterprises; and also farm labour itself becomes 
subject to external prescription. As a consequence, the farmer's 
craftsmanship, his specific ability to 'govern' the production and reproduction 
processes on the farm, is to a large extent rendered useless. The family farm 
loses its relative autonomy, being reduced to no more than just another link in 
the highly industrialized food production chains (van der Ploeg and Ettema, 
1990).331 This has important consequences, both for the quality of the 
product that reaches the consumer and for the remuneration of the farmer. 
Quality, according to van der Ploeg and Ettema, becomes something that, 
through all kinds of technological interventions and/or chemical additives, is 
added to the product at the end of the production process; or it is derived 
from the green image that more and more foodstuffs are provided with by the 
producer or in the shops, which thereby attempt to meet the preferences of a 
growing number of consumers for natural and healthier products. The farm 
household loses income as part of its potential margin is creamed off by 
intermediate processing and marketing institutions (in the dairy farming sector, 
for example, the milk factories and retailers). 
According to Muller, it is often precisely in disadvantaged areas that 
alternatives arise for traditional ways of production and commercialization; 
what these alternatives tend to have in common is that farmers manage to 
overcome structural drawbacks by realizing a higher remuneration for their 
labour (Muller, 1987: 460). Crucial is that farmers regain or consolidate their 
grip on the commercialization of their products; which means that they are 
able to control all stages their products are going through, from the byre or 
the land to the moment they are delivered to the consumer. Other initiatives 
(see van der Ploeg and Ettema, 1990) concern the promotion of products that 
have maintained their own, 'intrinsic' quality, i.e. the quality which through 
the farmer's knowledge and craftsmanship is added during the production 
process (instead of being artificially attached to them at the end). Speaking 
This line of argument runs in no small measure parallel to Braverman's analysis of the 
degradation of industrial labour (Braverman, 1974). 
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about Europe, we are dealing with products whose production is generally 
restricted to specific regions; the locally generated knowledge about methods 
of production, processing and marketing is decisive. These products, and the 
way they were produced and sold, usually already existed in these regions, 
but disappeared or were marginalized when the industrialized food production 
chains became dominant. Many of these products are now being 
'rediscovered' and, ironically enough, the quality producers whose methods of 
production and commercialization were long seen as outdated, are now 
referred to as 'rural entrepreneurs' {Muller, 1987), and 'pioneers' of 
innovating farming processes (cf. van Broekhuizen and Renting, 1994). 
We saw that in the Basque Country 'traditional' hawkers of fresh milk, by 
selling their milk directly to their clients instead of to a dairy factory, had long 
managed to secure an acceptable income (and in some cases, much more 
than that) with a relatively small number of cows. In recent years, and 
through a variety of circumstances (see Chapter 6), they were faced with a 
declining number of clients which motivated many of them to give up hawking 
or even get out of farming altogether. In 1985, the association Baserriko 
Esnea was created. The object of this association, which had about 40 
members in Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia by the end of the decade, was twofold: 
recovering the market for fresh milk and warding off the threat of a definitive 
ban on hawking. Farmers could only become members if they had participated 
in the latest Health Campaign (the anti-tuberculosis/brucelosis campaign 
among cattle) and accepted regular quality tests of their milk, which would be 
carried out by a government sponsored cattle breeding association; 
furthermore, milk had to be sold in plastic bags, so farmers needed a packing 
machine. A few years later, the possession of a cold-storage room became 
compulsory, and associated hawkers were also advised to distribute the 
plastic bags in refrigerator vans. The whole idea behind all this was that the 
non-pasteurized milk of Baserriko Esnea members would reach the consumers 
in optimal conditions, free from pathogenic germs. This way, the association 
tried to induce the Basque Administration to legalize the commercialization of 
fresh milk in plastic bags. As the spokeswoman of Baserriko Esnea in 
Gipuzkoa explained: 
"We want to present fresh milk as a quality product, a product with 
all its properties. Different from pasteurized or sterilized milk and 
appreciated by the consumer. You can then also ask a higher price 
for it." 
[lone, I/89] 
The negotiations that were held with the regional Departments of Agriculture 
and of Public Health did not have the intended result. Farmers associated to 
Baserriko Esnea used to complain that every time they thought they had 
fulfilled all conditions for legalization, the Administration came up with new 
requirements, which in their eyes were only artificial obstacles enabling the 
regional Government to put off a final decision. Especially the relationship 
with the Department of Agriculture was a strained one, according to 
representatives of the association. The Vice-minister of Agriculture explained 
the Department's policy as follows: 
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"Baserriko Esnea may be an alternative for a few farms, but not for 
the whole dairy sector. (..) We tolerate them, but we don't support 
them. It's a commercial problem: we support the strongest 
commercial structures, projects that are valid for the whole sector, 
that is to say: the dairy cooperatives - and not today Baserriko Esnea 
and tomorrow ten other organizations." 
[Urrutia, Department of Agriculture, Basque Autonomous 
Government; Vll/90] 
In spite of their complaints, farmers thought it wiser to satisfy the conditions 
imposed by the Administration than to oppose them. Eventually, this strategy 
of 'pragmatic compliance' was successful: since 1993, Baserriko Esnea 
members who met the conditions stipulated by the regional Department of 
Public Health could apply for a Health Certificate. Possession of a Certificate 
meant that they did no longer have to fear prohibition of their activities; 
besides, it allowed them to deliver their fresh milk to groceries and cake 
shops, and to institutions like hospitals or old people's homes. With such a 
certificate, hawkers were also allowed to sell their fresh milk otherwise than 
in plastic bags. What had happened, though, was that in some ten years of 
struggles and uncertainties membership had fluctuated: some new people had 
joined, but a greater number had left the association; membership had gone 
down to 35 in 1996. It was hoped that by the end of that year all associated 
members would have a Health Certificate. 
Farmers belonging to Baserriko Esnea had thus been able to create an 
economic 'niche' for themselves (cf. Bennett and Kanel, 1983: 225), i.e. a 
sector of the market where their specific productive and commercial activities 
had an almost exclusive validity and could therefore hardly be affected by 
competition from outside. 
Baserriko Esnea's spokeswoman emphasized the importance of a Health 
Certificate for the association's members, not so much because the 
possession of a Certificate would suddenly mean a growing number of new 
clients, but because it permitted them to concentrate on a part of the market 
where they expected better opportunities. Hawkers usually valued the 
personal relationships with their clients: after all, a happy customer is a loyal 
customer. But hawking is also a rather time consuming activity. Now, the 
plastic milk bags of Baserriko Esnea have an important advantage over the 
milk sold in milk-cans by 'traditional' hawkers, namely that they can be left in 
the halls of flat-buildings where your clients live or in nearby shops. However, 
many Baserriko Esnea members had experienced that they had lost clients 
when they left the bags of milk for them in nearby shops instead of delivering 
these bags personally from door to door. On the other hand, there was a 
growing awareness among Baserriko Esnea members that the number of 
regular buyers of fresh milk was decreasing anyway - and for the same reason 
as traditional hawkers were losing clients: more and more people found it 
easier to buy their milk together with the rest of their shopping in the 
supermarket. Supermarkets and groceries were not a good alternative, 
because the bags of fresh milk had to compete with different brands of 
pasteurized and sterilized milk there. But in bars, coffee houses and frozen 
food shops non-pasteurized milk was preferred over factory milk for making 
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croquettes, pies, and all kinds of bechamels and other sauces. (In fact, I was 
told that even in the years these shops were officially forbidden to use fresh 
milk, many of them used pasteurized or sterilized milk for ordinary 
consumption, but illegally bought a few litres of fresh milk every day to make 
snacks.) When Baserriko Esnea hawkers spoke about regaining and 
consolidating the market, they referred mainly to these places. Moreover, 
several associated farmers began to sell an increasingly important part of their 
total production to the dairy factory Iparlat; this had recently become possible 
for hawkers with a Health Certificate. 
For many years, the dairy cooperative Gurelesa had refused to accept milk 
from Baserriko Esnea members: as soon as they started to sell fresh milk in 
plastic bags they were notified that the cooperative would no longer accept 
their surplus production. They were thus forced to feed this milk to the 
calves, to sell it to a cheese factory in a neighbouring province, or to make 
cheese themselves. The association's spokeswoman blamed it on this policy 
of Gurelesa that membership in Gipuzkoa had always remained so much lower 
than in Bizkaia: only 25% of the hawkers belonging to Baserriko Esnea lived in 
the former province. The manager of Gurelesa explained that the cooperative 
had initially accepted the milk of these farmers, but that some of them had 
abused the cooperative's confidence. 
"They convinced shopkeepers to accept more bags than they would 
be able to sell. 'Never mind, what you can't get rid off, I'll sell to the 
cooperative', they said. These bags of fresh milk had laid there on 
the shelves all day. Just imagine what these shopkeepers and their 
clients might come to think of our dairy products. We had to stop 
this." 
[Larrea, Gurelesa; XII/89] 
Some Baserriko Esnea members believed that Gurelesa's policy was meant to 
deter hawkers or cooperative members from joining the association, in an 
attempt to ward off the threat of future competition from Baserriko Esnea. 
Now that recently the milk of hawkers who were in possession of a 
Health Certificate was accepted by Iparlat, some of them had even begun to 
sell more milk to the factory than on the streets. Farmers associated to 
Baserriko Esnea were thus in command of two outlet channels: direct sales, 
which provided them with a higher income per litre, and the dairy factory, 
which assured them the purchase of the rest of their milk. Shifting from one 
channel to the other, according to market opportunities, they were able to 
make the best of both worlds. 
The long period of insecurity had demotivated some of the association's first 
members. Others, with apparently more faith in the successful outcome of the 
struggle over official recognition, had expanded considerably. Two contrasting 
examples will be discussed in the following section. 
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7.3 The cases of Iriondo and Garibai 
Iriondo 
When Baserriko Esnea was founded in Gipuzkoa, Inigo Zubieta had become its 
first president in this province. He was 32 years old in 1988, his parents were 
almost 60, and together they ran one of the biggest dairy farms in Aritzmendi: 
35 milch cows and some 10 heifers. Inigo's wife came from another village 
nearby where she had her own hairdresser's shop. 
Formerly, Inigo's mother and sister had hawked milk in town in the 
traditional fashion, going from door to door with milk-churns. But soon after 
Inigo took over hawking from them, in 1985, he began to sell their milk in 
plastic bags. He sold more than 200 litres a day in town, most of it in 
groceries, butcher's shops and bakeries; in the halls of several flat buildings 
he left 5 or 6 bags of milk and only a few bags were delivered personally to 
individual clients. In summer, when sales went down considerably, he used to 
sell an important part of his production to a cheese factory in a neighbouring 
province. 
When I asked him whether he believed his way of commercializing raw 
milk would be successful in the future, he answered that this depended on the 
people's consciousness: Basque people should consume regional products 
instead of products from elsewhere. He realized that more and more people 
bought pasteurized or sterilized milk and skimmed dairy products, but he 
qualified this as 'fashions'. 
"Our clients know what they buy. Milk directly from the farm has 
one big advantage: it contains no preservatives nor additives. The 
dairy factories, on the other hand, obtain their milk from different 
farms and they have to add all kinds of chemicals to make that into 
a non-perishable, homogeneous drink." 
[Inigo, VI/96] 
Nevertheless, he recognized that he would not object to delivering all his milk 
to the dairy factory provided it offered a good price "and this price were less 
subject to sudden fluctuations than it is today". 
In 1991, Inigo left Baserriko Esnea and gave up milk hawking. For two 
years he worked for an agricultural service cooperative, set up by farmers of 
six villages in the region, where he carried out contract-work with specialized 
farm machinery on behalf of the associated members. But again he left, 
allegedly because he did not have enough work to earn a reasonable income. 
He returned to the farm once more and began to help his parents, who had 
maintained most of the cows but now sold all their milk to the cheese factory. 
In 1995 he became a mechanic in a nearby car factory, where he was still 
working when I met him a year later; in the evenings, he followed a course to 
get the necessary diplomas. He spent the weekends on his parents' farm, but 
during the rest of the week he and his wife used to live in the village. 
This was a relatively modern farm, not with so much land, but with quite 
an extensive livestock. Inigo had bought a packing machine and had been able 
to introduce his fresh milk in a lot of shops while maintaining many of his 
individual clients as well; in fact, he was generally believed to be the only 
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young farmer in the village who would continue his parents' farming 
enterprise - although in 1988 some villagers had already told me they 
expected him to leave if he were offered a factory job. Why did a farmers' 
son with apparently good economic perspectives nonetheless decide to give 
up farming? 
"A farmer's life may not be very hard, but he is very much tied to his 
work. The family farm, especially a dairy farm... I compare it with 
being a prisoner in Martutene.341 If you are able to run your farm 
among two or three young men as a kind of cooperative, you can 
have a few days off once in a while, but on these small farms here 
you can never earn enough to sustain two families." 
[Inigo, VI/96] 
His parents, who were both over 65 then, still kept some 25 dairy cows. 
Although Inigo had advised them to sell half of their livestock and take things 
easier, they tried to maintain production on a reasonably high level. They had 
obviously decided to continue farming as long as possible, so that their son 
had something to fall back on in case he lost his present job. Inigo himself 
also seemed to take into account this possibility: 
"I don't want to give up the farm completely. Nowadays, they don't 
give you a permanent job anywhere, so who knows...? You won't 
get rich on the farm, but you have at least enough to subsist." 
[Inigo, VI/96] 
When Inigo had given up hawking five years before, his round of clients had 
been taken over by two brothers, also Baserriko Esnea members, who ran a 
family farm together. 
Garibai 
When Inaki and Antxon became members of Baserriko Esnea, in 1988, they 
were both about 30 years old. They had always sold milk in milk-churns to 
individual customers in town, but the plastic bags enabled them to introduce 
their fresh milk in shops as well. Before, they had delivered the surplus 
production to Gurelesa and the cheese factory mentioned earlier, and they 
simply continued doing so after they associated to Baserriko Esnea. The 
cheese factory made no problem of this, but Gurelesa let them know that 
their milk would no longer be accepted. However, they were able to convince 
the dairy that their selling milk in plastic bags was only a temporary strategy 
and that they eventually intended to deliver their whole production to the 
cooperative. 
In winter they produced some 700 litres of milk a day which was normally 
all sold on the streets - an extraordinary amount if we take into account that 
most hawkers found it difficult to sell more than 200 litres. Of the 500 litres 
they produced in summer, they managed to sell only half in town, while the 
Martutene is the name of a well-known prison in San Sebastian. 
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rest was delivered to the factories. Hawking was generally done by Inaki and 
his sister Amaia; meanwhile their parents and Antxon fed the livestock of 
approximately 40 head and did other farmwork. Amaia was married and she 
and her husband, who was a farmer's son but had a job in industry, normally 
lived on the Garibai farm; only in summer did they spend one or two months 
on the farm of her parents-in-law. With a simple comparison, Inaki 
demonstrated the importance of being able to sell their milk to shops (both in 
terms of the amount of milk sold and the reduction of labour input this 
implied): while Amaia delivered 100 bags of milk to individual customers in 
one hour, he only needed half an hour to leave 400 litres in some butcher's 
and baker's shops. 
Inaki and Antxon were carrying out a kind of small-scale land re-allotment 
scheme of their own, selling land that lay far away from the farmstead or on 
mountain slopes (but that was often of good quality) and buying back parcels 
adjacent to other fields of their property. They realized that in purely economic 
terms they lost money in these transactions, but hoped that this was more 
than compensated by having larger pieces of mechanizable land closer to the 
farm. Many of the parcels they bought were full of pinetrees or thornbushes. 
They had the machinery to clear these fields themselves, which was more 
profitable than having that done by a contracted company. According to Inaki, 
"people in the neighbourhood who first said we were crazy now admit that 
we've gained by it". 
When Inigo of the Iriondo farm gave up hawking, Antxon and Inaki took 
over his clients. They built a big cowshed, expanded their livestock, but at the 
same time reorganized the commercialization of their milk. In 1996, they still 
used to sell 400 litres in town on average; the major part of their production, 
however, about 800 litres a day, was delivered to the cooperative. Antxon 
had married and Inaki was believed to get married soon; Amaia and her 
husband lived elsewhere. Consequently, before long there would be two 
young families living on the farm, together with the aged parents. 
7.4 Exigencies of the trade 
Looking at the cases in Sections 7.1 and 7.3, we could ask ourselves what it 
is that makes a niche successful. Obviously, a niche is successful if the 
agents operating within the niche are able to perform sucessfully. While 
dealing with the former question from this perspective, I shall rely largely on 
Muller (1987), whose article about the so-called 'exploitant rural' provides a 
comprehensive discussion on the generation of quality products (or what are 
presented as such) in disadvantaged areas like the Basque Country. 
Muller states that diversification rather than specialization is the norm on 
most 'exploitations rurales'. Perhaps, with a bit of good will, the Jauregi farm 
might be seen as an example of a holding where family members carried out a 
variety of activities; these activities had originally been more or less integrated 
but some had gradually become more independent of the others. Elsewhere 
(van den Broek, 1990) I have given an example of a farming enterprise, a 
small-scale cooperative, where diversification of products and activities was 
chosen as a strategy to create enough farming jobs for all of its members and 
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at the same time become less dependent on changing market developments; 
the cooperative members did not only have dairy cows and autochtonous 
Pyrenean beef cattle, but also kept hundreds of sheep, both for their lambs 
and to provide milk to make cheese, they made and sold their own bread, 
there were rooms for rural tourists, etcetera. As yet, however, diversification 
of activities is not the rule on most Basque farms where quality products are 
generated. As for Baserriko Esnea members, they normally ran farm 
enterprises that had specialized in the production and commercialization of 
raw milk, without having any sidelines of importance. 
The generalization of Muller's statement is, in my view, debatable, at least 
when referring to quality production and the personal commercialization of the 
products. Both the generation of quality products and their commercialization 
by household members themselves are much more labour demanding than 
bulk production and delivering the products to some marketing association. If 
the mobilization of farm labour is problematic anyway, which is the case on 
most holdings in the Basque Country, farmers are simply forced to 
concentrate on few, but highly remunerative, products and activities. 
The comercialization strategies of producers of quality are aimed at those 
categories of clients that are searching for products of a specific quality (or 
"qualité particulière", in Muller's words; Muller, 1987: 471). What Muller does 
not mention, however, is that this makes these producers become highly 
dependent on the personal whims of their customers and on their preference 
for fashions. Baserriko Esnea members had noticed this when consumers who 
had always preferred their milk for its 'naturalness' started to buy sterilized 
milk for reasons of convenience. 
Muller then states that producers of a quality product frequently create a 
formal organization in order to protect their niche, to shield it from 
competition from outside, and to have it recognized as a valid alternative 
among other, more established, forms of production and commercialization. 
The case of Baserriko Esnea shows that recognition by other institutions 
within the relevant regional or national context, in particular the 
Administration, may be problematic if there exist competing organizations that 
already count on official support. If despite the existing difficulties the 
Baserriko Esnea members persisted in their attempts, it was because they 
assumed that their economic future was to a large extent dependent on the 
legalization of their alternative by some authoritative body. Just like all other 
hawkers they experienced the gradual desertion of individual clients. But 
when their way of marketing was finally legalized, the associated farmers 
could apply for a Health Certificate which enabled them to concentrate their 
commercial activities more on bars and frozen food shops and the like, where 
their fresh milk was especially appreciated for making snacks, desserts and 
sauces. Official recognition had been a precondition to displace their client 
network to a sector of the market that offered them better guarantees for the 
future. A positive side effect was that this reorientation proved to be highly 
time-saving, as well, since just as many litres of milk could be delivered to 
some of these establishments in a relatively short time as to a great number 
of individual customers in a few hours. This was important for the farmers in 
question, as it bridged the gap between two conflicting goals of many quality 
producers, namely the (time-consuming) personal commercialization of their 
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products and the desire to reduce the labour input of household members. 
(That a strategy of labour reduction may also undermine the survival capacity 
of the farming household specialized in the generation of quality products will 
be explained in Section 7.6.) 
The success of quality producing enterprises does not exclusively depend 
on family members' farming skills per se. As we are dealing here with 
activities which normally demand an extra input of labour and time of 
household members, it is essential that they are able and willing to carry out 
the necessary activities to produce and commercialize the quality product(s) 
around which the niche is built. Capability and, especially, willingness have a 
lot to do with the family members' vocation. Apart from vocation, we will see 
that creativity is important to turn quality production into a success. 
In spite of their specialization, Baserriko Esnea farmers should be able to 
carry out several tasks that are irrelevant to most producers who deliver to 
the dairy factory. Muller speaks of 'pluricompetence' (1987: 467). Apart from 
producing milk, associated farmers have to watch more personally over the 
quality of their product, through hygienic methods of milking and packing, 
than cooperative members whose milk is tested in the factory; besides, they 
should be good salesmen and women. They are especially the demands on the 
commercial capacities of members of the household that is focused on quality 
production which tend to dominate all other activities (ibid.: 466; cf. also 
Mendras, 1970: 151, 152, and 226). Through establishing direct links with 
their clients, producers not only 'pocket' the margin that is otherwise 
appropriated by intermediate institutions, but also intend to convert the 
specific quality they attribute to their products into a better price. It is 
therefore important to maintain good relationships with one's customers and 
to give them the feeling that the quality of the product and additional services 
offered are better tailored to their particular wishes than anything else on the 
market. 
It is important to note that most of the hawkers of raw milk, not only the 
members of Baserriko Esnea but also the traditional hawkers, are women. 
"Women are better able to establish and maintain social relationships with 
clients than men," some of my respondents said. In general, only if the (male) 
farmer was single, if his wife had her own job, or if she was physically unable 
to walk very long and climb up and down the steps in flat buildings, did he do 
the hawking himself. It was certainly no coincidence that on the Garibai farm 
Inaki delivered the milk in a few shops, while his sister Amaia did the 
distribution among their individual customers, who were mainly housewives. 
The willingness of family farm members to carry out the tasks that are 
necessary for the production of quality is a more direct function of their 
vocation for farming as opposed to alternative labour preferences. We saw 
how Inigo of the Iriondo farm initiated new projects with apparent enthusiasm, 
only to give them up after a while for other ones. Future labour shortage on 
his own farm, or lack of work and thus income when working for the 
machinery cooperative, in themselves might have been good motives to start 
looking for more viable alternatives. But what really made him decide not to 
continue on the farm if he could avoid it was that he had 'suddenly' 
discovered how much farm labour resembled imprisonment. About Inaki and 
Antxon of the Garibai farm, who had taken over his clients in town, he 
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remarked: "They've run into great debts; when they're sixty, they may say 
'Now we can start living'. But life is short and should we live like slaves then? 
Not for me!" 
The willingness to work hard and invest so as to turn quality production 
into a success is in no small measure determined by the prospects of future 
viability. These prospects depend mainly on the amount of family labour 
power that can be mobilized upon succession. This is where the farms Iriondo 
and Garibai differed. Inigo's parents still maintained an enterprise of about 25 
head of cattle in order to provide their son with a good economic basis to 
survive, in case he was forced to return to the holding. But Inigo must have 
realized long ago that sooner or later he would have to do all the farmwork 
alone, the more so because his wife had a full-time, off-farm job. Conversely, 
the brothers Antxon and Inaki of Garibai would continue the holding together. 
As a result of the infrastructural improvements and the expansion of the 
livestock, their farm would soon generate enough income to sustain two 
families. 
Apart from being able and willing to work harder and having the vocation to 
make sacrifices when needed, the possession of a certain creativity is 
necessary to make the household's performance successful. This creativity 
particularly concerns the way in which producers are able to define the quality 
of the product to be commercialized. 
7.5 Quality: a social construction 
Farmers who deliver their milk to the dairy factory are in the first place 
interested in its fat and protein level and the bacteriological composition, as 
these are the criteria the factory uses to judge the quality of their product. 
Conversely, for the dairy farmer who sells his products directly to his 
customers, quality is the complex of properties of the product that respond 
adequately to the particular wishes of the consumers; quality is thus a social 
construction, something that is defined in the interrelations between producer 
and consumer. What distinguishes the dairy hawker from the one who delivers 
his milk to the factory is, to use an industrial metaphor, that he should not 
only be his own Product Manager, but also develop his abilities as a Marketing 
Manager. 
Quality producers who want their products to compete effectively with 
products that have undergone industrial processing will generally follow a 
strategy that is based on highlighting the 'naturalness' of their product, its 
being 'free from chemicals', or 'home-made' {etxeko in Basque);351 
competing products are depicted as factory-made, unnatural and the result of 
artificial manipulation. This is how hawkers of fresh milk managed to enrol 
consumers into their client network (added to the other elements they were 
able to offer them, such as a common background and the latest local news). 
Muller speaks here of 'tricks' the farmer uses to maintain the 'look fermier' (farm look) of his 
product (Muller, 1987: 468). 
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Their anti-propaganda against the dairy factory played on the widespread 
aversion among Basque people to the chemical treatment of foodstuffs, an 
aversion that was projected onto most farm products that had been 
industrially processed. These hawkers (including Baserriko Esnea members) 
were quite effective in convincing their clients that pasteurized and sterilized 
milk had been chemically adulterated. To counteract this image, the 
cooperative Gurelesa organized excursions for school-classes to the dairy, so 
that at least the children could see with their own eyes what processes milk 
had to go through in the factory. The former president of the cooperative 
complained that "there is an enormous lack of knowledge about these things 
among Basque people; even the teachers of these children often have no idea 
what pasteurization really is about." 
If these hawkers wanted to have their way of marketing non-pasteurized 
milk officially legalized, they had to conform to a number of criteria 
(concerning inspection, hygienic treatment, etc.), established by the regional 
Department of Public Health. Those who did were offered a Health Certificate. 
This official recognition had no influence on the behaviour of their individual 
clients, but opened up a new market of customers in the catering industry. 
As a matter of fact, awarding a product which satisfied formal quality 
criteria an officially recognized label did not necessarily lead to its greater 
acceptance by the public, as many consumers, especially elderly people, 
considered a label on a farm product to be the proof of its factory origin. 
Sheep-farmers in the region had more experience with labelled quality 
products than cattle breeders. Ewe-cheese made by shepherds who grazed 
their sheep in the mountains around the village of Idiazabal had traditionally 
had a very good name, but lost part of its prestige, when it became known 
that some traders sold cheese that had been imported from other regions in 
Spain as original Idiazabal cheese on the Basque market. A sheep-breeders' 
association, supported by the Basque Administration, turned the tide: the 
brand name Idiazabal was officially registered, with its own Appellation 
d'Origine ('Denominacidn de Origen' in Spanish), and the use of the 
corresponding label was restricted to cheese that was locally produced with 
milk of the autochtonous Latxa sheep-race. Nevertheless, for many years 
consumers had little faith in this product: on local markets and agricultural 
fairs, shepherds belonging to the association found it generally easier to sell 
cheese without than with the quality label. The former president of the 
association explained how he managed to fool suspicious consumers: 
"On fairs, I lay the cheese with Idiazabal labels on one side of my 
stall and on the other side, especially for these people, the same 
cheese but without any labels, often together with some pieces that 
have not come out too well; the worse the appearance of the 
cheese, the more authentic some people think it is." 
Some time after the members of the sheep-breeders' association brought their 
cheese on the market with the Idiazabal quality label, the cheese department 
of the small dairy cooperative LANA (see Section 6.3) began to make ewe-
cheese which also conformed to the necessary requirements and could thus 
be sold with the same hallmark. Although the name LANA was explicitly 
mentioned on cheese sold by the cooperative, and only on their cheese, this 
116 
confusion with labels may have been another reason why so many consumers 
thought that all labelled cheese was factory-made. However, to complete the 
picture, it should be mentioned that the Idiazabal cheese with its quality label 
had become a generally accepted and esteemed product in supermarkets, 
gourmet shops and restaurants. 
Consumers obviously attributed another meaning to the label than it had 
for the shepherds. Whereas for the latter it was a means to demonstrate the 
authenticity of their product, their potential clients suspected they were 
offered a product that had undergone chemical manipulation. That such a 
discrepancy of definitions is not restricted to labels, but may also arise as to 
other manifestations of quality becomes evident in the following case. This 
concerns a dairy farmer who had his own pasteurization machine and 
converted all his milk into yogurt, curd and cheese; his products were sold in 
many shops in and around the provincial capital. Now, curd that was 
produced by dairy factories was generally sold in little earthenware mugs, an 
imitation of the way farmers traditionally used to sell this product to 
consumers. But this farmer had begun to use plastic cups, being a much more 
hygienic way to distribute the curd: 
"In restaurants, people normally use these mugs as ashtrays once 
they've finished their desserts. Housewives use them temporarily to 
keep their soap, oil or chlorine in. Due to their irregular surface, it's 
almost impossible to clean these clay mugs thoroughly. They have a 
few pesetas deposit, and when you get them back, you can often 
still see or smell what they contained." 
To his disappointment, his innovation turned out to be anything but a success, 
as consumers preferred the traditional mugs, which they saw as more 
authentic. 
"I sell a natural product, but because it's sold in plastic cups, it 
doesn't have such a natural appearance - and that's what seems to 
count most for consumers. So now we're forced to start selling our 
curd in the traditional, but less hygienic, clay mugs again. That's 
what they ask for..."3 6 1 
To say that in both these cases the consumers became the victims of their 
own ignorance, is but one way of phrasing it. Quality is not only something 
that can be objectified by means of hygienic, chemical or pathogenic 
parameters, it is just as much something which is given shape in the 
interaction between farmers and their clients. In these two cases the 
producers' client networks were based on a definition of quality that both 
parties (producers and consumers) had agreed upon. When this definition was 
tacitly reconstructed by the producers, it led to the desertion of many of their 
clients. These consumers adjusted their behaviour to how they interpreted the 
new quality status of the product they used to buy, not in accordance with 
the quality itself. In the eyes of the producers, the deserting clients went 
More recently, some factories had started to sell curd in plastic cups with an 'earthenware' 
design. These were accepted more easily by most consumers. 
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therefore against their own, 'objective' interests. 
In the cases of both Idiazabal cheese and Baserriko Esnea milk, some 
consumers dissociated themselves from the producers' client networks when 
the definition of quality was readjusted. But the new quality definition turned 
out to be meaningful for clients in another part of the outlet market: 
supermarkets and restaurants in the case of Idiazabal cheese, bars and shops 
for Baserriko Esnea milk. A redefinition of the bond on which a social network 
is based may thus lead to the desertion of actors that form part of it, but also 
to the displacement of the network as such. 
7.6 The ephemerality of the niche 
It is true, as Muller (1987: 471) observes, that strategies of quality producers 
often hark back to traditions that existed in the region. But I have shown that 
it is not simply the maintainance of traditional activities that 'does it'. Success 
is frequently the outcome of a strategy of 'turning tradition upside down'. 
This is true for the Baserriko Esnea alternative which managed to adapt the 
traditional activity of milk hawking to generally accepted, 'modern', standards 
with respect to the hygienic treatment of food. Folk criteria as to the quality 
of this farm product were thus linked to objective criteria, like its 
bacteriological composition and fat and protein content. 
Farmers (and also shepherds, as we have seen) created quality products 
which they wanted to see officially recognized and maybe protected against 
unlawful competition. Dairy farmers associated to Baserriko Esnea and in 
possession of a Health Certificate had warded off the threat of a prohibition of 
their activities by the regional Administration and had managed to open up 
new (or lost) markets. The point is, however, that quality labels, official 
certificates, and the like may have become prerequisites for farmers to survive 
in an environment that is more and more ruled by bureaucratically established 
standardized norms, but hardly appeal to the average consumer. And the 
chances are that once this consumer does take them into account when 
purchasing agricultural products, he does not know how to distinguish 
between one label and the other. This is what had happened with the 
Idiazabal hallmark several years ago. 
But the same case demonstrated something else: as soon as objective 
quality norms for a product are established, in particular if they are 
disconnected from the farmer's craftsmanship, the generation of such a 
quality product is no longer necessarily the monopoly of individual 
producers.37' Industrial competition may also become more likely as a result 
of labour saving strategies of farmers. We saw that the production and 
commercialization of a quality product is generally more time consuming and 
De Roest observes that even the famous Parmezan cheese, still produced predominantly in 
small-scale farmer-run cooperatives, is facing competition of a more industrially produced 
variety. As the quality of the latter cheese variety is somewhat lower, its possibilities to 
replace Parmezan cheese are limited. Nevertheless, the author warns that minor changes in 
quality between both varieties might lead to quite radical shifts in consumer preferences (de 
Roest, 1990). 
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labour intensive than producing an 'average' product that is subsequently 
delivered to an intermediary marketing institution. As this is so, it is not 
surprising that quality producers, once the experimental stage has been 
passed, intend to reduce their drudgery of labour, both through the 
introduction of technological improvements in the production process and the 
rationalization of commercial activities.381 As soon as quality products can 
be produced and sold in a more routine manner, industrialized production by 
institutions beyond control of the pioneers may be expected. Hence, farmers 
who created their own economic niche where they expected their chances for 
survival to be greater than outside, may thus be confronted with industrial 
competition after all. It is in this context that I hypothesize the ephemerality of 
the niche where craftsmanship is superseded and labour is routinized.391 This 
is not to say, of course, that the disintegration of the niche is inevitable. It 
merely implies that quality producers have to take this possibility into account 
and anticipate on it while designing future strategies. 
The quality production strategy can be illustrated with the following 
Chayanovian diagram (Figure 13). The generation of quality products normally 
asks for investments; demand satisfaction has to be postponed and the 
corresponding curve CD is pushed upward (to curve I). Furthermore, 
household members are usually forced to intensify their labour input (hence, 
the upward shift of curve AB). Baserriko Esnea members, for example, had to 
invest in a packing machine and all kinds of measurements through which the 
hygienic treatment of their product would be guaranteed; on the other hand, 
their labour input rose as a result of the filling of the plastic bags and, most of 
all, their hawking activities. But farm households are only willing to do these 
investments and to accept a higher drudgery of labour if in return they can 
expect a higher remuneration of their efforts. This is realized through a better 
price for their product. Consequently, the demand satisfaction curve falls to P; 
the equilibrium point Y is more favourable than X. As in Chapter 6 (see Figure 
10), the total output is lower than upon delivery to the dairy factory, but the 
eventual income level of quality producers lies higher. Farmers may try to 
routinize their production and marketing activities in order to reduce their 
labour drudgery; the result is represented through the arrow R. (Of course, 
traditional hawkers did not have to do the investments referred to, so for 
them the demand satisfaction curve was situated even lower, which implies 
their equilibrium point was more favourable than that of Baserriko Esnea 
members and farmers belonging to the dairy factory. But their alternative 
As women seemed to be more willing to maintain networks of individual clients (men would 
even argue that women were better socially equipped for it), we may expect the 
rationalization of networks to be first and foremost a 'male' preference. 
In the Netherlands, there are several examples of farmers selling regional quality products on 
the holdings themselves. Time and labour spent on commercialization are thus kept within 
bounds and need not be further rationalized. And as total volumes are normally rather limited, 
industries are less likely to be interested in these markets. Selling quality products on the 
farmyard is also done on a small number of holdings in Euskadi (an example can be found in 
van den Broek, 1990). The strategy may work quite well for the commercialization of non-
perishable goods, such as cheese or wool, but obviously not to sell fresh milk. 
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lacked any long-term perspectives.) 
satisfaction 
[marginal 
utility of 
consumption] 
drudgery 
(marginal 
disutility 
of labour) 
output (income) 
Figure 13. Quality production and interlocking projects. 
Following this line of reasoning, we might ask ourselves if, upon 
rationalization of the production and marketing of fresh milk, there would be a 
real impediment for dairy factories to sell the same product just as well. That 
this question is not without any foundation was demonstrated during an 
interview I had in 1996 with the former Minister of Agriculture of the Basque 
Autonomous Government and present member of the Board of Directors of 
the dairy factory Iparlat, J .M. Goikoetxea (cf. also Chapter 4). Due to what he 
referred to as the propagation of the 'Tetrabrik culture' among Basque 
consumers, that is their preference for packed and sterilized products, 
pasteurized milk had lost an important part of its market share. He explained 
that the dairy factory Iparlat, as part of its policy to regain a portion of the 
market lost, had recently asked the regional Government to create a Basque 
quality label for pasteurized milk. 
"Why did we decide to focus on pasteurized milk and not on the 
certified milk without thermic processing? First, because milk that 
has undergone thermic processing does not need to be supplied daily 
- daily supply is one of the major inconveniences of the consumption 
of fresh milk. And second, - and in spite of the appreciation of the 
fresh product, the product which has not been subject to high 
temperatures - because the market for skimmed and semi-skimmed 
milk is growing. We cannot ignore this market; if we only used 
pasteurized or fresh milk to make full-cream dairy products, our 
market would become smaller and smaller." 
[J.M. Goikoetxea, Board of Directors of Iparlat; VII/96] 
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Apparently, the people in charge of the dairy factory had considered the 
commercialization of non-pasteurized milk, but they had rejected the idea on 
account of the product's fat content and perishability. Its fat content is not 
always an impediment, though - on the contrary, it is seen as one of its main 
advantages by consumers who need fresh milk to elaborate desserts and 
sauces. And other regular consumers of fresh milk do not seem to mind its 
higher percentage of fat either. There is definitely a market for non-
pasteurized milk, but its potential importance for the dairy depends on its size, 
its stability, and the possibility to shorten the time in which this milk reaches 
the consumers. The perishability of the product is its greatest handicap, 
something it has in common with pasteurized milk. But new procedures had 
been developed to keep pasteurized milk fresh for about five days, which 
implied that it had become a lot easier to buy and store than in the past 
(though by no means as easy as sterilized milk yet). And new systems of 
distribution of this kind of milk have to be established, so that it reaches the 
consumers faster than through the present distribution channels. Although it 
may still sound rather speculative, I would argue that these developments 
make commercialization of fresh milk by the dairy industry more likely.401 
7.7 Conclusions 
Baserriko Esnea was presented as an alternative, both for dairy cooperative 
members who felt increasingly marginalized within their organization, and for 
traditional hawkers who saw their market shrink ever more. Farmers had 
associated with this network of professionals in order to safeguard the future 
of their network of clients. The attempts of Baserriko Esnea to create a niche 
for the marketing of good quality fresh milk were initially ignored by the 
If the scenario of the commercialization of fresh milk by the dairy factory should become 
reality, the question remains which farmers will have to deliver this milk. The milk of the 
majority of the dairy cooperative members cannot simply be resold as fresh milk, since their 
methods of milking and storing (in the milk tank) are not virus and bacteria free; so far, this 
has been no problem, because their milk is all pasteurized or sterilized. Traditional hawkers 
are not eligible either, as their installations are seldom more hygienic. The only suitable 
suppliers would be the dairy farmers with a Health Certificate. The truck of the cooperative 
could collect the fresh milk on the farms, deliver it to the factory where it would be packed 
(if this had not already been done on the farms), and distribute it in shops, restaurants 
etcetera, the same or the following day. What advantages are there for the farmers? The 
distribution of their milk will be done by the factory, which saves them quite a lot of labour; 
but the price per litre they get paid will be lower than when they did the hawking 
themselves. They should be paid more than the average cooperative members, as their milk 
is of higher quality, due to the investments they have done in the past and which have to be 
paid back. Halfway the 1990s, the general pattern seemed to be that Baserriko Esnea 
members delivered most part of their total production to the dairy factory for which they 
received more or less the same price as other cooperative members; the price they were paid 
for the milk they sold directly to their customers was about twice as high. In the 
(hypothetical) future situation, the price per litre for their whole production, though probably 
higher than what other dairy farmers delivering to the factory are paid, will depend on the 
importance the factory attributes to non-pasteurized milk for safeguarding its own position 
on the market. The economic niche of Baserriko Esnea members will then have given way to 
a situation of mutual dependence between them and the dairy factory. 
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relevant Basque Government departments, a policy which Baserriko Esnea 
members qualified as 'passive obstruction'. 
After many years, the Baserriko Esnea alternative was officially recognized 
by the Department of Public Health of the regional Government. Hawkers 
whose farm enterprises fulfilled the required conditions were given Health 
Certificates which allowed them to sell their non-pasteurized milk in 
commercial establishment; a favourable side-effect was that from then on the 
dairy factory Iparlat (formerly Gurelesa) accepted their milk, too. These 
developments led to an important displacement of the hawkers' client 
networks, which was also brought about because the number of individual 
consumers continued to decline. 
Traditional hawkers also combined direct sales on the streets with selling 
their surplus to the dairy factory. But they had been forbidden to deliver to 
institutions and shops and gradually lost their individual clients as well, 
whereas their position within the factory, as a result of their relatively low and 
irregular deliveries, was a marginal one. In contrast, Baserriko Esnea members 
focussed predominantly on direct sales to shops and restaurants, while trying 
to keep their individual customers as long as possible; at the same time, they 
strengthened their position within the dairy factory by expanding their 
production and delivering an ever-increasing part of it. 
The new situation which enabled these hawkers to enjoy the best of both 
worlds (high prices for part of the milk produced through direct sales and a 
reliable marketing channel for the rest of their production) was the outcome of 
a conscious strategy that had resulted in the establishment of multiple 
interlocking projects. 
The commercial activities of quality producers often demand more 
technical and social skills of them than of the average producer. Apart from 
the standard requirements that everyone has to fulfil, they have to meet the 
sometimes highly specific quality criteria of institutions belonging to their own 
'circuit' - which means that they may, deviously, get caught on an alternative 
treadmill after all (cf. Mak, 1996: 122). The social skills of quality producers 
include (1) the awareness to detect changes in consumer preferences and (2) 
enough creativity to attune one's offer to the clients' wishes. Moreover, social 
skills are needed to effectively motivate parents, children, siblings and so forth 
to cooperate in carrying out all the tasks that have to be done. This is 
important on most farms, but the more so on quality producing enterprises, 
where labour intensity is generally higher than on other holdings. 
Precisely because quality production and the maintenance of client 
networks is highly time consuming and labour intensive, households are more 
inclined to focus on specialization than on diversification of their activities. For 
the same reason, household members will try to reduce their labour input 
through the routinization of production and the rationalization of their 
marketing activities. I have argued that this development makes industrial 
competition more likely. I therefore hypothesized the ephemerality of the niche 
for individual producers of quality products. 
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Chapter 8 
'PART-TIME' FARMING: FACTORY, FARM AND FAMILY 
LABOUR 
In line with Chayanovian tradition, I see the family farm as a more or less 
organic whole in which household members develop divergent strategies that 
serve to reproduce the holding. These strategies may concern scale-
enlargement, intensification, or an orientation to crafts, trades or off-farm 
labour - whereby that combination of activities is chosen which, upon 
weighing income and labour drudgery against each other, results in the most 
favourable equilibrium point. 
However, in the distinction between full-time and part-time farming the 
power of labels and the imperative character of typologies can again be 
noticed. If farming is, by definition or by default, understood to be the 
household's full-time dedication to profitable, agricultural activities, farm 
enterprises where reproduction of the household is realized exclusively 
through agricultural labour are automatically, in analysis and policy, set 
against those where this happens through a combination of farming and non-
farming activities. Barlett (1986) observes that part-time farmers are generally 
seen either as small farmers who have not been able to continue a full-time 
holding or as rural residents who pursue a high-quality lifestyle and who are 
not in the first place interested in running an economically profitable 
enterprise. From this point to labeling part-time farmers as inefficient or not 
seriously involved in agriculture, is but one step, and confronting them with 
the corresponding policy consequences, another. 
The distinction, according to the degree of exclusivity of the agricultural 
basis for the reproduction of the family farm, becomes even more debatable if 
we watch the problems that social scientists experience when determining 
exactly what farms should be regarded as part-time (see Section 8.1). 
With all these critical observations in mind, I shall nevertheless discuss 
part-time farming as a separate category, mainly because this category is time 
and again referred to in the discourses of policy makers, full-time farmers and 
representatives of farmers' unions - and usually in a negative sense. 
Moreover, through a medium-sized, well mechanized part-time enterprise, 
counting on the labour input of several family members, the organization of 
labour within the farm household will be further analyzed. 
8.1 A definition problem 
In her comprehensive study on part-time farming in the Basque Country, Miren 
Etxezarreta (1984) describes the part-time farm as an agricultural enterprise 
where neither the head of the farm nor any of the other family members is 
exclusively engaged in agricultural activities. However, this definition is a little 
problematic. Those farms where, for example, the head has a full-time factory 
job and the farm is run by his wife and parents, or where the future heir, 
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waiting for the moment to take over the farm, is working in industry while 
investing his wages in his parents' farming enterprise, would normally be 
regarded as part-time farms by fellow farmers as well as by the regional 
Administration, but should be excluded from this category if we follow 
Etxezarreta. 
Gasson (1986: 365) distinguishes three classes of part-time farms: those 
where "farming is the main source of the household's earned income", those 
"with some farm earnings but another main income source" (also called 'spare 
time' farms), and the holdings that are kept "for motives of amenity or 
residence rather than profit" (or 'hobby' farms). In Gasson's view, farms 
where sons and daughters take up an off-farm job also belong to the part-time 
farming category. The problem here is that she does not make any difference 
between (potential) successors and other children; thus, the modern dairy 
farm Etxeberri (see Section 5.1), where four sons worked in construction or 
industry in 1996, should also be considered a part-time enterprise as long as 
those sons do not marry and leave the farm. 
An analysis in terms of pluriactivity does not automatically overcome the 
shortcomings of the above 'part-time farming' definitions. For Eizner (1985), 
for example, 'pluriactivit.6' includes complementary farm activities like honey 
or cheese making, direct sales of farm products ('vente directe'), or rural 
tourism. And also Hetland, who defines pluriactivity as "the diversification of 
activities carried out by one household on and off the holding in order to 
secure the household's economy and welfare" (Hetland, 1986: 385), 
mentions on-farm activities like fur farming or tourism as one of the possible 
forms. In these cases, I would rather speak of diversification; the terms part-
time farming and pluriactivity may then be reserved for those situations in 
which off-farm income is involved.411 
De Vries (1995) uses a somewhat different notion of pluriactivity, based 
on a more limited definition of the relevant unit of analysis. Recognizing that 
not all family members with an off-farm job hand over their entire income to 
the household, she takes as her unit of analysis, not the whole farm family 
household, but "only those members of a household (..) that actually 
contribute to the continuity of the (farm) enterprise and the household" (de 
Vries, 1995: 8; my translation), that is the head of the farm and his (or her) 
spouse, together with their successor (if there is one) and his (her) spouse; 
she then defines pluriactivity as "the phenomenon that the head of the farm 
and/or his spouse, or the heads of the farm and their spouses, carry out paid 
activities outside the farming enterprise or non-agrarian activities on the farm" 
(ibid.). Her definition of pluriactivity is based on a differentiation within the 
household family (between senior and succeeding farming couples on the one 
hand and the rest of the siblings on the other) which is similar to the one I 
have suggested myself (see Chapter 1). It avoids the major shortcomings of 
other definitions cited above and has the added advantage of linking up well 
with what the 'people in the field' understand by part-time farming. This is the 
definition which therefore suits my own discussion of the phenomenon best. I 
Hetland even speaks of pluriactivity if farmers receive a pension (cf. Hetland, 1986: 387); a 
term like 'multiple incomes' would be more suitable here. 
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will not adopt the term pluriactivity, though, but stick to 'part-time farming', 
since this was also the generic term ('agricultura a tiempo parcial') used by 
farmers and policy makers in the research context. 
Basque farmers do not only classify their own or another farm as a part-
time enterprise if the head of the farm has a job in industry, but also if the son 
(or occasionally the daughter) who is believed to continue the farm as a 
productive enterprise earns an off-farm income, while his parents work full-
time on the holding. However, if in the latter case the son has a factory job 
but is not expected to use the farm as anything more than a rural dwelling in 
the future, the holding will be regarded as a full-time enterprise until the 
moment of succession. The heir's willingness to continue the farm as a 
productive unit is normally measured in terms of his (or her) visible labour 
input on the farm and of how much of his (her) off-farm income is invested in 
the farm economy. Which farming enterprises are regarded as part-time and 
which as full-time holdings is socially defined and often based on the 
subjective judgement of the respondents. (Consequently, these respondents 
do not always agree when asked whether a specific farm should be seen as a 
part-time or a full-time enterprise.) 
In its policy on subsidies and credits for the agrarian sector, the Basque 
Administration also took into account the on- and off-farm activities of both 
the 'old' and the 'young' farming couple. According to the criteria in force, for 
example, if a successor had an off-farm income that was higher than what the 
farm yielded, his parents would not be eligible for credits at low interest rates. 
The same occurred if it was the successor's wife who had an income that 
was higher than the farm's revenues. Noteworthy was that in the latter case 
neighbouring farmers would normally not consider the holding a part-time 
enterprise. Again, the explanation must be sought in what fellow farmers 
probably perceived as her insignificant labour input on the farm and her low 
contribution to farm investments. 
8.2 Becoming a part-time farmer 
The reduced extension of the farm enterprise (too small to employ the family 
members) and an insufficient income from agricultural production (not enough 
to guarantee the reproduction of the household) were mentioned in Chapter 2 
as push factors that motivated farmers to look for a job in industry. Pull 
factors were the existence of dispersed industrialization, causing a demand for 
labour in small-scale industries in rural areas, and of relatively high wages in 
industry, in comparison with the remuneration of the hours worked in 
agriculture. An important condition to make the combination of agricultural 
activities with an off-farm job feasible was the modernization of transport and 
infrastructure. Access roads to farms had normally been asphalted and on 
most farms there was at least one car. 
Most of the time, farmers who had found a job in industry continued to 
work outside for the rest of their productive lives, but some, like Ignacio of 
Beko-etxe (Section 6.1), had an off-farm job only to bridge a period of extra 
expenses, after which they continued their farm on a full-time basis again. 
The following short farm histories give an idea of how some farmers who 
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had begun to work in industry in the sixties and seventies had adapted to their 
new situation. 
When Jos6 (45) was about 18, there were his parents, his grandparents, 
himself, and seven brothers and sisters living and working on the farm. 
They had a mill and used to sell the calves of their 5 or 6 cows. His 
brothers and sisters all left the farm and his grandparents died. When he 
married he took over the holding from his parents, but his wife did not 
want to live there. So Jos6 bought a flat in the village and found a job in 
industry, but after his work in the factory and at the weekends he spent 
most of his time on the farm, where his parents still lived. In the 1980s, 
they still had some 5 cows plus their calves and an apple orchard. 
When he started working in the factory, Lufs (about 65 when I spoke to 
him) replaced his four Friesian cows by the same number of Swiss cows. 
The latter do not yield as much income but they need less labour and 
health and birth risks are lower. According to Lufs, the wisest thing a 
small farmer could do was combining farm work with an off-farm job: you 
can cultivate most of your food in your own garden which allows you to 
spend your wages on more luxurious things. You do not have to live in a 
flat in the village, and instead of hanging around in bars you can do a bit 
of gardening (thereby saving money instead of wasting it...). 
After his mother's death, Pedro worked on the farm with his father and 
three brothers. They had 4 or 5 dairy cows and just as much land as 
today. When he married and took over the holding (his brothers had 
already abandoned the farm), he found that the farm alone did not yield 
enough income to live on. He joined the dairy cooperative but that did not 
really solve his financial problems. By the end of the 1950s, being still a 
young man of about 25, he found a job in industry. His wife worked very 
hard to keep the farm running. They managed to increase the number of 
milch cows to 8. Pedro claimed that all that he was able to save from his 
wages was invested in the farm. 
These farm histories highlight a few differences regarding the strategies of 
part-time farmers and the importance they attributed to maintaining the farm 
as an agricultural enterprise. On the whole, two dominant models of part-time 
farming could be distinguished in the 1960s and 70s. In the first model, farm 
production was drastically reduced and its orientation on the market very 
much restricted when the head of the household began to work in industry. 
Many farmers reduced their dairy livestock, while others gave up milk 
production and replaced their dairy cows by beef cattle; the latter need less 
looking after but still keep the fields clean. Often, hectares of fertile pasture 
land were converted into pine plantations. Land that was not used 
productively was seldom sold to other farmers. The farmer's factory wages 
provided the family with enough money to live on and to pay for some 
consumer goods and improvements in and around the house that raised their 
standard of living. The family lacked the means or the motivation to bring the 
farm economy back on its original level. In the second model, both the farmer 
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himself, after his work in the factory, and his wife intensified their labour 
input on the farm. The off-farm income enabled them to accumulate capital 
and invest in cattle, the cowshed and light agricultural machines. Production 
remained on more or less the same level or was even raised. There even 
happened to be different ways to accomplish this: the farmer might invest 
most of his factory wages in his farming enterprise, or he might try to reinvest 
the income yielded by agrarian production. 
Most part-time farmers and their families continued living on the farm, but 
others decided to settle in a nearby urban centre and only visited the holding 
once a day or a few times a week, just enough to keep an eye on it and give 
the animals a little extra fodder. 
In the 1980s, there was a wider range of farm machinery available and 
most part-time farmers had the average 'package' of milk tank, milking 
machine, small tractor plus plough, field chopper, and mowing machine. Their 
level of mechanization exceeded that of many small-scale, full-time holdings. 
Again, there were differences among these part-time enterprises, from those 
where machines were in the first place meant to make farm work lighter and 
do things faster, to other holdings where they were used to increment farm 
production. 
All in all, according to critics, there can be little doubt about it that part-
time farming allowed the maintenance in agriculture of many small-scale 
holdings that would otherwise have disappeared; thus, the phenomenon is 
said to contribute to the obstruction of agricultural development. 
8.3 The bad reputation of the part-time farmer 
Not only in the Basque Country do part-time farmers have to face the negative 
judgement of rural development planners or modernizing farm owners. 
According to Zurek, part-timers in the Federal Republic of Germany are also 
"as a rule, discredited, often discriminated against and at best ignored by 
policymakers, scientists and administrators" (Zurek, 1986: 377). Gjelten 
(1984) gives a few examples of criticism of part-time farming that his Spanish 
respondents came up with. For instance, full-time farmers seemed to fear that 
part-timers would undermine farmers' political power as a result of their low 
participation rate in agricultural unions; industrial workers and their unions 
thought the presence of part-time farmers in industry might push the wage 
rate down, as the latter were supposed to accept lower wages than others. 
Planners seemed to be especially negative: 
"They say that the part-time farmer cultivates his land less carefully, 
is slower to adopt new technologies, is less efficient, and in general 
produces less than his full-time counterpart. Moreover, his decisions 
about which type of agriculture to practise will be motivated by time 
concerns rather than commercial concerns; the widespread practice 
of part-time farming could lead to an excess of those crops that are 
produced easily" (Gjelten, 1984: 41). 
Similar criticism was also recorded by Eizner (1985: 111) with respect to part-
time farming in France. 
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If a farmer accepts a full-time job in industry, the labour input on the farm 
of the other household members, especially the farmer's wife, is believed to 
increase considerably. Etxezarreta (1977, 1979) states that a part-time 
farmer, after his eight hours in the factory, usually works another seven hours 
on the farm, while his wife is engaged an average of 10.5 hours a day in 
agricultural activities, combining these with her domestic tasks - a situation 
she characterizes as an "intense deterioration of the quality of farm life" 
(Etxezarreta, 1977: 247). She also investigated what items part-time farming 
households spent their money on (see table 11; Etxezarreta, 1984) and comes 
to the conclusion that in general more money is invested in obtaining a higher 
living standard than in the purchase of means of production. 
Table 11. Use of family savings; percentage of farm enterprises (in relation 
to the total number of investigated part-time farms) that invested 
in the mentioned categories (Gipuzkoa). Source: Etxezarreta, 
1984; summarized. 
house durable machinery buildings, car land other 
consumer installations 
goods 
74.5 100 100 55.8 99.2 19.6 17.1 
Almost all farm households in this category invested in durable consumer 
goods and the buying of a car, and many also spent money on improving the 
rural dwelling. As to 'productive investments', we see that fewer farmers 
spent money on the stables and outbuildings and only one fifth of them 
invested in the purchase or improvement of land. (The category of machinery 
is treated as an exception.) 
Modernizing farmers among my own respondents mainly used to criticize 
part-timers for their supposed unwillingness to sell or lease land or their entire 
holding to other farmers who might be able to make a more productive use of 
it. The idea that part-time farmers impeded agricultural development also 
prevailed in both farmers' unions EHNE and ENBA. The former president of 
EHNE expressed this as follows: 
"Imagine me and my brothers would all start working in the factory. 
We would build our houses on the fields around the farm, perhaps 
keep a few cows and some sheep - and we would control this 
mountain. As a means of subsistence this whole area would be lost. 
Our children would also have to go and work in industry, for they 
would not be able to earn a living here." 
[Aldasoro, EHNE; IX/88] 
Criticism of part-time farmers is, in my opinion, not always justified. Much of 
it is based on generalizations that are copied time and again and that 
eventually obtain the status of unchallenged truths. To begin with, criticism of 
different authors is sometimes mutually exclusive. One cannot state, for 
example, that household members on a part-time farm generally work far too 
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many hours, and at the same time maintain that as a consequence of part-
time farming we may expect an overproduction of those products that 
demand little labour input. Some points of critique may also be outdated. 
Incidentally, it may still happen that farmers plant pinetrees on meadows or 
pastures, but this certainly does not occur as extensively as in the 1960s, and 
part-timers are not the only ones who must be held responsible for this. It is 
true that few part-time farmers would be willing to sell their land to other 
farmers, although we should keep in mind that this unwillingness is just as 
widespread among full-timers. On the other hand, my experience is that part-
time farmers frequently lease scattered fields somewhat farther away from 
the farmhouse to large-scale farmers who normally use it for forage 
production. If this does not happen more often, it is because there is not a 
generalized, effective demand for land among modernizing, full-time farmers 
(see Section 5.6). 
A minority of part-time farmers in Spain was said to belong to agricultural 
unions. If the same can be said of the Basque Country, such a low 
participation rate should hardly come as a surprise taking into account that 
neither of the Basque farmers' unions considered the defense of the part-
timers' interests a priority (putting it mildly). 
Etxezarreta's claim that most part-time farmers use their savings for 
consumptive rather than for productive investments is open to debate. Table 
11 only indicates what percentage of part-timers invested in each of the 
categories mentioned, but not what percentage of their savings was actually 
spent on these different items. Part-time farm households normally have more 
savings and thus their choice of what to spend the money on is wider. It is 
possible that they first spent money on durable consumer goods, a car and 
the house and only later on farm buildings, machinery and land - whereas 
small-scale full-time farmers, who depended exclusively on the holding for 
their income, would give priority to more 'productive' investments. Moreover, 
the whole distinction between productive and consumptive investments is 
debatable. Investments in the house or in durable consumer goods may be 
part of a strategy to convince a future spouse to come and live on the 
farmstead or to content other family members. On a part-time holding, which 
in the absence of the head of farm depends on the labour input of spouse and 
next-of-kin, this is particularly important. And finally, Etxezarreta's own data 
show that on all part-time holdings investments were made in machinery. 
Technological improvements on the farm do not only help to save time, but 
can also reduce physical efforts, which is important on part-time farms where 
women or children may have to take over some of the heavier tasks that were 
formerly only done by men. What cannot be ignored is that many part-time 
farmers probably would not have realized such investments if they had 
continued working full-time on their holdings, either because they would have 
lacked the financial means, or because there would have been no need to do 
so. 
Part-time farmers are accused of being less efficient and less progressive 
in adopting new technologies than their full-time colleagues. Yet, it is 
important to specify here with what category of full-time farmers the 
comparison is made. The main fallacy in much of the criticism against part-
time farms is that they are, often implicitly, set against the reduced group of 
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modern, large-scale farming enterprises. As a result of this comparison, part-
time holdings are almost invariably pictured as less productive, less efficient 
and not as innovation-minded as they should be. However, just as among full-
timers, I would argue there are also important differences among part-time 
farming enterprises: as to their scale, their level of production, orientation on 
the market, readiness to adopt new technology, and so forth. These 
differences can be attributed to infrastructural and economic factors, like 
orography, plot dissemination, the condition of farm buildings, and the level of 
agricultural income and factory wages, as well as to social factors, such as 
family composition, age of household members, educational levels, job 
preferences, and power relations within the family. In this context, one might 
recall Cavaco's conclusion (in a study about part-time farming in the region 
around Lisbon) that "work off the holding by the household head or other 
members of the family unit does not necessarily imply under-use of productive 
resources, lower production per hectare, or lower productivity. Nor can this 
form of agriculture be regarded as the single or indeed main cause of the 
general stagnation of the agricultural sector" (Cavaco, 1985). 
It is my contention that much of the criticism referred to can be traced 
back to the normative belief that part-time farming (just as 'traditional' 
farming) is hindering agricultural development. Such a perspective obscures 
the rationale of farmers themselves for their strategies. 
In the following section, I will discuss the case of a farm where total 
revenues from agriculture increased when the future successor decided to 
take up a factory job, both due to the fact that other family members made up 
for the loss of labour force by intensifying their own labour input and because 
the introduction of new technology made it possible to reach a higher level of 
labour productivity. 
8.4 Antolar: technology and family labour 
When I visited this farm in the summer of 1989, the family household 
consisted of 8 people: Xabier (31) and his wife Edurne, their two young 
children, Xabier's parents and a younger sister and brother. An older brother 
and sister had both married and lived in towns nearby. Xabier's parents, who 
were still the official owners of the farm, were close to retirement; many 
years ago, it had already been decided that Xabier would inherit the holding 
and not his older brother, as the latter had left the village as soon as he had 
found a good office job elsewhere. 
They had 13 dairy cows producing some 340 litres of milk per two days, 
which was all sold to the cooperative Gurelesa. Xabier also kept 14 beef 
cattle in the mountains. When Xabier had started working in industry, six 
years before, he wanted to work in shifts so that he would be better able to 
combine his job with his tasks on the farm. The work on the land was mainly 
done by Xabier, his younger sister Lorea (28) and their mother, whereas 
Edurne did most of the household; their father had problems with his shoulder 
and seized any opportunity to get out of doing too much work. Xabier's 
youngest brother, who was only 20, also had a factory job, but used to help 
on the farm in the evenings and at weekends. Lorea had a job of two hours a 
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day that provided her with some money and, just like her younger brother, she 
could keep her income for herself. Xabier invested most of his earnings in the 
farm. In recent years, he had bought several new machines and by the end of 
the 1980s he was considered to be the farmer with the most modern 
agricultural machinery in Zelaizabal and the surrounding villages. 
All agreed that it had principally been because of mother Maria, her 
tenacity and zest for work, that the farm had prospered. 
Maria 
Maria was 63 in 1989, her husband two years older. When they married and 
she came to live on the farm, 39 years ago, there were two oxen and 5 Swiss 
cows on Antolar. The cows used to have one calf a year each, which were 
sold after a few months; Maria's mother-in-law made a cheese a day and sold 
them, together with some surplus farm products, on the weekly market in a 
nearby town. Maria: "I came from a farm where we had 8 dairy cows and my 
mother earned more money than my family-in-law. Two years passed, but I 
saw that we didn't have enough money. We had two nice calves, so I 
convinced my husband that we should sell them and buy a milch cow back. 
My father-in-law got angry: 'How on earth can you start selling milk?' But the 
following year we did the same, and the next, and by and by we progressed, 
and so finally we began to live." She also kept a few sows and started to 
breed piglets for which she prepared the mash food herself. The calves of the 
dairy cows were raised on the farm and then all sold after 14 to 16 months. 
In those days, cows were usually bought outside. "Only recently, through 
good quality artificial insemination, farmers have begun to raise heifers in 
order to replace their cows. Try to buy a good dairy cow today, it'll cost you 
more than a month's salary." 
Maria's work on the farm consisted of feeding the animals, working in the 
kitchen garden and the forage fields, haymaking in summer, and the 
commercialization of eggs and chickens in town. They had always sold the 
milk through Gurelesa. Maria would have preferred to sell directly to 
consumers in town, but she did not have a driving licence. If she wanted to 
go to the market on Saturdays to sell her farm products, she had to go by 
bus, like so many farmers' women. 
Twenty years ago, they were the first farmers in the village to buy a 
milking machine. They had some 10 cows by then and needed to buy several 
pieces of land. When Xabier was 16, they sold the oxen and bought a small 
tractor. Maria: "Xabier, unlike his oldest brother, didn't want to study - but he 
loved the farm." 
Xabier 
When Xabier was 12 years old, his father asked him to help him milk the 
cows, but Xabier only accepted if his father bought him a bicycle. Two years 
later he wanted a moped, and again he got what he asked for. "We did this, 
because we saw that he wanted to continue on the farm; when he was 14, 
he was already very strong and worked more than us," according to Maria. 
When he left primary school, he went to an agricultural school for two years 
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and after that, he bought a number of sheep of which he sold the lambs. He 
got his driving licence when he was 18, and then had to do his military 
service. When he came home again, his brother-in-law, a sales manager in a 
factory in a nearby town, offered Xabier a job, but his parents were against it. 
Maria: "We thought it would mean the end of the farm. Now I feel sorry that 
we stopped him: it's a lot of money he earns every month!" When he was 25, 
he finally accepted. The same year, he also married Edurne. 
When Xabier started working in the factory, they had 12 dairy cows on 
the farm. Xabier had sold his sheep and kept 5 beef cows, instead. But then, 
during an anti-tuberculosis campaign, it turned out that several cows were 
infected, so their whole livestock had to be sacrificed. They had to start all 
over again. The provincial Administration gave subsidies to farmers who had 
to buy new cows, but estimated that 5 dairy cows were enough for an old 
couple with a married son working in industry. Nevertheless, they replaced all 
the cattle they had lost. Maria: "How much milk can you get from 5 cows? 
With the cows we have now (in 1989), we earn as much money on the farm 
as Xabier in industry." 
After a few months, Xabier started working in three shifts which enabled 
him to work longer hours on the farm. He also began to work for other 
farmers with his machines and this work intensified when he bought a bigger 
tractor, three years later, and a hay-baler. He also had a big plough and a 
modern mowing machine with which he often worked for others. In 1989, he 
had more than 25 regular clients in the region. According to Xabier: "There 
are many farmers who have a small plough, but with the one I have the work 
is done much faster. And as for the hay-baler, few farmers make haystacks 
nowadays, they all prefer bales. On most farms there's more money and you 
see that people prefer paying some money in order to work less." In the time 
he worked for other farmers, he could also have done more tasks on his own 
farm, but he preferred the extra income. "While we're drinking a cup of coffee 
or having siesta, he goes away for an hour or so to bale or plough," said 
Lorea. Moreover, "when he has to work somewhere else, he knows that at 
home there are two people who'll do the work that he would've had to do," 
she added, referring to her mother and herself. 
Lorea 
Lorea regretted that she had left school when she was only 14 years old; 
later, she felt that it had been partly because of this that she had hardly had 
any opportunities to leave the farm. She had a small income from a part-time 
job and for the rest of the day she worked in and around the house. She 
helped her sister-in-law with the household, her mother in the garden and the 
fields and her brother in the mountains and with the haymaking. She hardly 
had any fixed tasks, but normally did what she was told to do by her mother 
or Xabier. She often had to work with the small farm machines, something 
she quite enjoyed, and she was the only one who, in the absence of her 
brothers, was able to handle the big tractor. However, she had never wanted 
to learn how to milk the cows. This was her father's job and she feared that, 
once she had learned, she would have to do that as well. 
She worked hard, but on the other hand she could sometimes sunbathe 
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for more than an hour in the afternoon, or go shopping in town in the 
morning, without anyone criticizing her for that. About her work on the farm 
she said: "I wouldn't want to do this work all my life. I wouldn't marry a 
farmer, or in any case, I wouldn't continue living on the farm." Her ideal was 
to get married, have children and 'live her own life'. She and her boyfriend 
were looking fore a suitable flat in town and within a year or so she expected 
to get married and leave her parents' holding. Her mother considered a 
wedding and her own house to be Lorea's remuneration for so many years of 
hard work. Lorea said that after her marriage she would probably visit the 
farm regularly in order to help her parents: "When I know that they are busy 
making hay, for example, I would not go shopping." But she would not do the 
same for her brother. Lorea's major complaint was that her brother did not 
value all the things she did. This also became evident when I asked Xabier, in 
the presence of the other family members, what things they would have to 
change on the farm, when Lorea and their younger brother married and left, 
and how they would manage. He answered: "They don't help in the cowshed. 
As for the forage fields, we'll get rid of part of the maize and the beans. And 
haymaking is something I can do practically alone with the machines. 
Anyway, they only help a little in summer; in winter there's hardly anything to 
do here. And remember that within a few years my son can help as well." 
Nevertheless, they all recognized that they would have to reduce the number 
of cows in the future. Xabier said he first wanted to pay off his debts, which 
would cost him a few years (they had rebuilt the whole farmhouse that year), 
and then he would get rid of the dairy cows and only keep beef cattle in the 
mountains. His sister and brother would leave, and within five years or so he 
did not expect his parents to be able to work as much as they did then. "If 
you work in shifts, you can hardly combine this with milking times. Only once 
every three weeks, when I work from 10 pm. to 6 am., could I milk the cows 
at regular hours. But with my income and some beef cattle we'll have enough 
to make ends meet. And I would of course continue working for other farmers 
with my machines." 
In 1996, there were 7 people living on the farm: Edurne and Xabier had 
had another daughter, whereas Lorea and her younger brother had married 
and now lived somewhere else. They had 13 dairy cows and 6 heifers and 
kept 11 beef cattle. Their total milk-yield had also increased (although their 
production of 580 litres per two days was somewhat flattered due to the fact 
that several cows had given birth in the same period; in winter, total 
production would be below normal). Xabier had bought a bigger pick-up cart 
and, together with a cousin of a neighbouring farm and Joseba of Etxeberri 
(see Section 5.1), a machine to make silage bales. Xabier did even more 
contract-work for other farmers than before. Edurne: "All farmers seem to 
have modernized so much; nobody wants to work, they all make bales. 
Xabier and Joseba have so much work, both with the silage and the hay 
baler, that they can't keep up." 
Maria did not keep pigs anymore. But she still worked in the garden and 
the forage fields and went to town once a week to sell eggs. She also had to 
milk the cows, because the health problems of her husband had aggravated. 
In summer, Maria and her husband did not work as much in the hayfields as 
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before. Therefore, Edurne had to do this heavy work more than in the past. 
She also had more things to do in the house and sometimes helped her 
mother-in-law in the cowshed, though she could not milk the cows (as a 
matter of fact, when she married Xabier, she had made the condition that she 
would not have to learn it). Lorea visited them almost every day to lend a 
hand. And their youngest brother used to come and work every weekend, and 
even on workdays he frequently helped them in the evenings. 
Two years ago, Maria and her husband had been on holiday to the 
Mediterranean coast for two weeks, and in 1995 Edurne and Xabier and their 
children had been there for a few days, too. The problem was that the 
employees in the factory where Xabier worked had to take up their holidays in 
July, when there was a lot of work to do on the farm. If they wanted to go 
away, it could not possibly be for more than a long weekend. It would have 
been better, they said, if they could have had a week off in September, when 
the haymaking season was over; their parents, with the help of one of the 
other children, would have been able to do most of the tasks without working 
much harder. 
8.5 The social organization of family labour 
The following factors were of influence on the social organization of family 
labour and particularly on the allocation of tasks among household members: 
- Gender. On the Antolar farm, Edurne ran the household, Maria and Lorea 
(with the help of Maria's husband) worked in the garden and the forage fields, 
Xabier and his younger brother (with the help of Lorea, and in the haymaking 
season with the help of everyone else) did all the work in the meadows and 
the pasture fields, and Xabier (sometimes with the help of his brother) used to 
work in the mountains. This was a pattern that was also valid for most other 
farms, which gives the impression that we have to do with a cultural trait. 
Keeping in mind figure 5 of Section 5.7, the distribution of gender related 
labour on the farm may be sketched as in Figure 14. The work in the 
cowshed, pigsty, stables, etc. was normally done by both the farmer and his 
wife. In relation to this, it must be noted that they were normally the men 
who worked with agricultural machines, whereas the women worked with 
non-mechanical tools (Lorea was known in the village for being an exception 
to this rule!). 
- Physical abilities. We saw that Maria's husband, due to his health problems, 
could only carry out a limited number of tasks, and even Maria herself found 
that some work was becoming too strenuous for her. 
- Knowledge and ability to carry out the tasks successfully. Xabier's parents, 
like so many aged farmers in the region, did not know how to work with most 
of the agricultural machines, and now that Lorea did not live on the farm any 
longer, the work in the fields often had to wait until Xabier was back from the 
factory. On a neighbouring farm, the son normally worked on his tractor, 
while his father still used to cut grass with a scythe and transport it on a cart 
pulled by a mule. 
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Figure 14. Gender related task allocation 
- Personal preferences. One's dislike towards a certain task may, for instance, 
be translated into what we could call 'strategic ignorance': Lorea and Edurne 
refused to learn how to milk the cows so as to avoid having to do this work. 
On the other hand, Lorea could work with the mechanical field chopper for 
several hours, and in the burning sun (a much heavier job than milking the 
cows for half an hour!), and nevertheless say she enjoyed this work. She 
derived a certain status from her work with machines and it also enabled her 
to escape outside control for some time. 
- Drudgery versus leisure. It was accepted that Lorea, after having done very 
strenuous work the day before, had the 'right' to lie in the sun for a couple of 
hours. And when Lorea and her younger brother still lived on the farm, they 
frequently went out at the weekend and used to go on a short holiday in 
summer. Conversely, it seemed to be an accepted fact that the farm owners 
and the succeeding couple were more tied to the holding; Maria and her 
husband and Xabier and his family had only recently begun to take a few days 
off. 
- Authority and task autonomy (the power to influence other people's or one's 
own task performance). Maria and Xabier decided themselves which tasks had 
to be carried out and in what order; for them, design, execution and control of 
their work were concentrated in one hand (de Rooij, 1992). Whereas Lorea's 
work could best be characterized as "a complex of unrelated and disembodied 
tasks dispersed over the entire production process" (de Rooij, 1994: 73); 
often, others decided what tasks she had to do. The difference between 
having one's own 'labour domain' and doing 'work of the second order' (ibid.) 
determines to a large extent one's job satisfaction. 
- Expected remuneration. For most people, this remuneration is not only 
measured in terms of money; other factors such as recognition for the tasks 
they carried out, the personal satisfaction of having done a certain job 
particularly well, or being able to take relevant decisions related to one's task 
performance are equally important. 
135 
One thing this discussion shows is that at the level of individual household 
members it is far too simple to depict Chayanov's subjective evaluation of 
labour drudgery and remuneration in terms of physical exertion versus money 
and goods. These family members do make such subjective evaluations, 
though not only confronting two, but a whole gamut of dimensions. For 
individual actors, drudgery and remuneration are social constructions (defined 
in relation to 'relevant others', such as rural peers or urban reference groups); 
they are made up of a variety of elements and mean different things to 
different people. If we accept that household members make similar 
evaluations as to their personal projects as the undifferentiated farm 
household does according to Chayanov's model, the individual actor's 
evaluation of drudgery and remuneration could graphically be represented as 
in Figure 15, that is as clusters of curves (in theory, one for each constituent 
element) intersecting with each other, whereby the equilibrium is not just one 
point but a rather diffuse area of intersections. 
remuneration drudgery 
Figure 15. The actor's equilibrium of subjective evaluations. 
The mobilization of the internal network by the senior farmer or the successor, 
and thus the social organization of labour on the farm, comes about through 
negotiations among family members over the personal projects individual 
members aim to realize, projects that are outlined on the basis of the 'area of 
equilibrium' of each member's subjective evaluations. This area can be seen 
as a metaphor for the actor's room for negotiation versus others. And it is the 
outcome of these negotiations which eventually determines to what extent 
family members are prepared to carry out farm household strategies. 
If we accept that the eventual pattern of family labour organization comes 
about on the basis of negotiations among these family members over their 
personal projects and preferences, it should be noted that these negotiations 
are seldom explicit. Over the years, family members have learned to 'read the 
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arguments of others between the lines'; preferences have become taken for 
granted and struggles over work to be carried out ritualized. For this reason, 
the organization of family labour, which is in principle short-time and liable to 
be changed as a result of new negotiations, is often surprisingly stable (so 
much so that we may indeed speak of 'patterns'). 
I have argued before that social skills are important for farm heads (senior 
farmers or their successors) who need to enrol other household members into 
their projects in order to turn their farming strategies into a success. The 
farmer's authority alone is not sufficient to guarantee the mobilization of 
enough labour power within a society where there are several labour and thus 
income alternatives available for family members. For girls even marriage may 
be a possibility to break away from their father's or brother's authority, as the 
Antolar case shows. The farm heads' own labour input radiates a strong moral 
influence on their next of kin. On Antolar, Xabier and Maria worked so hard 
that it was felt they had the right to expect similar efforts of the rest of the 
family. It meant, for instance, that Xabier could tacitly count on his relatives 
to exert themselves a little more when he had to work somewhere else with 
his machines. In other words, contract-work, like all other interlocking projects 
that demand the withdrawal of labour from other farm tasks, is only possible 
thanks to the organization of family labour. 
It should be recognized, of course, that the example of the Antolar farm 
can not easily be generalized to other part-time holdings. The case suggests 
that raising production to a considerably higher level, comparable to that of 
modern enterprises, was only possible if two important conditions were 
fulfilled. One, there had to be enough family members on the farm who were 
able and willing to work harder when their brother or father was working in 
the factory. And two, one of them should be able to handle the most 
important machines, or the part-time farmer's working hours should allow him 
enough time to work with the machinery himself. Big investments, for 
instance in a hay or silage baler, were only profitable if the farmer could carry 
out contract-work with the machines on fields of other holdings. And that 
was only feasible for a part-time farmer who worked in shifts, as this allowed 
him to dedicate roughly two-thirds of a full-timer's working day to farm work. 
A part-timer who had a regular eight-to-six job would barely have enough time 
to work on his own farm. Important was also that shift-work was relatively 
well-paid, better than an ordinary job, which made it easier for the farmer in 
question to bear the expenses of such investments. One or two contract-
workers sufficed to meet the demands of farmers in a village, so that a 
specialization in contract-work would only be a viable strategy for a few of 
them. 
8.6 The rationale of part-time farming 
In most cases the expected difficulty to earn a living exclusively with farming 
makes a farmer decide to find an off-farm job, but many a time this decision is 
also taken in spite of favourable economic perspectives. One of my 
respondents explained: "My parents' farm is a full-time enterprise with 
excellent profitability. The income you can get out of a farm like my parents' 
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you could never earn in industry, no matter what titles you have. The problem 
is that you're too tied down by your work. That's why my younger brother, 
who's going to take over the farm, will find a job outside and just keep a few 
beef cows." 
As to the reasons for part-time farming, I would argue that there has been 
a shift from economic motives in former decades (1960 to 1980) to 
predominantly social motives in more recent years. In the past, farmers with 
an income from agriculture that was too low to guarantee the reproduction of 
the farm used to take up a job in industry in order to increase their total 
income level. Occasionally, the income from farming remained higher than 
factory wages, which were seen as supplementing farm revenues, but more 
often the main part of the family's income was earned in industry. A farmer's 
principal motive for trying to find off-farm work was money. As one of these 
farmers said: "I saw that more and more friends who worked a few hours in 
industry earned a lot more than I did - so then I decided to find a job, too." 
The evaluations of young farmers nowadays can best be illustrated 
through the following dialogue I recorded between Edurne and Xabier of the 
Antolar farm: 
Xabier: "People here will probably continue working on the farm. But the 
worst thing as to farming, in my view, is that you have to work on 
Saturdays and Sundays. 
Edurne: "And the money. (..) You alone earn 200.000 pesetas a month in 
the factory. In order to get the same income out of farming, we have 
to work the six of us. And that's how it is on all farms. (..) One of 
the sons on the M... farm doesn't have more than 80.000 pesetas a 
month in the factory where he works, but if he stayed on the farm, 
his father would never be able to pay him that much." 
Xabier: "If you work hard on the farm, you can earn quite a lot of money. 
But it's too tied. (..) Young people nowadays go out on Friday 
evening and come home late at night; on Saturday morning they 
wake up late or they have a siesta after lunch - and in the evening 
they go out again. They come home on Sunday morning at 6.00 or 
7.00, when their father has already begun to milk the cows. That's 
no way to run a farm! (..) On work days, everybody works without 
protesting, but on Saturdays and Sundays... At five o'clock your 
friends go out and you want to go with them." 
Edurne: "And if you don't go out with your friends, you'll just become 
another bachelor, like so many farmers' sons. (..) Look at my 
brother. Maybe his girl-friend doesn't want to go and live on the 
farm. (Edurne's brother was about to take over his parents' farm; 
HvdB.) 
Xabier: "He's got a lot of cows and he doesn't have any debts." 
Edurne: "No debts, but he can't buy a new tractor either, even though he 
needs one." 
Xabier: "He can't? But he could buy a new car, couldn't he? As a farmer, 
you buy a tractor before you buy a car, I'd say. But he bought a new 
car so he could go to town with his girl-friend once a week." 
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Edurne: "He's 24. What should he have done? Buy a new tractor and not go 
out with his girl-friend?" 
[Antolar, X/89] 
Let us follow the line of reasoning of the son who succeeded to a small or 
medium-sized {and even on many a large-scale) holding in recent years. He 
knew that if he stayed on the farm, his father would never be able to pay him 
as much as what he would earn having a factory job. He might accept this 
situation knowing that one day the holding would be his. His attitude towards 
work and free time had to be in accordance with was generally expected of a 
future farm owner and he would no doubt be subject to his parents' criticism 
if his behaviour was considered inappropriate or irresponsible. But at the same 
time he realized that if he did not go out every once in a while, it would be 
difficult to meet a girl who might be willing to become his wife; there was a 
real danger he would remain a bachelor. 
If he had a girl-friend, and especially if she had an urban background, she 
would probably find it hard to accept that he sometimes had to give priority to 
working on the farm over going out with her. More than once he might be 
tempted to sacrifice farm interests rather than put his relationship at stake. 
Being in charge of the holding, he would only be able to get a good income 
out of farming with a large herd and working almost day and night, preferably 
with the help of other people, like his parents and his wife. But it was a well-
known fact that more and more women had their own job and that very few 
were willing to give up their career in order to help their husbands on the 
farm. The prospect that years of hard work and little free time, earning an 
income that perhaps at best equaled industrial wages, might put pressure on 
his marriage was not very promising either. 
No wonder, that on succession many farmers' sons continued a full-time 
holding as a part-time enterprise. This was true in almost all cases where prior 
to succession they already had a job in industry.421 The major part of the 
household's income was earned in the factory, whereas the farm sometimes 
yielded a smaller income (this is what Gasson, 1986, calles 'spare time 
farming'). Very often, however, there was no substantial income from farming 
at all; in those cases, the farm's contribution to the household economy lay 
mainly in the family's savings on food (this is termed 'hobby farming'; ibid.). 
Hence, in the 1960s and 70s the majority of farmers who chose to 
combine their farm holdings with a job in industry did so in order to satisfy 
income needs. This motive may still have played a role for farmers in more 
recent years, but social motives have become much more dominant. Mainly as 
a result of the growing contacts between town and countryside and the ever 
greater influence of the mass media, leisure has become a highly appreciated 
good among farmers and their wives. The emulation of the urban consumption 
That is also in line with Gasson's observation (for England and Wales) that "the switch from 
full to part time farming may occur at the point of succession, when full time farmers hand 
over to sons who do not relinquish their off farm employment" (Gasson, 1986: 373). 
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pattern also implies, for example, going out now and then and having a few 
weeks off in summer. This is hardly compatible with running a full-time dairy 
farm. 
As a matter of fact, a greater preference for more free time and fewer 
hardships can not only be detected among part-time farmers. On many farm 
enterprises, both full-time and part-time, I observed that the owners were 
quite willing to pay for the services of a contract-worker so as to avoid having 
to do the heavy work themselves. In Zelaizabal, of the more than twenty 
farms where Xabier regularly carried out contract-work two-thirds were full-
time holdings. In general terms, we may conclude that, due to the penetration 
of urban values in the countryside, the need for farmers (and not only for 
those of the youngest generation) to satisfy their preference for leisure has 
increased considerably. 
8.7 Part-time farming: a long-term solution? 
The literature shows that in several countries part-time farmers form a group 
with a high rate of turnover: that is, full-time farmers become part-timers, 
other part-time farmers give up and leave the sector, and people with an 
urban background buy a holding and combine their job in industry with some 
agricultural production (Gasson, 1986: 370-372). In Gipuzkoa the incidence of 
city dwellers entering the rural sector, not just as weekend or holiday visitors, 
but settling permanently on a farm while maintaining their work in town, was 
still insignificant. Nevertheless, regional policymakers had probably better 
anticipate an increase of this phenomenon in future years. 
In the 1980s, Etxezarreta claimed that there were hardly any indications 
of the existence of second generation part-time farming in the Basque Country 
(Etxezarreta, 1984). There was also evidence in both the Federal Republic of 
Germany and in England and Wales that "part time farmers are less likely than 
full timers to have successors" (Gasson, 1986: 369). The situation in the 
Basque Country, however, seems to have changed. I would argue that there 
seems to be enough evidence to hypothesize a tendency from full-time to 
part-time (i.e. spare-time) farming, and from the latter to hobby farming. 
My own findings with respect to succession on full-time and part-time 
farms are based on more or less extensive information (gathered in 1989) 
about 38 holdings in Zelaizabal (see Table 12). Of the 12 part-time farms, 4 
were run by aged, childless couples or old bachelors; 3 holdings were 
expected to be taken over as spare-time or hobby farms; and on 5 farms the 
children were too young to be able to say anything about succession yet. As 
to the 26 full-time farms, 7 would have no successors in the first line; 6 
would probably be continued as hobby farms and 8 as spare-time (or hobby) 
farms; 5 were supposed to be taken over as full-time enterprises, although in 
some cases the possibility of part-time succession was held open. (In 1996, it 
turned out that only 3 farms in the village would be continued as full-time 
enterprises.) 
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Table 12. Generational tendency in dedication to farming. 
expected dedication for the following generation 
in 1989 full-time spare-time hobby no 
succession 
unknown 
full-time 5 (3) 8 (10) 6 7 -
part-time - 3 4 5 
The information about part-time holdings is probably too scarce to draw any 
conclusions, but the data on full-time enterprises suggest a tendency towards 
part-time or hobby farms in the following generation. However, this is not to 
say that we are witnessing a stage-wise evolution towards the final 
proletarianization of these farmers. As yet, there are no indications that, for 
example, hobby farming brings a household closer to the eventual 
abandonment of the holding. Some plots may be leased to other farmers but 
hardly ever is all the land sold. It can not be entirely excluded that in times of 
economic recession and rising unemployment figures these part-time holdings 
are again developed into full-time enterprises. 
Nowadays, full-time or part-time farmers who give up most of their 
agricultural activities seldom abandon the farmstead; together with the 
adoption of a more urban leisure pattern, they have learned to appreciate their 
living in the countryside (see Chapter 3). Thus, for the coming years we can 
expect a reduction of the percentage of full-time farmers, whereas the group 
of part-time and hobby farmers will grow, probably not only as a percentage 
of the total farming population, but also in absolute numbers. 
Zurek goes so far as to state that in developed societies, "part time 
farming will be the only long-term solution to keep (disadvantaged rural areas) 
functionally and structurally intact to the benefit of its inhabitants and of the 
whole society" (Zurek, 1986: 383). Mendras makes the observation that in 
France, in the 1960s, part-time farming was generally believed to be the 
preliminary step towards the farmer's final abandonment of the agricultural 
sector - but twenty years later already more than fifty percent of the farm 
holdings turned out to be run by part-timers. (See for a similar development in 
Sweden: Persson, 1983.) If this is so, Mendras says, "should we not revise 
our knowledge and design a policy on pluriactivity, instead of still treating it 
as an exception to the norm?" (Mendras, 1987: 334; my translation). In view 
of what I have said before about the expected changing composition of the 
farming population in Gipuzkoa, I think the same question may be asked as 
regards the agricultural policy in the Basque Country. 
The incidence of part-time farming need not be as negative for the evolution 
of full-time enterprises as is often assumed. After all, part-time farmers are 
often more willing to lease (though not to sell) some plots of land to 
expanding farmers than the many aged full-timers. On the other hand, 
however, it is far from hypothetical that in the long run the growing number 
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of part-time farmers will lead to an excessive popularity of those production 
lines that demand relatively little labour input (Gjelten, 1984; see Section 8.3), 
for example different breeds of beef cattle. It might be worth investigating 
how the consequent production increase would affect farmers who specialize 
in those products. 
8.8 Conclusions 
The definition of the part-time holding as used in this study is that of a farm 
enterprise where either the senior farmer (occasionally his wife) or his 
successor has a paid job outside the farm; in the case of the successor it is 
further assumed that the greater part of his off-farm income is invested in the 
holding, and that his labour input is of considerable influence on how the farm 
is run. In this I have adopted the, in my eyes, most correct definition of the 
phenomenon from the literature, and tailored it to the Basque situation in such 
a way that it also dovetailed with the 'folk-understanding' of part-time 
farming. 
I have then argued that there is a fundamental fallacy in the implicit 
comparison of the part-time farmer with the modern full-timer on which much 
of the criticism against the former is based: that he does not make efficient 
use of his means of production and is little innovation-minded. The category 
of part-time holdings is highly differentiated: among them there are many 
small-scale, marginal farms, but also some quite modern enterprises. In the 
case of the Antolar farm, we saw how much labour and capital Xabier put 
into the farming enterprise, albeit perhaps not so much into dairy cows, but 
mainly into machinery and contract-work. Such a pattern of allocation of 
resources was only possible for a minority of part-timers. What it amounts to, 
though, is that he as well as most other part-time farmers have been able to 
create a farming enterprise which is maintained and reproduced in 
combination with off-farm earnings. And, as they say themselves, they have 
had to do this normally without being able to qualify for most of the financial 
support that full-time farmers are entitled to. Already twenty years ago 
Greenwood pleaded for cautiousness as to the interpretation of part-time 
farming. At a time when most observers in the Basque Country stressed its 
negative consequences for the structure of regional agriculture, he wrote 
about the phenomenon of farmers having an outside job that: "Rather than 
being a necessary sign of agricultural collapse, it may indicate a strong 
commitment to agriculture on marginal farms" (Greenwood, 1976: 206). 
Although some of the criticism concerning part-time farmers may be correct, 
in general it does not apply more to them than to most average full-timers. 
The reason why many farmers, or their successors, are no longer willing 
to continue their holding on a full-time basis has changed over the years. 
Formerly, their decisions were mainly based on economic considerations: they 
saw that they could earn more in the factory than on the farm, and by 
working less. Nowadays, social motives are dominant. From the moment they 
leave school to the time that they actually have to decide in what form they 
will continue the parental holding, farmers' sons have a long time to compare 
their own situation with that of their peers in the urban sector; and many of 
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them realize how difficult it will be to emulate the latters' consumption level 
and especially their leisure pattern when working exclusively on the farm (the 
more so if it concerns a dairy farm). 
Apart from the treadmill of investment and expansion I referred to in the 
earlier chapters, I would argue there is another treadmill, one of relative 
deprivation - whereby this deprivation concerns both material and immaterial 
consumer goods. This social treadmill even affects those who managed to 
withdraw from the techno-economic treadmill and is therefore, I believe, much 
more coercive than the latter. 
If on a part-time farm only the husband has an off-farm job, his wife will 
normally have a greater responsibility for the holding, which grows with the 
productiveness of the enterprise: having a semi-independent labour domain, 
her decision power as to how the farm should be run is likely to be stronger 
than that of the wife of, for instance, a full-time dairy farmer. However, this 
will seldom be a strong enough motive for the future spouse of a young 
successor to opt for a career in farming. 
Potential spouses of farmers, including those with a rural background, 
generally make higher demands on the family's lifestyle than in the past. 
Many of them have their own jobs and are not easily inclined to give them up 
upon marriage. A successor who does not want to remain a bachelor knows 
he had better respect these wishes. (Possible consequences of this 
development will be discussed in Chapter 9.) 
The preliminary conclusion should be that, seen in the light of farmers' 
personal evaluations, running a part-time enterprise often guarantees the farm 
household the most flexible labour system. During the active period of 
household members they enjoy the advantages of both their participation in 
the industrial sector (wages, social securities, building up an old-age pension) 
and farm life (savings on food, knowing what you eat, a relatively cheap 
dwelling, living in healthy surroundings). 
In this chapter, I have furthermore dwelt upon some points concerning the 
labour organization of the family household, which do not exclusively apply to 
part-time farm enterprises. In the first place, we have seen that children who 
have married and now live elsewhere generally still help on their parents' farm 
at times when the extra labour is needed, particularly during the hay-making 
season. (We saw this on the Antolar farm, but also earlier on Landa-berri and 
Eguzkitza, see Chapter 6.) The distinction we have made before between the 
senior and succeeding couple, on the one hand, and the other siblings living 
on the farm, on the other, should be extended to those siblings living 
elsewhere. These three categories can be distinguished according to their 
decision power concerning farming strategies and the labour and capital input 
into the farm enterprise that is expected from them. 
Secondly, I have hinted at the relation between the organization of labour 
on the family farm and the maintenance of external social networks. The 
articulation of the personal projects of household members, on which the 
social organization of family labour is based, is influenced by factors like the 
rural norms on the gender-based division of labour and on intra-family power 
relations, the individual qualities of household members (their knowledge and 
physical capacities), their personal preferences and motivations: this 
articulation comes about in the interface between rural and urban cultural 
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values. The farmer's management qualities as to the mobilization of family 
labour can be inferred from his capacity to steer the articulation in such a way 
that all household members experience, to a greater or lesser degree, a 
positive balance of remuneration and drudgery in relation to their own, 
personal projects. That is how he manages to enrol the other members of his 
family into the overall farming strategy. Only if the labour of family members 
can be effectively mobilized when needed, is it possible to establish and 
maintain external social networks. On the other hand, it may partly be 
because of these networks that the farm enterprise is able to function 
successfully - and that is what the farm head may need to continue to 
mobilize enough family labour power. 
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P A R T I I I 
O baserritxo artuko dezu, biotz barrenetikan mirt, 
eskerrak mirik ez dezu eta, ezin dezu gaur itzegin. 
Zenbat famili azi dezuen, Jainkuak bakarrik jakin, 
orain bakarrik uzten zaituzte, ondotik danak aldegin. 
(0 farmstead, you'll feel pain in your heart, 
fortunately you don't have a tongue and today you can't speak. 
Only God knows how many families you have raised, 
and now they leave you alone, they are all leaving you behind.) 
The late bertso/ari Jos6 Miguel Iztueta 'Lazkao Txiki' 
(cited in £/ Diario Vasco, 6 February 1993) 
Chapter 9 
LEISURE, MARRIAGE AND THE COMMON PROJECT 
In Part II, I discussed the farming strategies of different types of farm 
households in relation to the corresponding mobilization of external social 
networks and the organization of family labour on those farms. In this chapter 
I shall deal more particularly with strategies that successors devise to ensure 
that conditions for succession coincide with their own personal projects as to 
the future of the holdings (or, put differently, to make sure that their image of 
the future of the farm overlaps the image of the future of Self). These 
conditions for succession mainly concern (1) the possibility of mobilizing 
enough resources (particularly labour) to enable the successor to have the 
lifestyle he aspires to, and (2) finding a spouse who does not object to living 
on the holding. 
9.1 Money, labour and lifestyle 
In former years, when male primogeniture was the dominant form of 
succession on Basque farms, the successor did not bother to ask himself 
whether or not his images of the future of Self and the farm coincided: as the 
oldest son his position as sole heir to the holding was seldom challenged. He 
had been prepared for his tasks for years, and his being the future owner (or 
tenant) of a farm with landed property assured him a considerable status 
within the rural community. The aspiration to reach the status of farm owner 
often motivated younger sons, who knew they had no chance of inheriting 
their parents' holding, to get a job as a farm-hand (morroi in Basque) on a 
farm with only daughters, where they would then work for many years in the 
hope to marry one of these daughters and eventually take over the parents-in-
law's farming enterprise. 
But this all changed quite drastically. When the industrialization of the 
Basque Country asked for more and more workers from the countryside, 
farming became identified with rusticity and ignorance; the farming population 
felt looked down upon by townspeople. In recent years, the picture may have 
become more balanced: urban residents began to see the advantages of a 
healthier way of life and living in a natural environment, while the nationalists 
among them recognized the important role the farming population had played 
in maintaining the Basque language and cultural heritage to our days. But on 
the whole, the air of superiority with which the rural population was 
sometimes treated by especially people from the provincial capitals showed 
that among many townsmen and women the image of the farmers as 
uncivilized and backward people still prevailed. Several times I observed that 
farmwomen who went shopping in town thought it very important to be 
extremely well-dressed, well-coiffured and made up, so that they would not 
be identified as 'countryfolk'. 
But also the way townspeople were perceived by the rural population 
changed over time. Formerly, the term kaletarrak, or 'streetfolk', which 
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farmers attributed to all those who did not live on the farmstead, "had 
pejorative overtones of poverty and rootlessness" (Douglass, 1976: 47). But 
since the industrialization boom, the urban workers with their relatively high 
incomes for which they had to work much less than the average farmer 
became a more positive point of reference for young and old farm residents. 
More and more farmers started to combine their agricultural labour with a job 
in industry. In more recent years, it was no longer just the urban people's 
income level (or 'living-standard', in a more restricted sense) which appealed 
to farm residents, but also their leisure pattern and general lifestyle. The 
implications of this were particularly important for the sons (or occasionally 
daughters) who would succeed to their parents' holdings. Many a farmers' 
son, knowing his future life as the owner of an agricultural enterprise would 
be rather different from that of urban youth, definitely did not want it to be 
worse. 
I argued in Chapter 6 that a dual succession pattern had arisen: 
expanding, modernizing farm enterprises were inherited by the most capable 
and motivated sons, whereas succession to those holdings that were believed 
to become marginalized in the near future depended on the last son 
(sometimes daughter) to marry. I also mentioned that there was no clear 
causal relationship between the structure of the farm and the form of 
succession. Succession was rather a 'dialectical' process. If the parents 
realized that none of their children was sufficiently motivated to continue the 
holding as a productive business, they would gradually phase down the 
enterprise, so that marginalization became inevitable. Conversely, if one of 
their sons had expressed his desire to continue the farm on a full-time basis, 
they were likely to do their best to invest in new machinery and infrastructural 
improvements. All the same, miscalculations could not always be avoided, as 
the example of the Iriondo farm showed (see Section 7.3). 
If a successor had no intention to continue his parents' farm as a 
productive enterprise, but only occupied the farmstead as a dwelling-place 
while having a full-time job in the industrial sector, he was unlikely to 
experience many impediments to emulate the lifestyle of his urban colleagues. 
He had a relatively high and fixed wage, legally established holidays, and 
normally not such an extensive livestock that it would tie him to the holding 
day in and day out. For successors who intended to continue the farm as a 
fully productive business it would be far more complicated to model their 
consumption and leisure pattern on that of their urban reference group. They 
would have to mobilize enough labour power and attune this effectively to the 
work to be done if they wanted to go on holiday or have a free Sunday every 
once in a while. In order to maintain their income on an acceptable level they 
should at the same time keep up with the treadmill of expansion and 
mechanization (or concentrate on labour intensive quality production, but this 
made it even more difficult to imitate urban leisure patterns). 
One way to get round the problem of labour shortage after succession is 
to continue the parental holding among two or more successors. (The reader 
may remember that this was the suggestion of Inigo of the Iriondo farm, put 
into practice by the two brothers, Inaki and Antxon, of the farm Garibai; see 
Section 7.4.) The alternative would be to join two or more holdings and run 
them as one. There were some experiences of joint farming enterprises. 
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among relatives or close friends, or small-scale cooperative undertakings, 
which were quite successful. Yet, the general opinion in the field was that 
mutual distrust among farmers made this scenerio extremely difficult to 
realize. (Remember, for example, what Pilar of the Beko-etxe farm said about 
this; see Section 6.1.) This distrust was not totally unfounded: there were 
perhaps not many, but some very notorious examples of joint enterprises that 
had failed as a result of misbehaviour of one of the partners. I was repeatedly 
told the story of four farmers (who had no kin relationship) who for some time 
had privately pasteurized their aggregate milk production; the milk was 
hawked on the streets. A successful enterprise until it was discovered that 
one of them, before distributing the milk, and without the others knowing 
about it, used to water the milk down. The group fell apart and the three 
aggrieved farmers, having lost the confidence of their clients, began to deliver 
their milk to the factory. Stories like this one tended to get a life of their own: 
their symbolic meaning (of warning, of reaffirmation of values like 
individualism and relying only on oneself) thus exceeded their mere discursive 
content. 
Hence, the general pattern was for successors to continue their parents' 
farm on an individual basis. In former chapters I have hinted at the tendency 
of farming households to substitute money for labour as a way to get round 
the problem of mobilizing the necessary labour power at the right time. It 
became more and more common for farmers to contract someone with heavy 
machines, like hay or silage balers, for a few hours instead of doing the more 
strenuous tasks themselves. This even held good for the older farmers who 
had done the most tiresome work by hand all their lives. On the other hand, 
farmers in possession of extensive machinery adequately responded to this 
growing demand; they would prefer the money they could earn with this, 
even if it meant that work to be done on their own land had to wait. The 
preference for money of these, predominantly young, farmers could bring 
them into conflict with their fathers, who would stick to the cultural value 
that 'farm work should be done at the right time' and who might fear being 
criticized by people from their own group of reference: the other old farmers 
in the village. 
A farmer who fell ill or wanted to go on holiday for a week or two could 
contract a specialized farm-worker from Lurgintza or EHNE (see Chapter 4) to 
look after his holding. Although this service was not yet extensively used, it 
was gradually becoming more popular. 
Contracting a farmer with his machines for a few days or a specialized 
worker for two weeks would solve the problem of labour shortage during 
incidental labour peaks or allow a farm family to go on holiday, but the 
general problem of being able to do the usual tasks from day to day, including 
most weekends, remained. In Chapter 5 (see Section 5.8), it was argued that 
the phenomenon of late marriage among Basque farmers in combination with 
the increase of the size of viable farm units tended to aggravate this problem 
for many farmers, and perhaps especially for those running the biggest and 
most modernized farm enterprises. That was the reason why members of 
farming households used to emphasize how important it was that parents and 
other siblings living on the farmstead continued to assist the successors for as 
long as possible, and that brothers and sisters who lived elsewhere regularly 
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came round to lend a hand. 
But having a farm with enough land, cows, machinery and labour power 
did not suffice. The successor himself also needed the required qualities, such 
as knowledge and physical and social capabilities, to run the holding 
successfully. And even if these conditions were met and the perspectives for 
a successful economic undertaking were good (as in the case of the Eguzkitza 
farm, for instance; see Section 6.2), the successor might nonetheless prefer 
to continue the holding as a spare-time activity. It was in this context that I 
spoke of the crucial importance of the successor's motivation (which in 
agriculture is normally understood in terms of 'vocation for farming'). 
A successor's motivation is partly based on his assessment of the 
probability of economic success (in the light of the production factors present, 
his personal qualities and the market possibilities), but should above all be 
traced back to his job preference - i.e. does he expect farming to contribute to 
his 'self-realization'? Besides, it should not be forgotten that someone's 
motivation is often ideologically or organizationally boosted - a potential 
successor may, for example, draw on the farmer ideology of one of the 
farmers' unions (their views on farming as a 'useful' activity for society) or 
feel supported by a professional association like Baserriko Esnea. Motivation, 
however, should not be taken as a residual explanans, which would happen if 
we simply followed the reasoning that if the holding is not continued as a full-
time enterprise in spite of its good perspectives, it must be because of lack of 
motivation of the successor. The reverse is equally valid: if a successor is 
highly motivated to continue his parents' farm business, he will do anything to 
mobilize enough resources to make his enterprise a success. And, of course, a 
successor may fail despite his motivation or, conversely, be rather successful 
(through favourable circumstances, help of others or simply luck) without 
being excessively motivated. As I pointed out before (cf. Section 6.5), a 
person's motivation to continue a holding as a productive unit may often be 
deduced from the privations he had put up with in order to reach this goal. 
A crucial factor in relation to the successor's decision as to the terms on 
which the farm will be taken over is the quality of the relationship with his 
father. This relationship is usually characterized by the authority of the senior 
farmer over his son, which not only affected the latter's conduct of business 
but sometimes also his personal way of life. As Gasson observes: "The 
spectacle of elderly farmers holding firmly to the reins and refusing to retire in 
favour of their sons is a familiar one to agricultural economists and rural 
sociologists" (Gasson, 1980: 176), and the situation in the Basque Country 
can hardly be called an exception. Even though management control over the 
farm was normally tranferred to the successor upon the retirement of the 
senior couple, this seldom refrained the parents from interfering with how the 
farm was run. Thus, the hierarchical relationship between the parents and 
their succeeding son was a potential source of friction, and even more so if 
the son was married. The son himself would perhaps not be unwilling to 
overlook this, but for his wife it might be more difficult to accept. A successor 
with the intention to continue the holding on a full-time basis might reconsider 
his decision if this reduced his chances of finding a spouse willing to move 
into the farm. 
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9.2 "A yeoman must wive..."' 
Having a successor is not enough to safeguard the transgenerational 
continuity of the farm, he should also marry and eventually have a successor 
himself. This had been the bottleneck in the past, and that was the reason 
why so many farms that had been taken over by bachelors were abandoned in 
the end. 
Successors knew all too well how difficult it still was to find a suitable 
wife. In former years, migration of women from the rural villages to the urban 
sector had been even greater than the male exodus. These women knew the 
situation in agriculture from experience and did not want to become like their 
mothers: that is subject to their husbands in the field of production, and in the 
domestic sphere to their mothers-in-law (cf. Mendras, 1987:329; also 
Etxezarreta, 1977: 168, 169). Strangely enough, several of the farm heirs I 
interviewed had married a woman with an urban background. The explanation 
may be that such a woman, who often had her own job, was in a better 
position vis-a-vis her husband and parents-in-law to negotiate the conditions 
under which she would be prepared to live on the farm. Having a job and thus 
an income, and being deprived of any agricultural experience, it was probably 
more easily accepted that she neither could nor wanted to help on the land or 
in the cowshed. Conversely, a woman who had grown up in the countryside 
and married a farmer's son might find it much more difficult to get out of 
doing any farm-work. At the most, she might be able to wrest some minor 
concessions, like not having to do any milking (see Section 8.4; also Bennett, 
1982, and Mak, 1996). 
Gasson suggests several reasons why farmers' spouses or daughters 
might prefer to do off-farm work rather than to help on the holding (Gasson, 
1984: 217-220); these reasons may be of financial, social or personal origin. 
Some women feel that their need for a certain degree of financial 
independence cannot be fulfilled through working on the farm. Others prefer 
the social contacts that work off the holding will provide them. Or they hope 
that a paid job will give them the status and recognition they miss as workers 
on a farming enterprise. Finally, such employment may mean personal 
fulfilment for these women. 
Now, if this is true for farm women, the same motives are likely to 
function even more so as impediments for an urban-employed woman, about 
to marry a farmer's son, to give up her job in order to take up farm-work. The 
successor on a family farm has to take into account both his parents' wishes 
with respect to the future of the holding and his spouse's preferences as to 
her own position on the farm enterprise and in the farm-house. It demands a 
great deal of his creativity to do as much justice as possible to the objectives 
of the different participants in this drama - and he will not always succeed. 
In Gasson at al„ 1988, citing "Tusser's axiom that 'To thrive a yeoman must wive'"(ibid.: 
25). 
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Iturmendi revisited 
We saw in Section 6.4 that next to his parents' farmstead Aitor had had a 
new house built where he lived with his wife. She had an urban background 
and worked as a nurse in an old people's home in town. Aitor confessed that 
he would never have been able to conduct his farm business without this 
extra income. 
He had never considered living with his parents after marriage: first, 
because he thought that children once they reached a certain age should start 
living on their own, since the age difference might give rise to problems 
between the generations, and second, because "in my case, these problems 
would have been even greater, as my wife is from urban origin," he said. "My 
parents live nextdoor, which is an advantage for me, but we live here and 
they live over there." 
Aitor had switched from dairy hawking to selling his milk to the factory, 
and he would now have to build a big, new cowshed and expand his 
livestock. But he feared the financial consequences and claimed that he might 
have made a mistake when he had built their house: "You can't build a house 
before you set up a business." At the same time he recognized that he had 
had no choice. His wife would not have accepted to live in the same house as 
her parents-in-law. "If I had decided to build the cowshed first instead of the 
house, we would now be living in town and I would have to come to the farm 
every day to look after the cows." 
The original idea had been to split the farmstead in two: his parents would 
live downstairs, and he and his wife upstairs. It had been his mother who 
suggested to build a separate dwelling. A building contractor told them that 
for 25% more they could build a new house next to the farm. They were 
convinced. (In the end, the price turned out to be considerably higher than 
had been estimated.) 
The present situation had many advantages. Aitor and his wife had two 
children, 6 and 2 years old in 1996, and although most of the day they were 
at school and at the day nursery, "for them it is much healthier to grow up on 
the farm than in town," Aitor stated. "Besides, if we lived in town, I would be 
at home less often." 
Antonio's farm 
A similar story can be told about Antonio. His father had died in 1974, when 
Antonio was 26 years old. Antonio, being the oldest son, gave up his job in 
the factory and began to work on the farm. He did this for five years; for the 
following eight years he had another off-farm job, while he ran his farm on a 
part-time basis. Since 1986, he had been a full-time farmer again. When I 
interviewed him three years later, he had 12 beef cows, a bull and 7 calves, 
of which he would keep a few in order to expand his livestock. The animals 
used to graze on the pastures and mountain fields around the farm. 
All his five brothers and sisters had long married and left the village, and 
for several years Antonio and his mother lived alone on the farm. In 1987, he 
married a woman who owned a chemist's shop in town. He then bought part 
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of a big, renovated farmstead in the village nucleus, where the three of them 
went to live. During the day, Antonio's wife had to work in town, and Antonio 
himself and his mother worked on the farm. 
However, the two women did not get along with each other. After a few 
years and a lot of quarrels, Antonio and his wife decided to go and live in 
town, while his mother stayed behind alone. Later she fell ill and since then 
she lived alternately with each of her children. 
Antonio only came back to his farm in the evenings, to have a look at his 
cows and give them something to eat. He and his wife had two small children 
by then; they could have returned to their house in the village, but this may 
not have fitted in with their plans for the future. People in the village 
rumoured that Antonio and his wife were trying to buy a new chemist's shop 
in another town, where they would work together... 
9.3 Succession and subjective evaluations 
At the moment that the son who will in due course inherit the farming 
enterprise decides to get married, the personal projects of all parties involved 
(the successor himself, the future spouse, and his parents) are being 
articulated to each other. If succession is to be effectuated in a way that is 
acceptable for all participants, these different projects should be brought into 
line with one another as much as possible - which means that the readability 
of these projects should be negotiated. 
The prospective successor hopes to realize the take-over of the holding as 
smoothly as possible, so that he will still be able to count on his parents' and 
siblings' labour power in the future; and he naturally wants his fiancee to 
come and live on the farmstead with him after marriage. If his future wife has 
her own paid job, she probably will not be inclined to give this up and start 
doing farm-work. She may also demand a certain independence in the 
domenstic sphere in relation to her parents-in-law. In more and more cases, 
the eventual outcome of these negotiations between the senior farming 
couple and their successors seems to be a certain separation of domestic 
and/or labour domains along generational lines (see de Haan, 1994: 251, for a 
description of a similar development in a region in the Netherlands). 
An example of a separation of labour domains we saw on the Antolar 
farm (see Section 8.4), where Maria worked in the kitchen garden and the 
forage fields while her daughter-in-law Edurne did most of the household 
tasks; they did not normally interfere with each other's work. But the aged 
farmers and their children, including the succeeding couple, always ate 
together at the same kitchen table and lived in the same house. Such a 
situation is only viable if all people get on reasonably well with each other. 
This turned out to be the bottleneck on Antonio's farm. Antonio, his wife and 
his mother had moved into a house in the village nucleus so as to meet with 
the wish of Antonio's wife not to live on the farmstead. There was a physical 
separation of more than a kilometre between the labour domain on the one 
hand and the domestic domain on the other. Besides, Antonio's wife had her 
own job, so she and her mother-in-law did not see each other all day. But they 
still lived in the same house: in the evenings and at weekends they could not 
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avoid one another - and that is where it went wrong. 
On lturmendi, the domestic domains of the senior farmers and the 
succeeding couple were spatially separated. (Aitor had a very explicit opinion 
about this.) Whereas the senior couple lived in the old farmstead, the 
succeeding couple had their own house next to the farm; the two households 
were run independently from each other. Moreover, as Aitor's wife had her 
own job, no-one would demand from her that she entered the farm labour 
domain of her husband and parents-in-law. All parties seemed to realize that 
this was the most attainable solution. Aitor could at all times count on his 
parents, but they lived next-door and did not interfere with his personal life. 
His wife was happy with their beautiful house. And both of them thought it 
was better that their children grew up in a rural environment. The parents 
knew that if Aitor had not built this new house, he and his wife would 
probably have lived in town by now. 
The importance of this problem had also been understood by the women's 
association EBEL, a semi-independent department of the farmers' union EHNE. 
The association's spokeswoman told me that they had recently begun to 
discuss themes related to succession and the multi-generation household with 
farm women in different regions of Gipuzkoa: 
"Society should become aware of the problems of inheritance on the 
farms. We have to create the conditions under which women are 
prepared to live on the holding; that is something the union whole-
heartedly supports. (..) One of the main problems is that of two 
families living together, especially for the women. A certain physical 
separation is desirable so that a woman has her own space." 
[M. Agirrezabala, EBEL; VI/96] 
The way in which the family farm is passed on from one generation to the 
next (as a full-time or a part-time holding, with dairy cows or beef cattle, with 
what type of domestic separation and organization of labour, etc.) is based on 
the confrontation of subjective evaluations of the potential successor and all 
relevant others: his wife and parents, but also his siblings on and even off the 
farm. 
The successor's decision not to continue the holding as a full-time, 
productive business depends on what he considers to be the most limiting 
resource, whereby the term 'resource' should be understood in the widest 
possible sense here; that is, comprising not only the production factors land, 
labour and capital, but also one's knowledge, capabilities and motivation. 
Production factors can to some extent be substituted for each other. The 
problem of shortage of land, for example, may be met by making a more 
intensive use of it, applying fertilizers and better varieties of grass, by working 
the land more intensively, or by feeding the cows high quantities of 
concentrates. Lack of family labour power can sometimes be overcome 
through the mechanization of the most labour demanding tasks or by 
contracting outside labour.441 Substitution may be a solution especially if 
That is, in peak periods or for special reasons (such as holidays or illness). Family farms 
seldom hire outside labour on a more permanent basis. 
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shortage is temporary - only noticeable at definite times. 
But the problem of lack of personal qualities or motivation cannot be 
overcome that easily. Someone's refusal to take over the parents' farm 
business on a productive basis may also be motivated by his difficulty to find 
a suitable wife; a fiancee's 'unwillingness' to live on the farm may thwart 
plans for succession that are based on years of preparation, as we saw in the 
case of Julen's brother on the Eguzkitza farm (Section 6.2). 
Positive or negative decisions as to continuing the parental holding as a 
profitable, full-time enterprise are always subject to conditions and can 
therefore at any time be reconsidered. We saw this on the Eguzkitza farm (see 
above), but we may also recall what had happened on Iriondo (see Section 
7.3): Inigo took over his parents' dairy farm and invested in a more modern 
way of selling his fresh milk, but for reasons that remained rather obscure 
(lack of vocation for farming, the perspective of decreasing family labour 
power?) he gave up after a few years and began to work in a factory. Another 
example is Antonio's farm: the owner had bought a house in the village 
nucleus, so that his wife would not have to live on the farm, but due to the 
bad relationship between her and her mother-in-law, the couple left the village 
and the future of the farm became uncertain. 
Figure 16. The effect of off-farm female labour on the successor's labour 
drudgery. 
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Such a reconsideration of the future of the farm is not entirely impossible 
either in the case of farming enterprises like Aitor's, where the successor's 
wife has her own full-time, off-farm employment and does not assist on the 
holding. Once the senior couple is not able to work anymore and their 
successor only has his own labour power to count on, his room for 
manoeuvre may become severely restricted. In all probability, he will be forced 
to resort to further labour saving innovations. 
The situation in the latter case is illustrated by means of Figure 16. When 
the labour input of the senior couple becomes insignificant, the labour 
drudgery of the successor increases notably (and the corresponding curve 
moves up). The purchase of technology in order to reduce his labour input 
demands capital, so while the labour drudgery curve falls again, the demand 
satisfaction curve shifts upward (curve T): all in all, the resulting equilibrium Y 
is less favourable than in the starting position. Only if the successor's wife 
has an off-farm job and her income contributes to the household economy, 
the eventual demand satisfaction curve lies lower (in the area from O' to O"). 
The new equilibrium point lies somewhere between Z' and Z" - that is, it 
approaches X again or may even become more favourable. 
9.4 The common project jeopardized 
In the years of massive industrialization of the Basque coastal provinces, the 
bertsolari 'Lazkao Txiki' expressed in his improvised verses the sorrow of 
many people over the threatening depopulation of the countryside (see the 
paragraph with which Part III starts). In Chapter 3, however, we saw that 
there are indications that in Gipuzkoa the exodus from the rural villages to the 
urban centres has come to an end. Mendras describes a similar development 
for many villages in France: since 1975 a repopulation of rural areas seems to 
have taken place; at the same time, however, the number of farmers 
continues to decline. Consequently, "the farmers are no longer the majority in 
the countryside" (Mendras, 1987: 321; my translation). 
In the Basque Country, the result of the revaluation of village life has been 
that relatively few farmsteads have been abandoned in recent times. 
Conversely, there are many holdings where farmers had invested in the 
renovation of the buildings. If the senior farmers have children, their holding is 
normally taken over by one of them, sometimes in order to continue the farm 
business, but in most of the cases as a spare-time or hobby farm annex rural 
dwelling. In some villages houses had been built, and in others plans existed 
to do so, so that farmers' children who had to leave the parental holding could 
still continue to live in the countryside. 
But there is another side to the picture. There is a real danger that the 
development towards greater social viability of the rural villages has 
unintended, and undesirable, consequences. Also farms that are likely to be 
continued as part-time or full-time productive enterprises by one of the 
children are becoming more interesting for non-succeeding brothers and 
sisters, who either want to live there permanently or convert it into their 
second house. There have been cases of siblings instituting legal proceedings 
against the successor so as to obtain an equal right to the parental holding. 
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The underlying problem seems to be that many senior farmers tend to 
postpone the formalization of the succession too long. 
"Parents often do not want to transfer the holding into the hands of 
their successor as long as they are still able to look after themselves. 
But as it has become popular to have a second house and so... when 
the moment comes to speak about the inheritance, brothers and 
sisters who had gone to live elsewhere ask also for their part of the 
farm and the land. Several farm enterprises have been ruined that 
way." 
[M. Agirrezabala, EBEL; Vi/96] 
Paradoxically, the increasing popularity of countrylife might thus result in an 
accelerated reduction of the number of productive holdings - a tendency 
which would go against the expectation that a healthier social environment in 
the rural areas would keep the viable farmers on the land. 
So far, it had been common practice for non-succeeding siblings on most 
farms to accept that their parents' holding would be taken over by a single 
heir, who subsequently paid them their share (but hardly ever an equivalent 
part) of the farm's value. But what about those who wish to have a weekend 
house in the countryside or who want to live in the village permanently: if 
they have the choice between buying a house in the village nucleus or 
obtaining part of the parental farmstead, will they still agree with this single 
heir arrangement? 
Decisive is here the attitude of the parents. Are they able and willing to 
defend that the farm be taken over by a sole successor with the objective to 
be continued as an agricultural enterprise? The situation outlined above could 
be avoided if the terms of succession were formally laid down (preferably in a 
notarial act) at an early stage, for instance as soon as one of the children 
proves to be seriously interested in continuing the holding either on a full-time, 
productive basis or as a part-time enterprise. In the Netherlands the gradual 
transfer of the farm from one generation to the next is often established 
through a partnership (maatschap) between the senior farmer and his 
successor. 
"A partnership is an important shield against the risk of a successor 
losing his place. As a partner, he is assured of access to the whole 
farm, which protects him from the legal claims of siblings to 
appropriate land as part of an inheritance" (de Haan, 1994: 256). 
At present, such a construction anticipating the eventual transfer of property 
rights is hardly conceivable on most farm enterprises in Gipuzkoa, as Basque 
farmers are seldom willing to yield authority before retiring and handing over 
the 'reins' of the holding to one of their children. 
9.5 Conclusions 
So far, we have differentiated three levels within the (extended) farm family: 
the senior-successor axis, the siblings residing on the farm, and the siblings 
living outside. And we have seen how the senior farmers and their successors 
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not only mobilize resources through external social networks, but also attempt 
to enrol their own family members into what is understood to be the common 
family project of maintaining and continuing the farm enterprise. 
In this chapter I have dissected the relationship between the senior and 
successor couples. The successor finds himself in an intermediate position 
and subject to conflicting loyalties towards a) his parents, who try to ensure 
the continuity of the farm, and b) his spouse, who may refuse to work or 
even to live on the farm. In order to resolve this situation, a great deal of 
creativity and flexibility is demanded of all the parties involved. In a number of 
cases, a separation of the domestic domains of the senior farmers and the 
younger couple is believed to be the best solution. This implies first and 
foremost that a working consensus has to be reached about the position of 
the succeeding farmer's wife on the holding; it will eventually affect such 
things as the authority relationships between the older and the younger 
couple, the age and gender division of labour, and the incorporation of 
changing (urban) norms on labour and leisure into the existing farm 
management pattern. 
The successor intends to safeguard his parents' assistance for the years 
to come, while at the same time trying to create the conditions under which 
his wife is willing to live on (or close to) the farm. In the past, it was not 
uncommon for successors to put the continuity of the parental holding before 
marriage - hence, the many mutizarrak, or bachelor farmers, in Euskadi. The 
logical result was that upon the death of the successor the farm was often 
abandoned after all. At present, few successors would make the same 
decision. Those who try to overcome the dilemma in the way described 
above, however, need considerable ability in the management of family 
networks. 
The same ability is also needed in case the enrolment of other family 
members into the common project turns out to be problematic. In earlier 
chapters, I have gone to some length to explain that for the successor the 
labour input of his siblings, both living on and off the farm, is crucial in the 
years which follow taking over the enterprise. Their help could normally be 
taken for granted. Yet, there are indications that solidarity with the successor 
is no longer a fundamental sentiment among siblings: in a few cases, siblings 
not only dissociated themselves from the common family project but even 
actively undermined it. 
The economic and social changes in rural areas in the recent past, which 
manifested themselves in better infrastructure, decrease of the rural exodus, a 
rising living standard and the revival of social life in the villages, have at the 
same time led to a cultural break which might be characterized as countryside 
romanticism. It has caused a growing demand for rural housing, either for 
permanent residence or as weekend cottages, among urban and rural people 
alike. It is probably too early to speak of a marked tendency, but the 
indications are reason for concern for those who claim to defend the interests 
of the farming population. 
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Chapter 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this study I have explored how different types of farm households in the 
Basque province of Gipuzkoa, occupied in dairy farming, mobilize their family 
labour and external social networks so as to guarantee the realization of their 
main objectives: the satisfaction of consumption needs of the household 
members and the passing on of the family farm to the following generation. 
An important part of my ethnographic material was presented in the 
context of four chapters which followed in broad outline the categorization of 
the Basque rural sector that at the time I carried out my field research was 
still very much en vogue. However, I have argued that this apparent 'folk' 
typology - of modern, traditional and part-time farmers - had strong normative 
and ideological overtones. For most regional policy makers and agrarian 
economists, 'modern' farm enterprises represented the only valid model for 
agricultural development. As the combination of modernizing, expanding dairy 
farms and a strong dairy factory was seen as the best guarantee that, upon 
the incorporation of the region into the European Common Market, 
competition from outside could be resisted, agricultural policy throughout the 
1980s was aimed at the accelerated modernization of the dairy sector. 
Farmers who belonged to the other categories were believed to be hindering 
modernization. The farmers' union EHNE claimed to defend the small, 
marginalizing producers, but their policy was biased in favour of full-time 
farmers. Part-time farmers, by no means a small category in the Basque 
countryside, felt that their interests were ignored by virtually all institutions. 
By the end of the 1980s, however, the awareness had grown among regional 
policy makers that there might be good reasons (mainly of an ecological or 
social nature) to support not only the large-scale, modernizing enterprises, but 
to defend the maintenance of other types of holdings, as well. 
In line with the styles of farming approach, I then suggested that these 
three aforementioned categories (and a fourth: the small group of quality 
producers) can be understood as different farm practices, each having its 
own, particular logic, which offer varying but, in principle, equally valid 
responses to outside intervention. This is not to say, of course, that all farm 
enterprises are therefore equally successful. If some are more successful than 
others, this is due to differences in land and capital assets, in family 
composition (and thus in the possibility to mobilize labour), in knowledge and 
management qualities, etc. But success also depends in no small measure on 
the degree of support (or obstruction) that the agricultural policy mapped out 
for the region has to offer to different holdings - which is closely related to 
the typology on which this policy is based. In other words, if the so-called 
vanguard type of farming, the modern enterprise comprising both scale-
enlargement and intensification, has thus far proved to be successful, this has 
among other things to do with how 'success' has long been defined (i.e. as 
the creation of bigger and more intensive enterprises, increasingly 
incorporated into the food production chain) and with the institutional policy 
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which supported this definition. 
For the explanation of the economic actions of farm households, I have 
referred to Chayanov (1966), who argues that the farm family's decisions 
regarding the labour expended on farming or the technology to be adopted 
can be traced back to subjective evaluations as to the expected demand 
satisfaction versus the corresponding labour drudgery. I have suggested that 
the same may be said about the household's rationale for creating and 
mobilizing social networks. That is, external relationships - such as 
interlocking projects of the farm enterprise with other holdings, with particular 
categories of clients, or with relevant institutions - are established if the 
household esteems the resulting (subjective) equilibrium to be more favourable 
than before. 
However, while the Chayanovian subjective equilibrium figures in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7 of this study illustrate the motives at the level of the farm 
household for establishing and mobilizing interpersonal networks, they obscure 
the personal motives of the individual household members for letting 
themselves be enrolled or not into the common family project. This is why I 
have claimed that the analysis should zoom in on the individual family 
members: after all, they are not only involved in the common household 
project, but also attempt to realize their own, personal projects as much as 
possible. Siblings who have left the farm and founded a family of their own 
may still feel committed to the parental holding's survival strategy. 
Conversely, children living on the farm who find that there is too little room 
for their own projects may decide to dissociate themselves from the common 
project. Now, the rationale behind the household members' personal projects 
may also be described in terms of subjective evaluations of remuneration and 
drudgery. Yet, I have tried to make clear that at the level of individual family 
members these concepts should be understood as rather diffuse aggregates of 
other, constituent elements. Remuneration may comprise income, recognition, 
status, or personal realization, whereas labour drudgery may refer to physical 
exertion, type of work, authority relations as well as working conditions. By 
weighing all these elements against each other, household members 
eventually decide to what extent their personal projects are compatible with 
the common family project. 
In the course of this study, it has become clear that not all the members 
of the farm household have equal decision power, nor is an equivalent amount 
of labour or capital input into the farm enterprise expected from each member. 
There is a certain hierarchization, whereby the fundamental decisions with 
respect to farm management are taken by the senior couple and the successor 
(or the succeeding couple, in case he is married); they also provide most of 
the labour power and capital needed to run the holding. (Although it should be 
noted that the senior farmer normally still has the final say, as long as he has 
not retired and transferred the farm into the hands of his successor.) The 
other farm residents (brothers and sisters of the successor or an unmarried 
uncle or aunt) may have their own occupations, but they often help with the 
daily tasks that have to be done; their opinions are taken into account when 
decisions have to be made. Married and unmarried children living elsewhere 
generally help on the farm when extra labour power is needed (particularly in 
the haymaking season); they may occasionally be consulted, especially when 
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decisions are made that affect the inheritance or concern important 
investments. Schematically: 
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Figure 17. Hierarchy of decision power and mobilization of resources within 
The central locus of decisions concerning the household's strategies is the 
senior-successor axis. The senior farmers and their successor (or the 
succeeding couple) are the ones who mobilize family labour and social 
networks. Senior and successor also attempt to enrol each other into their 
respective projects, which do • not always run parallel. This becomes 
particularly evident in decisions on how to manage and continue the parental 
holding. 
The meanings the senior farmer and his successor attribute to 
remuneration and labour drudgery may diverge considerably, and so may their 
images of the future of Self (and the place of the farm therein). Both these 
meanings and the images of Self are to a large extent socially determined 
(Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969). The interactions with relevant others, be it 
directly or mentally, are of influence on these meanings and images; these 
relevant others are seldom the same for the senior farmer and his successor. 
For the former, his reference group is normally made up of the other farmers 
in the village, especially those whose holdings are comparable to his own. For 
the succeeding son, they are usually the urban youth, whose lifestyle he is 
acquainted with through his evenings out, the mass media and maybe his off-
farm work, or his rural peers, most of whom also have off-farm jobs, fixed 
wages, paid holidays, etc. The negotiations between senior and successor 
(and their respective spouses) over how the farm enterprise should be run in 
the years preceding the moment of succession, and how it should eventually 
be continued, are determined by these divergent perceptions of Self and the 
confrontation of remuneration/drudgery balances. 
The usefulness of Chayanov's model for the present sociological analysis 
of farming practices in Euskadi lies, first, in its emphasis on the importance of 
the farm family. 
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family composition and, second, in the insight that economic decisions made 
within the scope of the farm household are highly dependent on the subjective 
evaluations of the actors. It is understandable that mainstream economists 
have normally found this model difficult to accept, as subjective 
considerations are not easily expressed in quantifiable terms and do not fit in 
well with current theories that are based on notions of rational economic 
behaviour.451 I hope to have demonstrated that by introducing a sociological 
reconstruction of the Chayanovian concepts of satisfaction and labour 
drudgery, relating them to the actors' reference groups, these concepts have 
become meaningful for explaining the motives behind the actors' strategic 
behaviour. 
Let us now turn to the question of how the farm household's possibilities to 
mobilize internal and external relationships and its survival and succession 
strategies mutually determine and condition each other in practice. 
Establishing linkages with external agents in order to overcome economic 
obstacles may confront the actor with new constraints as to his future 
strategic decisions. Farm households, whether oriented to scale-enlargement, 
intensification or both, often establish institutional relationships so that certain 
tasks for which they lack the knowledge or the labour power are taken over 
by these institutions. The more these enterprises become integrated into the 
food production chain, the more their farm management becomes subject to 
external prescriptions and the more difficult it becomes for these holdings to 
break away from the treadmill of investment and expansion {Pile, 1990). 
Nevertheless, farmers who operate within the boundaries imposed upon them 
by what Benvenuti (1975, 1991) calls the Technological and Administrative 
Task Environment often completely internalize its prescriptive character, so 
much so that they may still affirm that their strategy of growth and further 
investment is entirely and exclusively theirs. 
Farmers who then meet with the limits of their possibilities for further 
development (through lack of land, overcapacity of expensive technology, 
etc.) may try to become involved in alternative networks so as to get round 
these constraints. They clean the fields of neighbouring farmers who use their 
land less intensively and can often keep the grass for free, as hay or silage 
fodder for their own cattle. Or they carry out contract-work with their 
machinery, enrolling other farmers in the area into their circle of regular 
clients. 
However, not only institutional networks condition the actions of farm 
households. Farmers who sell their non-pasteurized milk directly to consumers 
keep external institutions as much as possible at a distance. Their success is 
based on personal ties with their clients, but this also makes them highly 
dependent on their clients' consumption habits. When these change, they find 
Indeed, at a congress on Neurobehavioral Economics in Pittsburgh, in the summer of 1997, 
economists were reproached for having too exclusively built their theories on rational 
behaviour of people, while ignoring the role that instincts and emotion play in the actors' 
economic decisions. It was argued that by incorporating psychological processes into their 
models these would gain in explanatory strength. 
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it more and more difficult to safeguard the reproduction of their way of 
producing and marketing. Over the last decade, most dairy hawkers have seen 
their market decrease rapidly. The older farmers normally try to hold out until 
the moment of their retirement. Younger farmers and the successors of retired 
hawkers may attempt to switch over to milk production for the dairy factory 
or to selling fresh milk under the banner of Baserriko Esnea. Yet, we have 
seen that for these farmers, too, new links often imply new constraints. This 
step (and the same holds good for the few cooperative members who 
switched to Baserriko Esnea) normally demands extra investment in 
technology and/or expansion of livestock. It generally implies that such 
farmers, so to speak, have to make up arrears on the treadmill. External 
prescription thus tends to become even more compelling for them (the 
example of the Iturmendi farm in Section 6.4 is illustrative). 
Baserriko Esnea members are able to benefit from the best of both worlds 
as to marketing their product, shifting from direct sales to the dairy factory 
and back, according to their needs and possibilities; but at the level of 
production they are more subject to external control of the quality of their milk 
than any other category of dairy farmers. Moreover, they need great social 
and organizational skills and a high input of labour power to be successful. 
Attempts to reduce the amount of labour power needed (i.e. the search for a 
more favourable subjective equilibrium between remuneration and drudgery), 
through the routinization of production and marketing tasks, may be expected. 
I hypothesized that when this happens, competition from industrial enterprises 
becomes more likely. 
Furthermore, in the chapters on dairy hawkers and Baserriko Esnea 
members, it became clear that actors may be involved in one network for the 
purpose of creating or securing another. Hawkers who sold their milk in the 
same town would sometimes come together to discuss the prices they had to 
charge their clients; that way, competition was avoided. It also happened that 
a hawker who unexpectedly had to deliver more milk to some clients than he 
had counted on, could buy from his colleagues at a low price. Mutual 
cooperation thus favoured the stability of client networks. Eventually, when a 
hawker retired, his clients were 'redistributed' among the other farmers who 
were part of this hawker network. The Baserriko Esnea association was 
another example of a higher-order network: it was created with the objective 
of extending the networks of individual consumers to shops, restaurants and 
residences. 
I have further argued that, in discussing the decision of a successor on how to 
continue the parental holding, social and cultural factors should be an 
important focus of attention. First, there are the cultural patterns of marriage 
and inheritance which condition the successor's possibilities of enrolling the 
other household members in his project. This becomes especially relevant if he 
intends to continue the holding as a full-time enterprise. I have demonstrated 
that the tendency among people in the Basque countryside to marry relatively 
late in life has far-reaching consequences for the succeeding couple: the 
moment of succession, which normally does not take place until the senior 
farmer has fully retired, coincides with a decline of the labour power that can 
be mobilized within the family household (see Figure 9, Section 5.8). 
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Another feature is what I have termed the 'dual succession pattern'. On 
the one hand, there was the successor who, from the day he left school, had 
consciously prepared himself for his task to take over his parents' farm, and 
who could therefore be considered the most capable among his brothers and 
sisters to continue the holding. If he had a few younger siblings who still lived 
on the farm, the authority of the senior farmer and his successor normally 
guaranteed their regular collaboration in the tasks to be carried out. That way, 
the effect of the falling family labour curve at the moment of succession could 
be partially mitigated. On the other hand, it had become increasingly common 
that a holding was taken over by the son (or occasionally the daughter) who 
was the last one among the siblings to get married. As this successor was 
normally one of the youngest in the family, and thus the age gap between him 
and the senior farmer was greater, the decrease of the family labour curve 
upon succession was even more pronounced. Mitigation of its effect was in 
this case out of the question, since the other brothers and sisters had already 
left the farm. Moreover, it often happened that by the time the parents retired 
the successor had had an off-farm job for several years which he would be 
unwilling to give up. Such a farm was therefore seldom continued as a full-
time enterprise. 
The difficulty to mobilize enough family labour in the years which follow 
on succession is particularly felt on farms that are 'tied' to the treadmill of 
continuous investment, and especially if these holdings are in a disadvantaged 
position for which they have to make up. It also becomes more problematic 
for the successor to maintain the set of external relationships I referred to 
before. This social network may be instrumental in guaranteeing the 
household an acceptable income level, which in turn is necessary to continue 
to enrol family members in the common project. 
The revival of social life in the villages has brought the rural exodus of 
former decades to a halt. More than in the past, women who marry farmers' 
sons are prepared to live in the countryside; this even (or especially?) holds 
good for those with an urban background. But in more and more cases, a 
farmer's wife has her own, urban job, which she generally prefers over 
working exclusively on the farm. A successor who intends to continue his 
parents' holding as a full-time enterprise but knows he is not able to count on 
the labour input of his wife will seriously reconsider his plans. 
There are indications, however, that the revaluation of village life among 
the rural population may have consequences that are even more threatening 
for the future of the family holding than the lack of labour input of the 
farmer's wife. Thus far, the successor could normally count on the solidarity 
of his siblings who had left the farm. He had to pay each of them a part of the 
total value of the holding, but far less than an equal share; in turn, he and his 
wife would take care of his parents until their death. His brothers and sisters 
would help a little during the hay-making season or in case of illness, and at 
weekends they often came round for the sake of recreation. But now that 
living in the country or having a second, rural, dwelling are becoming ever 
more popular, some siblings seem to be inclined to demand an equal partition 
of the farm, thereby going against the regional norm of single inheritance. 
For the successor, it is quite evident that thrift and hard work are not 
enough to make succession a success. He also needs some economic and 
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legal knowledge (or access to this knowledge) and the right combination of 
authority, a flexible attitude and social skills so as to involve as many family 
members as possible in his project and reduce opposition to a minimum. The 
conclusion, in the light of the foregoing discussion, is that for many 
successors continuity of the parental holding as a full-time, productive farm is 
out of the question - and this is equally true for successors of economically 
strong enterprises. 
This is in line with my argument that successors who, over the last few 
decades, have opted for part-time farming have done so more and more 
because of social rather than of economic motives. For the good order, this is 
not to say that economic motives are no longer important for them, but it is 
rather to stress that considerations of lifestyle and social deprivation have 
become increasingly dominant, it is at this point that the sociological 
reconstruction of the Chayanovian concepts of labour drudgery and 
satisfaction (remuneration), which I referred to at the beginning of this 
chapter, is again highly relevant. Economic, technological and policy 
developments are reflected upon by the successor and weighed against the 
difficulties to mobilize enough family labour to maintain a sound, full-time farm 
enterprise. If he then compares his own situation with the lifestyle 
(consumption and leisure pattern) of the majority of his urban and rural 
contemporaries, the choice for combining an urban job with running a part-
time farm is clearly self-evident. 
Even if the starting position of a succeeding son is favourable (an 
economically viable farming business, sufficient labour power in the years to 
come), he will not always decide to continue his parents' holding on a full-
time basis. Conversely, not all farms that are continued full-time would be 
considered economically sound, according to prevailing standards. It is my 
contention that one of the reasons - and an important one at that - for a 
farmer's son to continue his parents' holding as a full-time enterprise is that 
he finds part of his personal realization in farming. Hence, we should no longer 
ask ourselves: why is it that so few successors continue the parental holding 
as a full-time, productive enterprise and become part-time or hobby farmers 
instead? The questions should rather be: Why is it that still so many farmers' 
sons - in spite of all that has been said so far - take over their parents' holding 
to become full-time farmers themselves? What economic and social strategies 
do they develop to realize their objective? And what does this mean for 
agricultural policy? 
The traditional mayorazgo principle has virtually disappeared. In the days 
when the oldest son automatically took over the farm from his parents, 
excluding the other siblings, his being the owner or tenant of a holding 
ensured a livelihood and status within the rural community. This might be 
reason enough for younger siblings as well to attempt to become farmers, for 
instance by marrying a farmer's daughter. But those days are gone, and being 
a baserritarra is no longer perceived as having status. In their discourse, 
farmers may still try to distinguish themselves from kaletarrak ('streetfolk') by 
depicting the latter in negative terms, but at the same time they attempt to 
emulate their lifestyle as much as possible. Nowadays, becoming a full-time 
farmer and accepting the sacrifices related to it has much more to do with 
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motivation, with a certain 'vocation' for farming. 
I have argued that the motivation to continue a farm enterprise on a full-
time, productive basis is not just dependent on the individual successor in 
question (and motivation or vocation should therefore not be treated as a 
residual explanatory factor), but may be organizationally, ideologically and also 
socially boosted. That is, the support of an organization like Baserriko Esnea 
or Iparlat may give a successor just the confidence he needs to 'give it a try'. 
The conviction that agriculture is not only about the creation of specialized, 
large-scale dairy farm enterprises may motivate another farmer to try 
something new, 'against all odds'. And a third one may decide to continue the 
parental holding because his wife will work with him on the farm or because 
the number of inhabitants of the village is no longer in decline and their 
children's school will not close down. 4 6 1 
Motivation may also be socially constrained. As a result of close rural-
urban contacts and under the influence of the mass media, the urban frame of 
reference has become predominant in the countryside and determines in no 
small measure farm household members' subjective evaluations of their 
consumption satisfaction and the drudgery of agricultural labour. It is true that 
labour drudgery decreases as a result of technological innovation and that 
agricultural labour is generally less monotonous than industrial work, but the 
corresponding remuneration, especially the amount of leisure, which 
household members may enjoy (in comparison with their urban peers), 
frequently remains such an important bottleneck that it may easily influence 
the potential successor's motivation negatively. 
And also the fact that young women today are more inclined to negotiate 
the conditions under which they would be willing to marry a farmers' son can 
be regarded as a social factor influencing the successor's motivation. At 
present, few succeeding sons would be willing to continue the holding as a 
bachelor; yet, marrying a woman with 'urban' wishes inevitably affects their 
farm management. This woman will probably make higher demands on the 
family's style of living than farmers' wives of former generations. But these 
demands may still run parallel to her husband's own preferences. It becomes 
more difficult if she does not want to do any farmwork, for instance, because 
she has a job of her own which she does not want to give up upon marriage. 
It forces the successor to rethink his strategy, in order to get round this loss 
of labour power on which he might implicitly have counted. If, on the other 
hand, her income contributes to the total family budget, as is normally the 
case, the farmer is probably able to invest more money in the purchase of 
labour-saving machinery than he had initially calculated, thus (partially) 
parrying the consequences of labour shortage. Nevertheless, many successors 
may take up an off-farm job themselves (if they did not already have one) and 
continue the parental enterprise as a part-time or hobby farm, considering this 
an easier way to reconcile preferences they find difficult to match otherwise. 
But vocation may have negative overtones, as well; Mak (1996) describes how even suicide 
and maltreatment of wife and children may be the result when farmers try to hold out under 
adverse conditions. 
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Empirical indications as well as theoretical considerations point to an 
expansion of the category of part-time farmers in Euskadi, both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of the total farming population. Since this type of 
farming is becoming more and more dominant in the Basque countryside, it 
can no longer be regarded as a residual category. 
Marxist authors have normally regarded part-time farming as a further step 
towards proletarianization of farm households. This fits in with the general 
idea, based on Kautsky (1987) and Lenin (1956), that the evolution of the 
farming sector will not differ much from that of industry, in other words, that 
eventually a differentiation will take place between capitalist holdings on the 
one hand and a rural proletariat on the other. Conversely, Neo-Populists, who 
mainly follow Chayanov's work4 7 1, have normally predicted the maintenance 
of family farm enterprises - arguing (one) that agriculture is too insecure a 
business for the large-scale penetration of capital and (two) that the farm 
household is functional within capitalist society, due to the self-exploitation of 
its members (cf. Shanin, 1988). The debate was at times more dominated by 
exegesis than by scientific arguments, though (Jorion, 1984: 71). 
In both theoretical approaches, structural factors come to the fore as 
determining either the disappearance or the survival of family farming. Farm 
households do not appear as agents that are capable of shaping their own 
future. From my own analysis, in which strategic actions of farm households 
are central, a different picture emerges. The reducing category of full-time 
dairy farmers, the gradual disappearance of hawkers, the growing number of 
quality producers, the continuous increase of the part-time sector - they are all 
indications of a changing composition of the rural population. But these 
changes do not seem to attend the disappearance of certain categories of 
farmers from the peasantry. It would thus be incorrect to interpret part-time 
farming, for instance, as the prior stage to proletarianization. Part-time 
farming might also be regarded as the attempt of small farmers to counter 
their full proletarianization and stay at least partially in farming (cf. 
Greenwood, 1976).481 If farmers who take an outside job do not give up 
their holding, this may be, of course, so as to have something to fall back on 
in case times get worse, but also because they owe part of their identity to 
being a farmer. 
Zurek (1986) states that, in disadvantaged rural areas in developed 
societies, part-time agriculture may be the only long-term solution. This idea is 
endorsed through Mendras' analysis of rural development in France (Mendras, 
1987). The situation in the Netherlands suggests that we might even put it in 
more general terms: in agriculturally developed countries, it seems that 
reproduction of the holding through economic diversification is becoming the 
For a discussion on the qualification of Chayanov as a (Neo-)Populist, see Shanin (1988: 159 
ff.). 
The importance of the existence of labour alternatives outside farming for the maintenance 
of a great number of family farms becomes evident if we compare Euskadi with, for example, 
the north of Portugal where industrial employment is much harder to find in the rural areas, 
and where consequently many small-scale holdings are being abandoned (Brouwer, 1995). 
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dominant tendency; this diversification can take on various forms of which 
part-time farming is one (cf. de Vries, 1995). 
However, the former conclusion does not appear to be applicable to the 
Basque Country. Diversification of activities within a farm household is 
unlikely if it is difficult to mobilize enough family labour (or if the main activity 
demands a high labour input, as we saw in Chapter 7). Lack of sufficient 
labour power on the farm is indeed one of the reasons why a full-time farmer 
may decide to reduce his farming activities to a minimum and take up an off-
farm job. But diversification does exist at the level of the dairy sector as a 
whole. And from the changing composition of the farming population we may 
deduce that diversification itself is in a process of transformation. Again, this 
would make further research in the tradition of the styles of farming approach 
highly relevant. 
I have already hinted that the four categories mentioned in Part II should 
not be regarded as the most adequately defined nor the only existing farming 
styles in the Basque countryside. Research would be able to bring out those 
styles of farming which are specific for Euskadi, to be differentiated according 
to criteria of regional relevance. Such research should ideally have a 
longitudinal character so that possible evolutions among and within farming 
styles can be discerned. Furthermore, this research should not only focus on 
farm households, but should also highlight the relationships among individual 
household members, especially the interface between senior farmers and their 
successors, for it is at this level that decisions are made about the projects to 
be developed. 
This way, we may avoid developing agricultural policies which, on the 
basis of taken-for-granted criteria such as 'modernization' and 
'competitiveness', not only distinguish between, but also actively create, first-
rate and second-rate farmers. The latter group would comprise most part-time 
farmers and those who operate outside the relevant food producing industries 
and administrative institutions. It would mean that many farmers who have 
managed to hold out for years without any appreciable support or even faced 
with important constraints (those who in general may be assumed to have the 
necessary vocation for farming) are then disqualified as technologically and 
economically inefficient - and only allowed to stay in farming because of the 
social and ecological functions they are believed to fulfil for the sector as a 
whole. 
The so-called Strategic Plan for the rural sector, which the Basque 
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries brought out in the beginning of the 
1990s, still stipulated that priority had to be given to supporting "potentially 
competitive family farming" and fostering "greater specialization for the sake 
of (achieving) major technico-economic efficiency". But at the same time it 
was recognized that agricultural policy should support - instead of simply 
tolerate - part-time farming ("insofar as it helps keeping rural areas alive") and 
holdings that complement agriculture with other economic activities (such as 
rural tourism). In the context of the European programmes 5b and Leader on 
behalf of the socio-economic revival of rural areas, it would be extremely 
interesting to investigate the matrix of interferences of this new, two-edged, 
regional policy with the divergent farm household strategies which emerge 
from the styles of farming analysis advocated above. 
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After all, as long as there are farm households designing strategies for 
survival and succession and institutional policies that interfere with them, 
there will be agricultural development requiring sociological research. In line 
with the present study, we may conclude that this research will only be 
carried out if researchers are able to ask the relevant questions and through 
their academic (and other) networks manage to mobilize the resources which 
allow them to search for answers. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Arbeid, Netwerken en Levensstijlen - overlevings- en overnamestrategieen van 
boerenhuishoudens in Baskenland. 
Op 1 januari 1986 werd Spanje lid van de Europese Gemeenschap. De 
verwachting was dat de toetreding vooral negatieve gevolgen zou hebben 
voor de melkveehouderij in de noordelijke regio's (stagnerende melkprijzen, 
toenemende concurrentie vanuit Noord-Europa). In Baskenland was het beleid 
van het ministerie van landbouw en visserij van de autonome deelregering 
gedurende de jaren tachtig gericht op een versneide modernisering van de 
melkveebedrijven, opdat deze in de concurrentiestrijd met de Noord-Europese 
zuivelsector niet ten onder zouden gaan. Baskische melkveehouders volgden 
uiteenlopende strategieen teneinde de reproductie van hun gezinsbedrijven te 
verzekeren: een kleine meerderheid leverde de produktie uitsluitend aan een 
zuivelcoöperatie, daarnaast ventte een aanzienlijk percentage boeren dagelijks 
persoonlijk hun (rauwe) melk uit aan urbane dienten, enkelen legden zieh toe 
op het verkrijgen van een officieel kwaliteitskeurmerk voor hun 
ongepasteuriseerde melk, en velen hadden naast hun boerenbedrijf een baan 
buiten de sector. Het regionale landbouwbeleid was ontegenzeglijk 'biased' 
ten gunste van de zuivelindustrie en de grotere, moderniserende 
boerenbedrijven. 
In deze Studie worden de genoemde strategieen beschouwd als in principe 
even valide stelsels van boerenpraktijken. Er wordt onderzocht op welke 
wijzen de verschillende boerenbedrijven hun gezinsarbeid en externe netwer-
ken mobiliseren teneinde vorm te geven aan deze strategieen, in het bijzonder 
voor zover deze gericht zijn op de overname van het bedrijf. Voor een verkla-
ring van het economische handelen van het boerenhuishouden wordt terugge-
grepen op Chayanov's model van de gezinslandbouw. Dit model stelt onder-
meer de gezinssamenstelling en de binnen het gezin gemaakte subjectieve 
afweging van (het marginaal nut van) inkomen en de geleverde arbeid cen-
traal. Individuele gezinsleden zijn niet alleen betrokken bij de gemeenschappe-
lijke bedrijfsstrategie, maar zullen ook hun persoonlijke projecten trachten te 
verwezenlijken. Ik heb betoogd dat de rationale achter hun persoonlijke 
projecten evenzeer begrepen kan worden in termen van subjectieve afwe-
gingen van beloning en arbeidsinzet (of moeite; datgene wat bij Chayanov 
'labour drudgery' heet). In het onderzoek is er met name aandacht voor de 
relatie tussen het oudere boerenechtpaar en hun opvolger (eventueel met 
partner). Binnen deze relatie worden de belangrijkste beslissingen genomen en 
worden gezinsarbeid, kapitaal en externe netwerken gemobiiiseerd. In dit 
verband heb ik een sociologische reconstruetie van de begrippen beloning en 
moeite ge'fntroduceerd door deze te relateren aan de voor de actoren relevante 
referentiegroepen. 
Het voornaamste referentiekader voor de oudere boeren wordt gevormd 
door de betekenis van het boerenbedrijf en de agrarische arbeid binnen de 
rurale samenleving. Hun potentiele opvolgers, daarentegen, spiegelen zieh veel 
meer aan de levensstijl van de meesten van hun urbane leeftijdsgenoten: jonge 
mannen en vrouwen met een (redelijk) vaste baan, een zeker (en jaarlijks 
stijgend) inkomen, een zeer acceptabel consumptieniveau en betaalde vakan-
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ties. Deze geheel andere perceptie van de eigen situatie onder jonge boeren, 
van de eigen plaats in de samenleving en daaraan gerelateerd de toekomst van 
de boerderij, heeft enerzijds gevolgen voor hun opvattingen over hoe een 
agrarische bedrijf gerund moet worden (welke soms conflicteren met die van 
hun ouders), maar vooral ook voor de wijze waarop zij tegen de bedrijf so ver-
name aankijken. Deze Studie toont aan dat opvolgers, in het spanningsveld 
tussen de eigen gezinssamenstelling, het persoonlijke referentiekader, netwer-
ken en sociaal-culturele factoren, de te mobiliseren gezinsarbeid op het 
moment van bedrijfsovername veelal als een sterk beperkende factor zullen 
ervaren. 
Hoe meer een boerenbedrijf geïntegreerd is in een institutioneel netwerk 
(van vermarktingscoöperaties, banken, landbouwvoorlichting, etc.), des te 
sterker wordt de bedrijf s voering doorgaans voorgeschreven, genormeerd, 
vanuit die instituties. De consequentie is dat het gezinsbedrijf wordt opgeno-
men in wat wel aangeduid wordt als de tredmolen van voortgaande investe-
ring en uitbreiding. In de Baskische berglandbouw stuiten moderniserende 
boeren al snel op de grenzen aan de schaalvergroting en mechanisering; door 
andere agrariërs in en rond het dorp in hun strategieën te betrekken weten 
sommigen evenwel grond- en machinegebruik te optimaliseren. 
Venters van niet-gepasteuriseerde melk, die als gevolg van het ontmoedi-
gingsbeleid van de regionale overheid en van veranderende consumenten-
voorkeur hun klantennetwerken uiteen zien vallen, kunnen trachten econo-
misch te overleven door hun melk voortaan aan de zuivelcoöperatie te leveren. 
Sommige venters en een enkel coöperatielid stappen over op de verkoop van 
als 'kwaliteitsprodukt' geafficheerde, want door erkende instanties gecontro-
leerde, rauwe melk. Door deze overstap krijgen zij te maken met alternatieve 
tredmolens waarbij zij bovendien veelal een achterstand hebben in te lopen qp 
degenen die hier al langer in meedraaien. 
Een aantal sociale en culturele factoren zijn van invloed op hoe potentiële 
opvolgers, in het licht van het voorgaande, tegen de overname van het ouder-
lijke bedrijf aankijken. Van oudsher gaat de boerderij ongedeeld over in handen 
van de oudste zoon. In recentere jaren heeft dit ma/orazflro-principe plaats-
gemaakt voor een tweevoudig verervingspatroon: sommige bedrijven worden 
voortgezet door de meest geschikte en gemotiveerde zoon of dochter, in 
andere gevallen is het degene die het laatst trouwt, die op de boerderij blijft 
wonen. Belangrijk is bovenal dat huwelijken op het Baskische platteland 
gewoonlijk op vrij late leeftijd plaatsvinden: de consequentie is dat de door de 
opvolger te mobiliseren gezinsarbeid daalt rond het moment van overname en 
de eerstvolgende twee decennia laag blijft (doordat de arbeidscapaciteit van 
de ouders van de opvolger terugloopt, terwijl die van zijn kinderen nog 
verwaarloosbaar is). Indien een der oudere kinderen het bedrijf voortzet en er 
derhalve vaak nog jongere broers en zusters inwonend zijn, kan het dreigende 
tekort aan arbeid wellicht een aantal jaren worden uitgesteld. Wordt de 
boerderij overgenomen door het laatste kind dat trouwt, dan is de 
leeftijdskloof tussen ouders en opvolgers vaak alleen maar groter en is voorts 
de overbrugging van het arbeidstekort niet aan de orde. Mijn veronderstelling 
is dat het effect van de neergaande arbeidscurve in het bijzonder voelbaar zal 
zijn op de bedrijven die in de genoemde tredmolen van voortgaande moder-
niseringen zitten en dan vooral wanneer zij bovendien een achterstand hebben 
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in te lopen. Enerzijds is in de bergachtige gebieden van Gipuzkoa net werk op 
het land slechts tot op zekere hoogte te mechaniseren; anderzijds is het door 
de afname van arbeidskrachten binnen het gezin problematisch de institu-
tionele en sociale netwerken in stand te houden die de uitbreiding mogelijk 
hebben gemaakt. 
In tegenstelling tot wat vroeger zeer gebruikelijk was, stellen de huidige 
opvolgers van landbouwbedrijven het vinden van een geschikte partner door-
gaans boven de overname en voortzetting van de boerderij. Door de weder-
opleving van het dorpsleven in streken die tot voor kort nog bedreigd werden 
door een massale uittocht van inwoners is het voor hen bovendien minder pro-
blematisch een partner te vinden dan in het verleden. De rol van de vrouw als 
echtgenote van een boer is tezelfdertijd echter danig veranderd. Het komt 
steeds vaker voor dat partners van bedrijfsopvolgers een eigen baan hebben 
die zij niet zomaar opgeven om op de boerderij mee te werken. Menigeen 
heeft zelfs geen rurale achtergrond. De autoriteit van de schoonouders in de 
huiselijke en de bedrijfssfeer wordt ook minder vanzelfsprekend door hen 
geaccepteerd. Een opvolger zal voor deze Problemen oplossingen moeten 
vinden die door alle partijen geaccepteerd worden. Het ontbreken van de 
arbeid van zijn partner versterkt het effect van de neergaande curve van te 
mobiliseren gezinsarbeid nog eens. Anderzijds kan haar inkomen ook een niet 
te verwaarlozen financiele ondersteuning betekenen voor de reproductie van 
het bedrijf. 
Het grootste gevaar voor de voortzetting van het gezinsbedrijf ligt evenwel 
in het doorbreken van het patroon van ongedeelde vererving. Nu het hebben 
van een (tweede) woning op het platteland populairder wordt, eisen broers en 
zusters van de beoogde bedrijfsopvolger soms ook een evenredig deel van de 
bij de boerderij behorende grond op om er een eigen huis op te bouwen. 
Deze tendensen, bezien tegen de achtergrond van de aspiratie van veel 
opvolgers naar een meer urbane levensstijl (qua consumptieniveau en vrije 
tijd), maken de groeiende voorkeur voor part-time farming begrijpelijk; deze 
voorkeur is in de loop der tijd meer ingegeven door sociale dan door 
economische motieven. Ik heb gesteld dat de vraag waarom zo weinig opvol-
gers het ouderlijk bedrijf full-time voortzetten nauwelijk relevant meer is. We 
zouden ons veeleer moeten afvragen waarom - ondanks alles wat hiervoor 
gezegd is - nog zovelen bereid zijn full-time melkveehouder te worden, welke 
economische en sociale strategieen zij daartoe ontwikkelen en hoe het 
landbouwbeleid hierop kan inspringen. Ik heb gesuggereerd dat de motivatie 
van de opvolgers, welke ideologisch, organisationeel of sociaal bepaald kan 
zijn, een voorname factor is bij de keuze voor full-time voortzetting van het 
bedrijf. 
De laatste jaren voert het regionale ministerie van landbouw een gediffe-
rentieerd beleid, mede onder invloed van Europese richtlijnen: enerzijds is dat 
gericht op actieve steun aan moderniserende, 'concurrerende', boerenbedrij-
ven, anderzijds is er, om sociale en ecologische redenen, ook meer aandacht 
voor part-time en 'marginalere' bedrijven. Nog immer wordt er echter, zij het 
op minder expliciete wijze dan voorheen, een tweedeling aangebracht tussen 
'economisch rationele' versus 'minder levensvatbare' bedrijven - waardoor er 
voorbij gegaan wordt aan de mogelijkheid dat jonge, gemotiveerde boeren ook 
levensvatbare strategieen kunnen ontwikkelen op als part-time of marginaal 
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gedefinieerde bedrijven. Ik pleit voor een categorisering (in de lijn van de 
Wageningse bedrijfsstijlenstudies) welke deze tweedeling overstijgt. 
Onderzoek zou vervolgens licht kunnen werpen op de interferentie van het 
regionale landbouwbeleid met de binnen de Baskische melkveehouderij 
werkelijk relevante bedrijfsstijlen. 
* * * 
178 
RESUMEN 
Trabajo, Redes Sociales y Estilos de Vida - estrategias de supervivencia y 
sucesion de familias agrarias en el Pais Vasco. 
El 1 de enero de 1986, Espafia se incorporö a la Comunidad Europea. Se 
prevefa que la adhesion tuviera consecuencias sobre todo negativas para las 
ganaderfas de leche en las regiones del norte de la penfnsula. Durante los anos 
80, el Departamento de Agricultura y Pesca del Gobierno Autönomo del Pafs 
Vasco llevö a cabo una polftica de modemizaciön acelerada de las 
explotaciones agrarias (denominadas 'caserfos' o 'baserriak' en la region 
misma), con el fin de que estas no se hundieran frente a la competencia de 
otras partes de Europa. Los ganaderos vascos segufan estrategias diferentes 
para garantizar la reproducciön de sus explotaciones familiäres: una pequena 
mayorfa comercializaba la production entera a traves de una cooperativa 
lechera, un porcentaje considerable vendfa la leche cruda personalmente a una 
clientela urbana, un grupo reducido se dedicaba a obtener un label de calidad, 
reconocido oficialmente, para su leche no pasterizada, y muchos caseros 
combinaban su explotaciön con un empleo fuera del sector. La polftica 
regional agraria favoreciö principalmente la industria lechera y las 
explotaciones agrarias modernas. 
En este estudio, consideramos las estrategias mencionadas como sistemas 
de präcticas ganaderas que en principio son igualmente välidos. Se investiga 
la manera en que las distintas explotaciones de leche en la provincia de 
Gipuzkoa mobilizan la mano de obra familiar y las redes sociales para dar 
forma a estas estrategias, y en especial a aquellas dirigidas a la sucesiön de 
las granjas en cuestiön. Para comprender las actuaciones econömicas de la 
familia granjera nos referimos al modelo de agricultura familiar de Chayanov. 
Este modelo resalta la importancia de la composition familiar y la evaluaciön 
subjetiva que la familia hace de (la utilidad marginal de) los ingresos y el 
trabajo correspondiente. Los miembros individuates de la familia no solo estän 
comprometidos con la estrategia empresarial comun, sino que intentarän 
tambien realizar sus proyectos personales. Hemos argumentado que la 
racionalidad que hay deträs de sus proyectos personales se puede comprender 
igualmente en termino de evaluaciones subjetivas de remuneration y esfuerzo 
(es decir, lo que Chayanov denomina 'labour drudgery'). La atenciön en este 
estudio se centra en la relaciön entre la pareja mayor y su sucesor (con su 
cönyuge). En esta relaciön se toman las decisiones mäs importantes y se 
mobilizan la mano de obra familiar, el capital y las redes externas. Es en este 
contexto que hemos introducido una reconstrucciön sociolögica de los 
conceptos remuneraciön y esfuerzo, relacionändolos con los grupos de 
referencia mäs relevantes para los actores. 
El marco de referencia mäs significativo para los caseros mayores estä 
formado por el significado de la explotaciön ganadera y el trabajo agrfcola 
dentro de la comunidad rural. Para los sucesores, en cambio, es mucho mäs el 
estilo de vida de la mayorfa de sus contemporäneos urbanos: hombres y 
mujeres jövenes con un puesto de trabajo (mäs o menos) fijo, unos ingresos 
seguros (y crecientes anualmente), un nivel de consumo muy aceptable y unas 
vacaciones pagadas. Esta percepciön totalmente diferente por parte de los 
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ganaderos j(5venes de su propia situaci6n, de su lugar en la sociedad y del 
futuro de su caserfo, tiene consecuencias, por un lado, en sus opiniones sobre 
el modo en que se debe llevar una explotaci6n agraria (opiniones que pueden 
chocar con las de sus padres), y por otro, en la manera en que consideran la 
sucesi6n de la explotacibn. Este estudio demuestra que, en el entramado de la 
composici6n familiar, el marco de referencia personal, las redes sociales y los 
factores socio-culturales, la evaluaci6n de los sucesores seri en muchas 
ocasiones que la mano de obra mobilizable en el momento de la sucesi6n, y en 
los afios siguientes, es un factor restrictivo. 
Cuanto mas integrada est6 una explotaci6n agraria en una red institucional 
(de cooperativas de comercializaci6n, bancos, extension agraria, etc.), tanto 
mas estas instituciones suelen prescribir la gesti6n de la explotacitin. El 
resultado es que la explotacion familiar entra en un cfrculo vicioso de 
inversiones y expansion. En la zonas de montana del Pafs Vasco, los 
ganaderos en vfas de modernizaci6n se encuentran pronto con los Ifmites a 
sus posibilidades de ampliar y mecanizar; algunos, sin embargo, consiguen 
rendir 6ptimo el uso de la maquinaria y de las tierras disponibles al implicar en 
sus propias estrategias a otros agricultores del pueblo y los alrededores. 
Hay vendedores ambulantes de leche cruda, cuyas redes de clientes se 
desintegran a consecuencia de los cambios en las preferencias de los 
consumidores asf como de una polftica restrictiva de la administraci6n 
regional, que tratan de sobrevivir econdmicamente entregando el producto a la 
cooperativa lechera. Otros vendedores y algunos miembros de la cooperativa 
empiezan a dedicarse a la produccidn y venta de leche no pasterizada con 
registro de sanidad, leche controlada por instituciones reconocidas. A rafz de 
estos cambios, los ganaderos suelen entrar en unos cfrculos viciosos de 
inversion alternativos, donde ademas deben compensar el retraso que tienen 
con respecto a los que ya llevan mds tiempo. 
Como factores sociales y culturales que influyen sobre las decisiones de 
los sucesores a la hora de continuar la explotaci6n de los padres (es decir, 
factores relevantes en el contexto de lo anteriormente expuesto) podemos 
mencionar los siguientes. Tradicionalmente el hijo mayor era el heredero 
exclusivo del caserfo, pero en afios mas recientes el mayorazgo ha cedido ante 
un sistema de herencia doble: en algunos casos es el hijo (o la hija) mas capaz 
y motivado el que continua la explotaci6n, en otros es el ultimo de los hijos en 
casarse el que se queda a vivir en el caserfo. Lo mas importante es que los 
matrimonios en las zonas rurales del Pafs Vasco suelen establecerse a una 
edad tardfa. Como consecuencia, la mano de obra familiar que el sucesor 
puede mobilizar disminuye alrededor del momento de la sucesidn y se 
mantiene a un nivel bajo durante los veinte anos siguientes (puesto que la 
capacidad de trabajo de los padres del sucesor disminuye, en tanto que aun 
no puede contar con la de sus hijos). En el caso de que uno de los hijos 
mayores continue la explotacidn y sus hermanos menores sigan viviendo en el 
caserfo, la falta de mano de obra puede verse atenuada o aplazada por unos 
afios. Pero si el ultimo hijo en casarse hereda el caserfo, la diferencia de edad 
entre los padres y el sucesor es a menudo aun mayor, mientras que la 
posibilidad de compensar la falta de mano de obra no existe (puesto que los 
hermanos mayores ya han salido de casa para fundar sus propias familias). 
Segun mi hipotesis, la disminuci6n de la mano de obra se notary 
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especialmente en las explotaciones atrapadas en el cfrculo vicioso de 
modernizaciones progresivas, y en particular si estas llevan un retraso que 
deben recuperar, con respecto a los demés. Hay que tener en cuenta que la 
mecanizaciön de los trabajos del campo tiene un Ifmite en las zonas 
montanosas de Gipuzkoa. Ademâs, la reduction del numéro de miembros 
familiäres dificulta el mantenimiento de las redes institucionales y sociales que 
habfan facilitado la expansion. 
Contrariamente a lo que solfa pasar en tiempos anteriores, actualmente la 
mayorfa de los sucesores de explotaciones agrarias valoran mes el encontrar 
una pareja adecuada, por encima de la herencia y continuation del caserfo. 
Ademés, a rafz de la revitalizaciôn de los pueblos rurales, que hace poco 
todavfa eran amenazados por el éxodo de sus habitantes, les résulta menos 
diffcil que antes encontrar una cönyuge. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, el 
papel de la mujer como esposa del ganadero ha cambiado considerablemente. 
Es cada vez mes frecuente que la mujer de un ganadero joven tenga su propio 
trabajo, trabajo al que no esté dispuesta a renunciar para ayudar a su marido 
en el caserfo. Y tampoco acepta con la misma facilidad que las generaciones 
anteriores la autoridad de los suegros en las esferas doméstica y laboral. Para 
hacer frente a estos problemas, el sucesor tendre que encontrar soluciones 
aceptables para todos los implicados. La carencia de la ayuda de su esposa 
refuerza una vez mes el efecto de la disminuciôn de la mano de obra familiar 
que el sucesor es capaz de mobilizar. Por otro lado, los ingresos de la esposa 
también pueden significar apoyo financiero para la reproduction de la 
explotaciôn. 
El mayor peligro para la continuation de la explotaciôn familiar proviene 
del derrumbamiento del principio de herencia ûnïca e indivisible. Ahora que se 
esté haciendo popular el tener una (segunda) vivienda en el campo, hay casos 
en que los hermanos del supuesto sucesor exigen su parte proporcional de las 
tierras para poder construir su propia casa. 
Considerando estas tendencias, y teniendo en cuenta que los sucesores 
en su mayorfa aspiran a emular un estilo de vida mes 'urbano' (en cuanto al 
nivel de consumo y tiempo libre), es comprensible que aumente la preferencia 
por la agricultura a tiempo parcial. En las ultimas décadas los motivos ocultos 
detrés de esta preferencia se han ido desplazando cada vez mes de lo 
econômico hacia lo social. El por que hay tan pocos sucesores dispuestos a 
continuar con dedication exclusiva la explotaciôn de los padres es una 
pregunta ya apenas relevante. Tendremos que preguntarnos mes bien por que 
todavfa quedan tantos sucesores - a pesar de todo lo dicho anteriormente -
dispuestos a seguir como ganaderos de lèche a tiempo total, asf como que 
estrategias econômicas y sociales desarrollan para realizar su objetivo, y que 
significa todo esto para la polftica agraria. Hemos sugerido que la motivation 
del sucesor, incentivada desde lo ideolögico, lo organizativo o lo social, 
constituye un factor de importancia para elegir el trabajo a tiempo total. 
En los Ultimos anos, el Departamento de Agricultura del Gobierno Vasco 
sigue una polftica diferenciada, influfda también por los reglamentos europeos: 
por un lado, se apoyan de forma activa las explotaciones agrarias modernas y 
'competitivas', por otro lado, y principalmente por razones ecolôgicas y 
sociales, se presta mes atenciôn a los caserfos 'marginales' y a tiempo parcial. 
Sin embargo, de esta forma, aunque menos explfcitamente que antes, se 
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siguen dicriminando las explotaciones econ6micamente racionales de las 
supuestamente no viables. Pero este enfoque ignora la posibilidad de que 
jdvenes ganaderos motivados pueden desarrollar estrategias viables aun en el 
seno de explotaciones definidas como marginales o a tiempo parcial. 
Defendemos una categorizaci6n que va mas alia de esta dicotomfa (de 
acuerdo con los estudios sociol6gicos llevados a cabo en Wageningen acerca 
de los 'styles of farming'). Otras investigaciones podrfan dilucidar a 
continuation la interferencia de la polftica agraria regional con las distintas 
categorfas de explotaciones relevantes dentro de la ganaderfa vasca. 
* • * 
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